Tag: Sources of law

  • Treaty

    A treaty is a formal, legally binding written agreement between sovereign states and/or international organizations that is governed by international law. A treaty may also be known as an international agreement, protocol, covenant, convention, pact, or exchange of letters, among other terms; however, only documents that are legally binding on the parties are considered treaties under international law. Treaties may be bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral (involving more than two countries).

    Treaties are among the earliest manifestations of international relations; the first known example is a border agreement between the Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma around 3100 BC. International agreements were used in some form by most major civilizations and became increasingly common and more sophisticated during the early modern era. The early 19th century saw developments in diplomacy, foreign policy, and international law reflected by the widespread use of treaties. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) codified these practices and established rules and guidelines for creating, amending, interpreting, and terminating treaties, and for resolving disputes and alleged breaches.

    Treaties are roughly analogous to contracts in that they establish the rights and binding obligations of the parties. They vary in their obligations (the extent to which states are bound to the rules), precision (the extent to which the rules are unambiguous), and delegation (the extent to which third parties have authority to interpret, apply and make rules). Treaties can take many forms and govern a wide range of subject matters, such as security, trade, environment, and human rights; they may also be used to establish international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, for which they often provide a governing framework. Treaties serve as primary sources of international law and have codified or established most international legal principles since the early 20th century. In contrast with other sources of international law, such as customary international law, treaties are only binding on the parties that have signed and ratified them.

    Notwithstanding the VCLT and customary international law, treaties are not required to follow any standard form, and differ widely in substance and complexity. Nevertheless, all valid treaties must comply with the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda (Latin: “agreements must be kept”), under which parties are committed to perform their duties and honor their agreements in good faith. A treaty may also be invalidated, and thus rendered unenforceable, if it violates a preemptory norm (jus cogens), such as permitting a war of aggression or crimes against humanity.

    A treaty is an official, express written agreement that states use to legally bind themselves. It is also the objective outcome of a ceremonial occasion that acknowledges the parties and their defined relationships. There is no prerequisite of academic accreditation or cross-professional contextual knowledge required to publish a treaty.

    However, since the late 19th century, most treaties have followed a fairly consistent format. A treaty typically begins with a preamble describing the “High Contracting Parties” and their shared objectives in executing the treaty, as well as summarizing any underlying events (such as the aftermath of a war in the case of a peace treaty). Modern preambles are sometimes structured as a single very long sentence formatted into multiple paragraphs for readability, in which each of the paragraphs begins with a gerund (desiring, recognizing, having, etc.).

    The High Contracting Parties—referred to as either the official title of the head of state (but not including the personal name), e.g. His Majesty The King of X or His Excellency The President of Y, or alternatively in the form of ” Government of Z”—are enumerated, along with the full names and titles of their plenipotentiary representatives; a boilerplate clause describes how each party’s representatives have communicated (or exchanged) their “full powers” (i.e., the official documents appointing them to act on behalf of their respective high contracting party) and found them in good or proper form. However, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties if the representative is the head of state, head of government or minister of foreign affairs, no special document is needed, as holding such high office is sufficient.

    The end of the preamble and the start of the actual agreement is often signaled by the words “have agreed as follows”.

    After the preamble comes numbered articles, which contain the substance of the parties’ actual agreement. Each article heading usually encompasses a paragraph. A long treaty may further group articles under chapter headings.

    Modern treaties, regardless of subject matter, usually contain articles governing where the final authentic copies of the treaty will be deposited and how any subsequent disputes as to their interpretation will be peacefully resolved.

    The end of a treaty, the eschatocol (or closing protocol), is often signaled by language such as “in witness whereof” or “in faith whereof”, followed by the words “DONE at”, then the site(s) of the treaty’s execution and the date(s) of its execution. The date is typically written in its most formal, non-numerical form; for example, the Charter of the United Nations reads “DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five”. If applicable, a treaty will note that it is executed in multiple copies in different languages, with a stipulation that the versions in different languages are equally authentic.

    The signatures of the parties’ representatives follow at the very end. When the text of a treaty is later reprinted, such as in a collection of treaties currently in effect, an editor will often append the dates on which the respective parties ratified the treaty and on which it came into effect for each party.

    Bilateral treaties are concluded between two states or entities. It is possible for a bilateral treaty to have more than two parties; for example, each of the bilateral treaties between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) has seventeen parties: The parties are divided into two groups, the Swiss (“on the one part”) and the EU and its member states (“on the other part”). The treaty establishes rights and obligations between the Swiss and the EU and the member states severally—it does not establish any rights and obligations amongst the EU and its member states.

    A multilateral treaty is concluded among several countries, establishing rights and obligations between each party and every other party. Multilateral treaties may be regional or may involve states across the world. Treaties of “mutual guarantee” are international compacts, e.g., the Treaty of Locarno which guarantees each signatory against attack from another.

