Tag: International law

  • Municipal law

    Municipal law is the national, domestic, or internal law of a sovereign state and is defined in opposition to international law. It encompasses the laws enacted by national, state, or local governments and is concerned with regulating the behavior of individuals, corporations, and entities within the country. Municipal law includes various branches such as criminal law, private law, administrative law, and constitutional law. It is enforced by domestic courts and administrative bodies.

    Municipal law is tailored to the unique needs, values, and circumstances of the specific political entity it governs. For instance, traffic regulations, criminal codes, and property laws are all examples of municipal laws that vary from one country to another.

    Key differences between municipal and international law
    Scope and jurisdiction: Municipal law applies within a specific country, while international law applies to relations between states and international entities.


    Sources of law: Municipal law is derived from a country’s constitution, statutes, regulations, and case law. International law is based on treaties, international agreements, and customary international law.


    Enforcement: Municipal law is enforced by domestic legal and administrative institutions. International law relies on international bodies, diplomatic efforts, and mutual consent for enforcement.

    Focus: Municipal law addresses internal matters of a state, including criminal justice, civil disputes, and regulatory issues. International law deals with issues such as diplomatic relations, trade agreements, and global security.


    Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties from 1969 provides that if a treaty conflicts with a state’s municipal law (including the state’s constitution), the state is still obliged to meet its obligations under the treaty. The only exception is provided by Article 46 of the Vienna Convention if a state’s expression of consent to be bound by a treaty was a manifest violation of a “rule of its internal law of fundamental importance”.

  • Customary international law

    Customary international law consists of international legal obligations arising from established or usual international practices, which are less formal customary expectations of behavior often unwritten as opposed to formal written treaties or conventions. Along with general principles of law and treaties, custom is considered by the International Court of Justice, jurists, the United Nations, and its member states to be among the primary sources of international law.

    Many governments accept in principle the existence of customary international law, although there are differing opinions as to what rules are contained in it. A rule becomes customary international if two requirements are met:

    (1) There is a state practice that “appears to be sufficiently widespread, representative as well as consistent” showing that a significant number of states have used and relied on the rule in question and the concept has not been rejected by a significant number of states,

    (2) states were motivated by a belief that they were legally compelled to accept the legitimacy of the rule in question because customary international law obligated them to do so (opinio juris).

    In 1950, the International Law Commission listed the following sources as forms of evidence of customary international law: treaties, decisions of national and international courts, national legislation, opinions of national legal advisors, diplomatic correspondence, and practice of international organizations. In 2018, the Commission adopted Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law with commentaries. The United Nations General Assembly welcomed the Conclusions and encouraged their widest possible dissemination.

    The International Court of Justice Statute defines customary international law in Article 38(1)(b) as “a general practice accepted as law”. This is generally determined through two factors: the general practice of states, and what states have accepted as law (opinio juris sive necessitatis). This means that many states need to engage in the practice (in particular, great powers) and that states engage in the practice out of a sense of legal obligation (rather than custom or habit).

    There are several kinds of customary international laws recognized by states. Some customary international laws rise to the level of jus cogens through acceptance by the international community as non-derogable rights, while other customary international law may simply be followed by a small group of states. States are typically bound by customary international law, regardless of whether the states have codified these laws domestically or through treaties.

    Jus cogens

    A peremptory norm (also called jus cogens, Latin for “compelling law”) is a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a non-derogable norm. These norms are rooted in natural law principles, and any laws conflicting with it should be considered null and void. Examples include various international crimes; a state violates customary international law if it permits or engages in slavery, torture, genocide, war of aggression, or crimes against humanity.

    Jus cogens and customary international law are not interchangeable. All jus cogens are customary international law through their adoption by states, but not all customary international laws rise to the level of peremptory norms. States can deviate from customary international law by enacting treaties and conflicting laws, but jus cogens are non-derogable.

    Codification

    Some international customary laws have been codified through treaties and domestic laws, while others are recognized only as customary law.

    The laws of war, also known as jus in bello, were long a matter of customary law before they were codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Conventions, and other treaties. However, these conventions do not purport to govern all legal matters that may arise during war. Instead, Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I dictates that customary international law governs legal matters concerning armed conflict not covered by other agreements.

    Silence as consent

    Generally, sovereign nations must consent in order to be bound by a particular treaty or legal norm. However, international customary laws are norms that have become pervasive enough internationally that countries need not consent in order to be bound. In these cases, all that is needed is that the state has not objected to the law. However, states that object to customary international law may not be bound by them unless these laws are deemed to be jus cogens. However, in a dispute with any nation that has not affirmed the “silence implies consent” principle, any invocation of the “silence implies consent” principle involves an appeal to custom, such that if that nation does not espouse the broader premise of acknowledging the existence of customary international law, such an appeal will depend on circular reasoning (“customary international law is binding because silence implies consent, and silence implies consent because the fact that silence implies consent is one aspect of customary international law”).