    The United Nations has extensive power to convene states to enact large-scale multilateral treaties and has experience doing so. Under the United Nations Charter, which is itself a treaty, treaties must be registered with the UN to be invoked before it, or enforced in its judiciary organ, the International Court of Justice. This was done to prevent the practice of secret treaties, which proliferated in the 19th and 20th centuries and often precipitated or exacerbated conflict. Article 103 of the Charter also states that its members’ obligations under the Charter outweigh any competing obligations under other treaties.

    After their adoption, treaties, as well as their amendments, must follow the official legal procedures of the United Nations, as applied by the Office of Legal Affairs, including signature, ratification and entry into force.

    In function and effectiveness, the UN has been compared to the United States federal government under the Articles of Confederation.

    Reservations are essentially caveats to a state’s acceptance of a treaty. Reservations are unilateral statements purporting to exclude or to modify the legal obligation and its effects on the reserving state. These must be included at the time of signing or ratification, i.e., “a party cannot add a reservation after it has already joined a treaty”. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties in 1969.

    Originally, international law was unaccepting of treaty reservations, rejecting them unless all parties to the treaty accepted the same reservations. However, in the interest of encouraging the largest number of states to join treaties, a more permissive rule regarding reservations has emerged. While some treaties still expressly forbid any reservations, they are now generally permitted to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the treaty.

    When a state limits its treaty obligations through reservations, other states party to that treaty have the option to accept those reservations, object to them, or object and oppose them. If the state accepts them (or fails to act at all), both the reserving state and the accepting state are relieved of the reserved legal obligation as concerns their legal obligations to each other (accepting the reservation does not change the accepting state’s legal obligations as concerns other parties to the treaty). If the state opposes, the parts of the treaty affected by the reservation drop out completely and no longer create any legal obligations on the reserving and accepting state, again only as concerns each other. Finally, if the state objects and opposes, there are no legal obligations under that treaty between those two state parties whatsoever. The objecting and opposing state essentially refuses to acknowledge the reserving state is a party to the treaty at all.

    There are three ways an existing treaty can be amended. First, a formal amendment requires State parties to the treaty to go through the ratification process all over again. The re-negotiation of treaty provisions can be long and protracted, and often some parties to the original treaty will not become parties to the amended treaty. When determining the legal obligations of states, one party to the original treaty and one party to the amended treaty, the states will only be bound by the terms they both agreed upon. Treaties can also be amended informally by the treaty executive council when the changes are only procedural, technical change in customary international law can also amend a treaty, where state behavior evinces a new interpretation of the legal obligations under the treaty. Minor corrections to a treaty may be adopted by a procès-verbal; but a procès-verbal is generally reserved for changes to rectify obvious errors in the text adopted, i.e., where the text adopted does not correctly reflect the intention of the parties adopting it.

    In international law and international relations, a protocol is generally a treaty or international agreement that supplements a previous treaty or international agreement. A protocol can amend the previous treaty or add additional provisions. Parties to the earlier agreement are not required to adopt the protocol, and this is sometimes made explicit, especially where many parties to the first agreement do not support the protocol.

    A notable example is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which established a general framework for the development of binding greenhouse gas emission limits, followed by the Kyoto Protocol contained the specific provisions and regulations later agreed upon.

    Treaties may be seen as “self-executing”, in that merely becoming a party puts the treaty and all its obligations in action. Other treaties may be non-self-executing and require “implementing legislation”—a change in the domestic law of a state party that will direct or enable it to fulfill treaty obligations. An example of a treaty requiring such legislation would be one mandating local prosecution by a party for particular crimes.

    The division between the two is often unclear and subject to disagreements within a government, since a non-self-executing treaty cannot be acted on without the proper change in domestic law; if a treaty requires implementing legislation, a state may default on its obligations due to its legislature failing to pass the necessary domestic laws.

    The language of treaties, like that of any law or contract, must be interpreted when the wording does not seem clear, or it is not immediately apparent how it should be applied in a perhaps unforeseen circumstance. The Vienna Convention states that treaties are to be interpreted “in good faith” according to the “ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. International legal experts also often invoke the “principle of maximum effectiveness”, which interprets treaty language as having the fullest force and effect possible to establish obligations between the parties.

    No one party to a treaty can impose its particular interpretation of the treaty upon the other parties. Consent may be implied, however, if the other parties fail to explicitly disavow that initially unilateral interpretation, particularly if that state has acted upon its view of the treaty without complaint. Consent by all parties to the treaty to a particular interpretation has the legal effect of adding another clause to the treaty – this is commonly called an “authentic interpretation”.

    International tribunals and arbiters are often called upon to resolve substantial disputes over treaty interpretations. To establish the meaning in context, these judicial bodies may review the preparatory work from the negotiation and drafting of the treaty as well as the final, signed treaty itself.

    One significant part of treaty-making is that signing a treaty implies a recognition that the other side is a sovereign state and that the agreement being considered is enforceable under international law. Hence, nations can be very careful about terming an agreement to be a treaty. For example, within the United States, agreements between states are compacts and agreements between states and the federal government or between agencies of the government are memoranda of understanding.

    Another situation can occur when one party wishes to create an obligation under international law, but the other party does not. This factor has been at work with respect to discussions between North Korea and the United States over security guarantees and nuclear proliferation.

    The definition of the English word “treaty” varies depending on the legal and political context; in some jurisdictions, such as the United States, a treaty is specifically an international agreement that has been ratified, and thus made binding, per the procedures established under domestic law.

    While the Vienna Convention provides a general dispute resolution mechanism, many treaties specify a process outside the convention for arbitrating disputes and alleged breaches. This may by a specially convened panel, by reference to an existing court or panel established for the purpose such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice or processes such as the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade Organization. Depending on the treaty, such a process may result in financial penalties or other enforcement action.

    Treaties are not necessarily permanently binding upon the signatory parties. As obligations in international law are traditionally viewed as arising only from the consent of states, many treaties expressly allow a state to withdraw as long as it follows certain procedures of notification (“denunciation”). For example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs provides that the treaty will terminate if, as a result of denunciations, the number of parties falls below 40. Many treaties expressly forbid withdrawal. Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that where a treaty is silent over whether or not it can be denounced there is a rebuttable presumption that it cannot be unilaterally denounced unless:

    it can be shown that the parties intended to admit the possibility, or a right of withdrawal can be inferred from the terms of the treaty. The possibility of withdrawal depends on the terms of the treaty and its travaux preparatory. It has, for example, been held that it is not possible to withdraw from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When North Korea declared its intention to do this the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting as registrar, said that original signatories of the ICCPR had not overlooked the possibility of explicitly providing for withdrawal, but rather had deliberately intended not to provide for it. Consequently, withdrawal was not possible.

    The Organization of American States (OAS) offers the ability of member states to withdraw from its framework by allowing states to officially inform the General Secretariat of the OAS of such intended withdrawal and being subject to a two-year long sunset period in accordance with Article 143 of the body’s charter.

    In practice, state legislatures or other officials where so structured sometimes use their sovereignty or provisions of supreme law to declare their withdrawal from and stop following the terms of a treaty even if this violates the terms of the treaty. Other parties may accept this outcome, may consider the state to be untrustworthy in future dealings, or may retaliate with sanctions or military action. Withdrawal by one party from a bilateral treaty is typically considered to terminate the treaty. Multilateral treaties typically continue even after the withdrawal of one member, unless the terms of the treaty or mutual agreement causes its termination.

    If a party has materially violated or breached its treaty obligations, the other parties may invoke this breach as grounds for temporarily suspending their obligations to that party under the treaty. A material breach may also be invoked as grounds for permanently terminating the treaty itself.

    A treaty breach does not automatically suspend or terminate treaty relations, however. It depends on how the other parties regard the breach and how they resolve to respond to it. Sometimes treaties will provide for the seriousness of a breach to be determined by a tribunal or other independent arbiter. An advantage of such an arbiter is that it prevents a party from prematurely and perhaps wrongfully suspending or terminating its own obligations due to another’s an alleged material breach.

    Treaties sometimes include provisions for self-termination, meaning that the treaty is automatically terminated if certain defined conditions are met. Some treaties are intended by the parties to be only temporarily binding and are set to expire on a given date. Other treaties may self-terminate if the treaty is meant to exist only under certain conditions.

    A party may claim that a treaty should be terminated, even absent an express provision, if there has been a fundamental change in circumstances. Such a change is sufficient if unforeseen, if it undermined the “essential basis” of consent by a party if it radically transforms the extent of obligations between the parties, and if the obligations are still to be performed. A party cannot base this claim on change brought about by its own breach of the treaty. This claim also cannot be used to invalidate treaties that established or redrew political boundaries.

    Cartels (“Cartells”, “Cartelle” or “Kartell-Konventionen” in other languages) were a special kind of treaty within the international law of the 17th to 19th centuries. Their purpose was to regulate specific activities of common interest among contracting states that otherwise remained rivals in other areas. They were typically implemented on an administrative level. Similar to the cartels for duels and tournaments, these intergovernmental accords represented fairness agreements or gentlemen’s agreements between states.

    In the United States, cartels governed humanitarian actions typically carried out by cartel ships were dispatched for missions, such as to carry communications or prisoners between belligerents.

    From the European history, a broader range of purposes is known. These “cartels” often reflected the cohesion of authoritarian ruling classes against their own unruly citizens. Generally, the European governments concluded – while curbing their mutual rivalries partially – cooperation agreements, which should apply generally or only in case of war:

    Deserters, escaped serfs and criminals were to be mutually extradited.

    Prisoners of war should be handed out according to rank in different exchange ratios.

    The maintenance of postal and commercial traffic including the entry and exit of couriers should be guaranteed in the fields of communication and transport.

    “Customs cartels” (“Zollkartelle”) and “coin cartels” (“Münzkartelle”) were “regulatory” agreements between Continental-European states in the 19th century.

    Against smugglers and counterfeiters, a joint action approach was adopted by the governments contracting on international trade treaties. The latter often contained the relevant “cartel” regulations in their annexes. The measures against criminals and unruly citizens were to be conducted regardless of the nationality and origin of the relevant persons. If necessary, national borders could be crossed by police forces of the respective neighboring country for capture and arrest. In the course of the 19th century, the term “cartel” (or “Cartell”) gradually disappeared for intergovernmental agreements under international law. Instead, the term “convention” was used.