    The International Court of Justice

    The Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges the existence of customary international law in Article 38(1)(b), incorporated into the United Nations Charter by Article 92: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such as disputes that are submitted to it, shall apply … international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”

    Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has recognized International Custom as evidence of general practice accepted as law. Thus, general practice demonstrates custom, and not vice versa. In order to prove the existence of customary rule, it is necessary to show that there exists a ‘general practice’ which conforms to the rule and which is accepted as law.

    Customary international law “consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way”. It follows that customary international law can be discerned by a “widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (state practice); Acts must occur out of sense of obligation (opinio juris); Acts must be taken by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a significant number of States.” A marker of customary international law is consensus among states exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation.

    The two essential elements of customary international law are state practice and opinio juris, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.

    In relation to the psychological element that is opinio juris, the International Court of Justice further held in North Sea Continental Shelf that “not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it … The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.” The Court emphasised the need to prove a “sense of legal duty” as distinct from “acts motivated by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition”. This was subsequently confirmed in Nicaragua v. United States of America.

    Bilateral vs. multilateral

    The recognition of different customary laws can range from simple bilateral recognition of customary laws to worldwide multilateral recognition. Regional customs can become customary international law in their respective regions, but do not become customary international law for nations outside the region. The existence of bilateral customary law was recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory case between Portugal and India, in which the court found “no reason why long continued practice between the two states accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two states”.

    Other examples

    Other examples accepted or claimed as customary international law include immunity of visiting foreign heads of state and the principle of non-refoulement. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted the Geneva Conventions as customary international law.

    If any treaty or law has been called as customary international law, then parties which have not ratified said treaty will be bound to observe its provisions in good faith.

  • Sources of international law

    International law, also known as “law of nations”, refers to the body of rules which regulate the conduct of sovereign states in their relations with one another. Sources of international law include treaties, international customs, general widely recognized principles of law, the decisions of national and lower courts, and scholarly writings. They are the materials and processes out of which the rules and principles regulating the international community are developed. They have been influenced by a range of political and legal theories.

    Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally recognized as a definitive statement of the sources of international law. It requires the Court to apply, among other things,

    (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

    (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

    (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

    (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. Archived 2011-06-29 at the Wayback Machine

    During the 19th century, it was recognized by legal positivists that a sovereign could limit its authority to act by consenting to an agreement according to the principle pacta sunt servanda. This consensual view of international law was reflected in the 1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and was later preserved in Article 38(1) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.

    The core of broad principles of law is general and dynamic, and they can sometimes be reduced to a proverb or a basic idea. Unlike other types of regulations, such as ordered law or agreements, broad standards of law have not been “established” according to the right sources of law. General norms of law, on the other hand, are regarded as a component of positive law, even if they are only used as auxiliary devices. They define critical principles for the framework’s actual operation and, in general, are drafted from the legal executive. General standards of law have been the subject of extensive doctrinal debate in international law, owing to the various connotations attributed to the concept and the hypothetical concerns that they raise. The use of the expression “central standards of international law,” which is at the top of the overall set of laws and begins in settlement or custom (e.g., the guideline of sovereign correspondence of states or the rule of the forbiddance of danger or the use of power), and which will not be managed here, causes a lot of confusion. Given the language used in Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. (“universal standards of law as recognised by acculturated countries”), the beginning of universal standards of law as applied at the global level has also been a source of debate. The conventional wisdom holds that these standards have their origins in homegrown general systems of laws. Once it is established that some of these broad instruments are frequently shared rules found in domestic systems, they can be utilised in international law as well. They are rational derivations that can be found in any overall group of laws: the standard of restitution for harm committed, the standard of rule understanding, or those used for the purpose of rule struggles—many of them known through Latin adages—are true models. Various general legal standards, such as “audiatur et altera” standards, “actori incumbit onus probandi”, or the method that the designated authority of benefits is also judge of the coincidental locale, have been promoted by the legal executive policy is very important of any war.

    On the question of preference between sources of international law, rules established by treaty will take preference if such an instrument exists. It is also argued however that international treaties and international custom are sources of international law of equal validity; new custom may supersede older treaties and new treaties may override older custom. Also, jus cogens (peremptory norm) is a custom, not a treaty. Judicial decisions and juristic writings are regarded as auxiliary sources of international law, whereas it is unclear whether the general principles of law recognized by ‘civilized nations’ should be recognized as a principal or auxiliary source of international law. Nevertheless, treaty, custom, and general principles of law are generally recognized as primary sources of international law.