    An otherwise valid and agreed upon treaty may be rejected as a binding international agreement on several grounds. For example, the Japan–Korea treaties of 1905, 1907, and 1910 were protested by several governments as having been essentially forced upon Korea by Japan; they were confirmed as “already null and void” in the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

    Ultra vires treaties

    If an act or lack thereof is condemned under international law, the act will not assume international legality even if approved by internal law. This means that in case of a conflict with domestic law, international law will always prevail.

    A party’s consent to a treaty is invalid if it had been given by an agent or body without power to do so under that state’s domestic laws. States are reluctant to inquire into the internal affairs and processes of other states, and so a “manifest violation” is required such that it would be “objectively evident to any State dealing with the matter”. A strong presumption exists internationally that a head of state has acted within his proper authority. It seems that no treaty has ever actually been invalidated on this provision.

    Consent is also invalid if it was given by a representative acting outside their restricted powers during the negotiations, if the other parties to the treaty were notified of those restrictions prior to his or her signing.

    Misunderstanding, fraud, corruption, coercion

    Articles 46–53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set out the only ways that treaties can be invalidated—considered unenforceable and void under international law. A treaty will be invalidated due to either the circumstances by which a state party joined the treaty or due to the content of the treaty itself. Invalidation is separate from withdrawal, suspension, or termination (addressed above), which all involve an alteration in the consent of the parties of a previously valid treaty rather than the invalidation of that consent in the first place.

    A governmental leader’s consent may be invalidated if there was an erroneous understanding of a fact or situation at the time of conclusion, which formed the “essential basis” of the state’s consent. Consent will not be invalidated if the misunderstanding was due to the state’s own conduct, or if the truth should have been evident.

    Consent will also be invalidated if it was induced by the fraudulent conduct of another party, or by the direct or indirect “corruption” of its representative by another party to the treaty. Coercion of either a representative or the state itself through the threat or use of force, if used to obtain the consent of that state to a treaty, will invalidate that consent.

    Contrary to peremptory norms

    A treaty is null and void if it is in violation of a peremptory norm. These norms, unlike other principles of customary law, are recognized as permitting no violations and so cannot be altered through treaty obligations. These are limited to such universally accepted prohibitions as those against the aggressive use of force, genocide and other crimes against humanity, piracy, hostilities directed at civilian population, racial discrimination and apartheid, slavery and torture, meaning that no state can legally assume an obligation to commit or permit such acts.

    Treaties under domestic national law

    Australia

    The constitution of Australia allows the executive government to enter into treaties, but the practice is for treaties to be tabled in both houses of parliament at least 15 days before signing. Treaties are considered a source of Australian law but sometimes require an act of parliament to be passed depending on their nature. Treaties are administered and maintained by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which advised that the “general position under Australian law is that treaties which Australia has joined, apart from those terminating a state of war, are not directly and automatically incorporated into Australian law. Signature and ratification do not, of themselves, make treaties operate domestically. In the absence of legislation, treaties cannot impose obligations on individuals nor create rights in domestic law. Nevertheless, international law, including treaty law, is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law and may be used in the interpretation of statutes.” Treaties can be implemented by executive action, and often, existing laws are sufficient to ensure a treaty is honored.

    Australian treaties generally fall under the following categories: extradition, postal agreements and money orders, trade and international conventions.

    Brazil

    The federal constitution of Brazil states that the power to enter into treaties is vested in the president of Brazil and that such treaties must be approved by the Congress of Brazil (Articles 84, Clause VIII, and 49, Clause I). In practice, that has been interpreted as meaning that the executive branch is free to negotiate and sign a treaty but that its ratification by the president requires the prior approval of Congress. Additionally, the Supreme Federal Court has ruled that after ratification and entry into force, a treaty must be incorporated into domestic law by means of a presidential decree published in the federal register for it to be valid in Brazil and applicable by the Brazilian authorities.

    The court has established that treaties are subject to constitutional review and enjoy the same hierarchical position as ordinary legislation (leis ordinárias, or “ordinary laws”, in Portuguese). A more recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Brazil in 2008 has altered that somewhat by stating that treaties containing human rights provisions enjoy a status above that of ordinary legislation, subject to only the constitution itself. Additionally, the 45th Amendment to the constitution makes human rights treaties approved by Congress by a special procedure enjoy the same hierarchical position as a constitutional amendment. The hierarchical position of treaties in relation to domestic legislation is of relevance to the discussion on whether and how the latter can abrogate the former and vice versa.

    The constitution does not have an equivalent to the supremacy clause in United States Constitution, which is of interest to the discussion on the relation between treaties and legislation of the states of Brazil.

    India

    In India, subjects are divided into three lists: union, state and concurrent. In the normal legislation process, the subjects on the union list must be legislated by the Parliament of India. For subjects on the state list, only the respective state legislature can legislate. For subjects on the concurrent list, both governments can make laws. However, to implement international treaties, Parliament can legislate on any subject and even override the general division of subject lists.

    United States

    In the United States, the term “treaty” has a distinct and more restricted legal definition than in international law. U.S. law distinguishes between “treaties”, as defined in the U.S. Constitution, and “executive agreements”, which are either “congressional-executive agreements” or “sole executive agreements”; although all three classes are equally treaties under international law, they are subject to different political and legal requirements and implications in the U.S.

    The distinctions primarily concern the method of approval: Treaties require the “advice and consent” by two-thirds of the Senators present, whereas sole executive agreements are executed by the President acting alone and congressional-executive agreements require majority approval by both the House and the Senate. The three classifications are not mutually exclusive: A treaty may require a simple majority in Congress before or after it is signed by the President or may grant the President authority to fill in the gaps with executive agreements, rather than additional treaties or protocols.

    Currently, international agreements are ten times more likely to be executed by executive agreement, due to their relative ease. Nevertheless, the President still often chooses to pursue the formal treaty process over an executive agreement to gain congressional support on matters that require Congress to pass implementing legislation or appropriate funds as well as for agreements that impose long-term, complex legal obligations on the U.S. For example, the agreement by the United States, Iran, and other countries is not a treaty under U.S. law, but rather a “political commitment” that does not bind the parties by law.

    The nuances and ambiguity of how international agreements are effectuated or implemented in U.S. law has been subject to multiple legal cases. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Head Money Cases (1884) that “treaties” do not have a privileged position over acts of Congress and can be repealed or modified by legislative action just like any other regular law. In a similar vein, the court’s decision in Reid v. Covert (1957) held that treaty provisions that conflict with the U.S. Constitution are null and void under U.S. law. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the “supremacy” of treaties in the U.S. Constitution, such as in Ware v. Hylton (1796) and Missouri v. Holland (1920).

    The relative ease by which certain international agreements could be entered into by the President has often prompted congressional pushback, most notably in the proposed Bricker Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly sought to reign in executive treatymaking powers.

    Treaties and indigenous peoples

    Treaties formed an important part of European colonization; in many parts of the world, Europeans attempted to legitimize their sovereignty by signing treaties with indigenous peoples. In most cases, these treaties were in extremely disadvantageous terms to the native people, who often did not comprehend the implications of what they were signing.

    In some rare cases, such as with Ethiopia and Qing China, local governments were able to use the treaties to at least mitigate the impact of European colonization. This involved learning the intricacies of European diplomatic customs and then using the treaties to prevent power from overstepping their agreement or by playing different powers against each other.

    In other cases, such as New Zealand with the Māori and Canada with its First Nations people, treaties allowed native peoples to maintain a minimum amount of autonomy. Such treaties between colonizers and indigenous peoples are an important part of political discourse in the late 20th and early 21st century, the treaties being discussed have international standing as has been stated in a treaty study by the UN.

    Australia

    In the case of Indigenous Australians, no treaty was ever entered into with the Indigenous peoples entitling the Europeans to land ownership, mostly adopting the doctrine of terra nullius (with the exception of South Australia). This concept was later overturned by Mabo v Queensland, which established the concept of native title in Australia well after colonization was already a fait accompli.

    Victoria

    On 10 December 2019, the Victorian First Peoples’ Assembly met for the first time in the Upper House of the Parliament of Victoria in Melbourne. The main aim of the Assembly is to work out the rules by which individual treaties would be negotiated between the Victorian Government and individual Aboriginal Victorian peoples. It will also establish an independent Treaty Authority, which will oversee the negotiations between the Aboriginal groups and the Victorian Government and ensure fairness.

    United States

    Prior to 1871, the government of the United States regularly entered into treaties with Native Americans but the Indian Appropriations Act of 3 March 1871 had a rider attached that effectively ended the President’s treaty-making by providing that no Indian nation or tribe shall be acknowledged as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty. The federal government continued to provide similar contractual relations with the Indian tribes after 1871 by agreements, statutes, and executive orders.

    Canada

    Colonization in Canada saw a number of treaties signed between European settlers and Indigenous First Nations peoples. Historic Canadian treaties tend to fall into three broad categories: commercial, alliance, and territorial. Commercial treaties first emerged in the 17th century and were agreements made between the European fur trading companies and the local First Nations. The Hudson’s Bay Company, a British trading company located in what is now Northern Ontario, signed numerous commercial treaties during this period. Alliance treaties, commonly referred to as “treaties of peace, friendship and alliance” emerged in the late 17th to early 18th century. Finally, territorial treaties dictating land rights were signed between 1760 and 1923. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 accelerated the treaty-making process and provided the Crown with access to large amounts of land occupied by the First Nations. The Crown and 364 First Nations signed 70 treaties that are recognized by the Government of Canada and represent over 600,000 First Nation individuals. The treaties are as follows:

    Treaties of Peace and Neutrality (1701–1760)

    Peace and Friendship Treaties (1725–1779)