    Treaties and conventions are the persuasive source of international law and are considered “hard law.” Treaties can play the role of contracts between two or more parties, such as an extradition treaty or a defense pact. Treaties can also be legislation to regulate a particular aspect of international relations or form the constitutions of international organizations. Whether or not all treaties can be regarded as sources of law, they are sources of obligation for the parties to them. Article 38(1)(a) of the ICJ Statute, which uses the term “international conventions”, concentrates upon treaties as a source of contractual obligation but also acknowledges the possibility of a state expressly accepting the obligations of a treaty to which it is not formally a party.

    For a treaty-based rule to be a source of law, rather than simply a source of obligation, it must either be capable of affecting non-parties or have consequences for parties more extensive than those specifically imposed by the treaty itself.

    Thus, the procedures or methods by treaties become legally binding are formal source of law which is a process by a legal rule comes into existence: it is law creating.

    Some treaties are the result of codifying existing customary law, such as laws governing the global commons, and jus ad bellum. While the purpose is to establish a code of general application, its effectiveness depends upon the number of states that ratify or accede to the particular convention. Relatively few such instruments have a sufficient number of parties to be regarded as international law in their own right. The most obvious example is the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims.

    Most multi-lateral treaties fall short of achieving such a near-universal degree of formal acceptance and are dependent upon their provisions being regarded as representing customary international law and, by this indirect route, as binding upon non-parties. This outcome is possible in a number of ways:

    When the treaty rule reproduces an existing rule of customary law, the rule will be clarified in terms of the treaty provision. A notable example is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which was considered by the ICJ to be law even before it had been brought into force.
    When a customary rule is in the process of development, its incorporation in a multilateral treaty may have the effect of consolidating or crystallizing the law in the form of that rule. It is not always easy to identify when this occurs. Where the practice is less developed, the treaty provision may not be enough to crystallize the rule as part of customary international law.

    Even if the rule is new, the drafting of the treaty provision may be the impetus for its adoption in the practice of states, and it is the subsequent acceptance of the rule by states that renders it effective as part of customary law. If a broad definition is adopted of state practice, the making of a treaty would fall within the definition. Alternatively, it is possible to regard the treaty as the final act of state practice required to establish the rule in question, or as the necessary articulation of the rule to give it the opinio juris of customary international law.
    Convention-based “instant custom” has been identified by the ICJ on several occasions as representing customary law without explanation of whether the provision in question was supported by state practice. This has happened with respect to a number of provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. If “instant custom” is valid as law, it could deny to third parties the normal consequences of non-accession.

    Pursuant to Chapter XVI, Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, the obligations under the United Nations Charter overrides the terms of any other treaty. Meanwhile, its Preamble affirms the establishment of the obligations out of treaties and source of international law.

    Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute refers to “international custom” as a source of international law, specifically emphasizing the two requirements of state practice plus acceptance of the practice as obligatory or opinio juris sive necessitatis (usually abbreviated as opinio juris).

    Derived from the consistent practice of (originally) Western states accompanied by opinio juris (the conviction of States that the consistent practice is required by a legal obligation), customary international law is differentiated from acts of comity (mutual recognition of government acts) by the presence of opinio juris (although in some instances, acts of comity have developed into customary international law, i.e. diplomatic immunity). Treaties have gradually displaced much customary international law. This development is similar to the replacement of customary or common law by codified law in municipal legal settings, but customary international law continues to play a significant role in international law.

    This element involves an examination of what rules states are observing. When examining state practice to determine relevant rules of international law, it is necessary to take into account every activity of the organs and officials of states that relate to that purpose. There has been continuing debate over where a distinction should be drawn as to the weight that should be attributed to what states do, rather than what they say represents the law. In its most extreme form, this would involve rejecting what states say as practice and relegating it to the status of evidence of opinio juris A more moderate version would evaluate what a state says by reference to the occasion on which the statement was made. It is only relatively powerful countries with extensive international contacts and interests that have regular opportunities of contributing by deed to the practice of international law. The principal means of contribution to state practice for the majority of states will be at meetings of international organizations, particularly the UN General Assembly, by voting and otherwise expressing their view on matters under consideration. Moreover, there are circumstances in which what states say may be the only evidence of their view as to what conduct is required in a particular situation.