    Upper Canada Land Surrenders (including Toronto Purchase(Treaty 13), Johnson-Butler Purchase (Gunshot Treaty)) and the Williams Treaties (1764–1862/1923)

    Robinson Treaties and Douglas Treaties (1850–1854)

    The Numbered Treaties (1871–1921)

    Treaty perceptions

    There is evidence that “although both Indigenous and European Nations engaged in treaty-making before contact with each other, the traditions, beliefs, and worldviews that defined concepts such as “treaties” were extremely different”. The Indigenous understanding of treaties is based on traditional culture and values. Maintaining healthy and equitable relationships with other nations, as well as the environment, is paramount. Gdoo-naaganinaa, a historic treaty between the Nishnaabeg nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy is an example of how First Nations approach treaties. Under Gdoo-naaganinaa, also referred-to in English as Our Dish, the neighbouring nations acknowledged that while they were separate nations they shared the same ecosystem or Dish. It was agreed that the nations would respectably share the land, not interfering with the other nation’s sovereignty while also not monopolizing environmental resources. First Nations agreements, such as the Gdoo-naaganigaa, are considered “living treaties” that must be upheld continually and renewed over time. European settlers in Canada had a different perception of treaties. Treaties were not a living, equitable agreement but rather a legal contract over which the future creation of Canadian law would later rely on. As time passed, the settlers did not think it necessary to abide by all treaty agreements. A review of historic treaties reveals that the European settler understanding is the dominant view portrayed in Canadian treaties.

    Treaties today

    Canada today recognizes 25 additional treaties called Modern Treaties. These treaties represent the relationships between 97 Indigenous groups which includes over 89,000 people. The treaties have been instrumental in strengthening Indigenous stronghold in Canada by providing the following (as organized by the Government of Canada) :

    Indigenous ownership over 600,000 km² of land (almost the size of Manitoba)

    capital transfers of over $3.2 billion

    protection of traditional ways of life

    access to resource development opportunities

    participation in land and resources management decisions

    certainty with respect to land rights in round 40% of Canada’s

    land mass associated self-government rights and political recognition

  • Customary law

    A legal custom is the established pattern of behavior within a particular social setting. A claim can be carried out in defense of “what has always been done and accepted by law”.

    Customary law (also, consuetudinary or unofficial law) exists where:

    a certain legal practice is observed and the relevant actors consider it to be an opinion of law or necessity (opinio juris). Most customary laws deal with standards of the community that have been long-established in a given locale. However, the term can also apply to areas of international law where certain standards have been nearly universal in their acceptance as correct bases of action – for example, laws against piracy or slavery (see hostis humani generis). In many, though not all instances, customary laws will have supportive court rulings and case law that have evolved over time to give additional weight to their rule as law and also to demonstrate the trajectory of evolution (if any) in the judicial interpretation of such law by relevant courts.

    A central issue regarding the recognition of custom is determining the appropriate methodology to know what practices and norms actually constitute customary law. It is not immediately clear that classic Western theories of jurisprudence can be reconciled in any useful way with conceptual analyses of customary law, and thus some scholars (like John Comaroff and Simon Roberts) have characterized customary law norms in their own terms. Yet, there clearly remains some disagreement, which is seen in John Hund’s critique of Comaroff and Roberts’ theory, and preference for the contributions of H. L. A. Hart. Hund argues that Hart’s The Concept of Law solves the conceptual problem with which scholars who have attempted to articulate how customary law principles may be identified, defined, and how they operate in regulating social behavior and resolving disputes.

    Customary law is the set of customs, practices and beliefs that are accepted as obligatory rules of conduct by a community.

    Comaroff and Roberts’ famous work, “Rules and Processes”, attempted to detail the body of norms that constitute Tswana law in a way that was less legalistic (or rule-oriented) than had Isaac Schapera. They defined “mekgwa le melao ya Setswana” in terms of Casalis and Ellenberger’s definition: melao therefore being rules pronounced by a chief and mekgwa as norms that become customary law through traditional usage. Importantly, however, they noted that the Tswana seldom attempt to classify the vast array of existing norms into categories and they thus termed this the ‘undifferentiated nature of the normative repertoire’. Moreover, they observe the co-existence of overtly incompatible norms that may breed conflict, either due to circumstances in a particular situation or inherently due to their incongruous content. This lack of rule classification and failure to eradicate internal inconsistencies between potentially conflicting norms allows for much flexibility in dispute settlement and is also viewed as a ‘strategic resource’ for disputants who seek to advance their own success in a case. The latter incongruities (especially inconsistencies of norm content) are typically solved by elevating one of the norms (tacitly) from ‘the literal to the symbolic. This allows for the accommodation of both as they now theoretically exist in different realms of reality. This is highly contextual, which further illustrates that norms cannot be viewed in isolation and are open to negotiation. Thus, although there are a small number of so-called non-negotiable norms, the vast majority are viewed and given substance contextually, which is seen as fundamental to the Tswana.

    Comaroff and Roberts describe how outcomes of specific cases have the ability to change the normative repertoire, as the repertoire of norms is seen to be both in a state of formation and transformation at all times. These changes are justified on the grounds that they are merely giving recognition to de facto observations of transformation. Furthermore, the legitimacy of a chief is a direct determinant of the legitimacy of his decisions. In the formulation of legislative pronouncements, as opposed to decisions made in dispute resolution, the chief first speaks of the proposed norm with his advisors, then council of headmen, then the public assembly debate the proposed law and may accept or reject it. A chief can proclaim the law even if the public assembly rejects it, but this is not often done; and, if the chief proclaims the legislation against the will of the public assembly, the legislation will become melao, however, it is unlikely that it will be executed because its effectiveness depends on the chief’s legitimacy and the norm’s consistency with the practices (and changes in social relations) and will of the people under that chief.

    Regarding the invocation of norms in disputes, Comaroff and Roberts used the term, “paradigm of argument”, to refer to the linguistic and conceptual frame used by a disputant, whereby ‘a coherent picture of relevant events and actions in terms of one or more implicit or explicit normative referents’ is created. In their explanation, the complainant (who always speaks first) thus establishes a paradigm the defendant can either accept and therefore argue within that specific paradigm or reject and therefore introduce his or her own paradigm (usually, the facts are not contested here). If the defendant means to change the paradigm, they will refer to norms as such, where actually norms are not ordinarily explicitly referenced in Tswana dispute resolution as the audience would typically already know them and just the way one presents one’s case and constructs the facts will establish one’s paradigm. The headman or chief adjudicating may also do same: accept the normative basis implied by the parties (or one of them), and thus not refer to norms using explicit language but rather isolate a factual issue in the dispute and then make a decision on it without expressly referring to any norms, or impose a new or different paradigm onto the parties.

    Hund finds Comaroff and Roberts’ flexibility thesis of a ‘repertoire of norms’ from which litigants and adjudicator choose in the process of negotiating solutions between them uncompelling. He is therefore concerned with disproving what he calls “rule scepticism” on their part. He notes that the concept of custom generally denotes convergent behaviour, but not all customs have the force of law. Hund therefore draws from Hart’s analysis distinguishing social rules, which have internal and external aspects, from habits, which have only external aspects. Internal aspects are the reflective attitude on the part of adherents toward certain behaviours perceived to be obligatory, according to a common standard. External aspects manifest in regular, observable behaviour, but is not obligatory. In Hart’s analysis, then, social rules amount to custom that has legal force.

    Hart identifies three further differences between habits and binding social rules. First, a social rule exists where society frowns on deviation from the habit and attempts to prevent departures by criticising such behaviour. Second, when this criticism is seen socially as a good reason for adhering to the habit, and it is welcomed. And, third, when members of a group behave in a common way not only out of habit or because everyone else is doing it, but because it is seen to be a common standard that should be followed, at least by some members. Hund, however, acknowledges the difficulty of an outsider knowing the dimensions of these criteria that depend on an internal point of view.

    For Hund, the first form of rule scepticism concerns the widely held opinion that, because the content of customary law derives from practice, there are actually no objective rules, since it is only behaviour that informs their construction. On this view, it is impossible to distinguish between behaviour that is rule bound and behaviour that is not—i.e., which behaviour is motivated by adherence to law (or at least done in recognition of the law) and is merely a response to other factors. Hund sees this as problematic because it makes quantifying the law almost impossible, since behaviour is obviously inconsistent. Hund argues that this is a misconception based on a failure to acknowledge the importance of the internal element. In his view, by using the criteria described above, there is not this problem in deciphering what constitutes “law” in a particular community.

    According to Hund, the second form of rule scepticism says that, though a community may have rules, those rules are not arrived at ‘deductively’, i.e. they are not created through legal/moral reasoning only but are instead driven by the personal/political motives of those who create them. The scope for such influence is created by the loose and undefined nature of customary law, which, Hund argues, grants customary-lawmakers (often through traditional ‘judicial processes’) a wide discretion in its application. Yet, Hund contends that the fact that rules might sometimes be arrived at in the more ad hoc way, does not mean that this defines the system. If one requires a perfect system, where laws are created only deductively, then one is left with a system with no rules. For Hund, this cannot be so and an explanation for these kinds of law-making processes is found in Hart’s conception of “secondary rules” (rules in terms of which the main body of norms are recognised). Hund therefore says that for some cultures, for instance in some sections of Tswana society, the secondary rules have developed only to the point where laws are determined with reference to politics and personal preference. This does not mean that they are not “rules”. Hund argues that if we acknowledge a developmental pattern in societies’ constructions of these secondary rules then we can understand how this society constructs its laws and how it differs from societies that have come to rely on an objective, stand-alone body of rules.

    The modern codification of civil law developed from the tradition of medieval custumals, collections of local customary law that developed in a specific manorial or borough jurisdiction, and which were slowly pieced together mainly from case law and later written down by local jurists. Custumals acquired the force of law when they became the undisputed rule by which certain rights, entitlements, and obligations were regulated between members of a community. Some examples include Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae for England, the Coutume de Paris for the city of Paris, the Sachsenspiegel for northern Germany, and the many fueros of Spain.

    In international law, customary law refers to the Law of Nations or the legal norms that have developed through the customary exchanges between states over time, whether based on diplomacy or aggression. Essentially, legal obligations are believed to arise between states to carry out their affairs consistently with past accepted conduct. These customs can also change based on the acceptance or rejection by states of particular acts. Some principles of customary law have achieved the force of peremptory norms, which cannot be violated or altered except by a norm of comparable strength. These norms are said to gain their strength from universal acceptance, such as the prohibitions against genocide and slavery. Customary international law can be distinguished from treaty law, which consists of explicit agreements between nations to assume obligations. However, many treaties are attempts to codify pre-existing customary law.

    Customary law is a recognized source of law within jurisdictions of the civil law tradition, where it may be subordinate to both statutes and regulations. In addressing custom as a source of law within the civil law tradition, John Henry Merryman notes that, though the attention it is given in scholarly works is great, its importance is “slight and decreasing”. On the other hand, in many countries around the world, one or more types of customary law continue to exist side by side with official law, a condition referred to as legal pluralism (see also List of national legal systems).

    In the canon law of the Catholic Church, custom is a source of law. Canonical jurisprudence, however, differs from civil law jurisprudence in requiring the express or implied consent of the legislator for a custom to obtain the force of law.

    In the English common law, “long usage” must be established.

    It is a broad principle of property law that, if something has gone on for a long time without objection, whether it be using a right of way or occupying land to which one has no title, the law will eventually recognise the fact and give the person doing it the legal right to continue.

    It is known in case law as “customary rights”. Something which has been practised since time immemorial by reference to a particular locality may acquire the legal status of a custom, which is a form of local law. The legal criteria defining a custom are precise. The most common claim in recent times, is for customary rights to moor a vessel.

    The mooring must have been in continuous use for “time immemorial” which is defined by legal precedent as 12 years (or 20 years for Crown land) for the same purpose by people using them for that purpose. To give two examples: a custom of mooring which might have been established in past times for over two hundred years by the fishing fleet of local inhabitants of a coastal community will not simply transfer so as to benefit present day recreational boat owners who may hail from much further afield. Whereas a group of houseboats on a mooring that has been in continuous use for the last 25 years with a mixture of owner occupiers and rented houseboats, may clearly continue to be used by houseboats, where the owners live in the same town or city. Both the purpose of the moorings and the class of persons benefited by the custom must have been clear and consistent.

    In Canada, customary aboriginal law has a constitutional foundation and for this reason has increasing influence.

    In the Scandinavian countries customary law continues to exist and has great influence.

    Customary law is also used in some developing countries, usually used alongside common or civil law. For example, in Ethiopia, despite the adoption of legal codes based on civil law in the 1950s according to Dolores Donovan and Getachew Assefa there are more than 60 systems of customary law currently in force, “some of them operating quite independently of the formal state legal system”. They offer two reasons for the relative autonomy of these customary law systems: one is that the Ethiopian government lacks sufficient resources to enforce its legal system to every corner of Ethiopia; the other is that the Ethiopian government has made a commitment to preserve these customary systems within its boundaries.

    In 1995, President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev announced a decree to revitalize the aqsaqal courts of village elders. The courts would have jurisdiction over property, torts and family law. The aqsaqal courts were eventually included under Article 92 of the Kyrgyz constitution. As of 2006, there were approximately 1,000 aqsaqal courts throughout Kyrgyzstan, including in the capital of Bishkek. Akaev linked the development of these courts to the rekindling of Kyrgyz national identity. In a 2005 speech, he connected the courts back to the country’s nomadic past and extolled how the courts expressed the Kyrgyz ability of self-governance. Similar aqsaqal courts exist, with varying levels of legal formality, in other countries of Central Asia.

    The Somali people in the Horn of Africa follow a customary law system referred to as xeer. It survives to a significant degree everywhere in Somalia and in the Somali communities in the Ogaden. Economist Peter Leeson attributes the increase in economic activity since the fall of the Siad Barre administration to the security in life, liberty and property provided by Xeer in large parts of Somalia. The Dutch attorney Michael van Notten also draws upon his experience as a legal expert in his comprehensive study on Xeer, The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa (2005).

    In India many customs are accepted by law. For example, Hindu marriage ceremonies are recognized by the Hindu Marriage Act.

    In Indonesia, customary adat laws of the country’s various indigenous ethnicities are recognized, and customary dispute resolution is recognized in Papua. Indonesian adat law are mainly divided into 19 circles, namely Aceh, Gayo, Alas, and Batak, Minangkabau, South Sumatra, the Malay regions, Bangka and Belitung, Kalimantan, Minahasa, Gorontalo, Toraja, South Sulawesi, Ternate, the Molluccas, Papua, Timor, Bali and Lombok, Central and East Java including the island of Madura, Sunda, and the Javanese monarchies, including the Yogyakarta Sultanate, Surakarta Sunanate, and the Pakualaman and Mangkunegaran princely states.

    In the Philippines, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 recognizes customary laws of indigenous peoples within their domain.