    The notion of practice establishing a customary rule implies that the practice is followed regularly, or that such state practice must be “common, consistent and concordant”.[13] Given the size of the international community, the practice does not have to encompass all states or be completely uniform. There has to be a sufficient degree of participation, especially on the part of states whose interests are likely to be most affected, and an absence of substantial dissent. There have been a number of occasions on which the ICJ has rejected claims that a customary rule existed because of a lack of consistency in the practice brought to its attention.

    Within the context of a specific dispute, however, it is not necessary to establish the generality of practice. A rule may apply if a state has accepted the rule as applicable to it individually, or because the two states belong to a group of states between which the rule applies.

    A dissenting state is entitled to deny the opposability of a rule in question if it can demonstrate its persistent objection to that rule, either as a member of a regional group or by virtue of its membership of the international community. It is not easy for a single state to maintain its dissent. Also, rules of the jus cogens have a universal character and apply to all states, irrespective of their wishes.

    Demand for rules that are responsive to increasingly rapid changes has led to the suggestion that there can be, in appropriate circumstances, such a concept as “instant custom”. Even within traditional doctrine, the ICJ has recognized that passage of a short period of time is not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule. Because of this, the question is sometimes raised as to whether the word “custom” is suitable to a process that could occur with great rapidity.

    It may be argued that the practice of international organizations, most notably that of the United Nations, as it appears in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, are an additional source of international law, even though it is not mentioned as such in Article 38(1) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38(1) is closely based on the corresponding provision of the 1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, thus predating the role that international organizations have come to play in the international plane. That is, the provision of Article 38(1) may be regarded as ‘dated, and this can most vividly be seen in the mention made of ‘civilized nations’, a mentioning that appears all the more quaint after the decolonization process that took place in the early 1960s and the participation of nearly all nations of the world in the United Nations.

    Opinio juris
    Main article: Opinio juris sive necessitatis

    A wealth of state practice does not usually carry with it a presumption that opinio juris exists. “Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”

    In cases where practice (of which evidence is given) comprises abstentions from acting, consistency of conduct might not establish the existence of a rule of customary international law. The fact that no nuclear weapons have been used since 1945, for example, does not render their use illegal on the basis of a customary obligation because the necessary opinio juris was lacking.

    Although the ICJ has frequently referred to opinio juris as being an equal footing with state practice, the role of the psychological element in the creation of customary law is uncertain.

    Jus cogens
    Main article: Peremptory norm
    A peremptory norm or jus cogens (Latin for “compelling law” or “strong law”) is a principle of international law considered so fundamental that it overrides all other sources of international law, including even the Charter of the United Nations. The principle of jus cogens is enshrined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

    For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
    Rules of jus cogens generally require or forbid the state to do particular acts or respect certain rights. However, some define criminal offenses which the state must enforce against individuals. Generally included on lists of such norms are prohibitions of such crimes and internationally wrongful acts as waging aggressive war, war crimes, crimes against humanity, piracy, genocide, apartheid, slavery and torture.

    The evidence supporting the emergence of a rule of jus cogens will be essentially similar to that required to establish the creation of a new rule of customary international law. Indeed, jus cogens could be thought of as a special principle of custom with a superadded opinions juries. The European Court of Human Rights has stressed the international public policy aspect of the jus cogens.

    The scope of general principles of law, to which Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ refers, is unclear and controversial but may include such legal principles that are common to a large number of systems of municipal law. Given the limits of treaties or custom as sources of international law, Article 38(1) may be looked upon as a directive to the Court to fill any gap in the law and prevent a non liquet by reference to the general principles.

    In earlier stages of the development of international law, rules were frequently drawn from municipal law. In the 19th century, legal positivists rejected the idea that international law could come from any source that did not involve state will or consent but were prepared to allow for the application of general principles of law, provided that they had in some way been accepted by states as part of the legal order. Thus Article 38(1)(c), for example, speaks of general principles “recognized” by states. An area that demonstrates the adoption of municipal approaches is the law applied to the relationship between international officials and their employing organizations, although today the principles are regarded as established international law.

    The significance of general principles has undoubtedly been lessened by the increased intensity of treaty and institutional relations between states. Nevertheless, the concepts of estoppel and equity have been employed in the adjudication of international disputes. For example, a state that has, by its conduct, encouraged another state to believe in the existence of a certain legal or factual situation, and to rely on that belief, may be estopped from asserting a contrary situation in its dealings. The principle of good faith was said by the ICJ to be “one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations”. Similarly, there have been frequent references to equity. It is generally agreed that equity cannot be employed to subvert legal rules (that is, operate contra legem). This “equity as law” perception is reinforced by references to equitable principles in the text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, though this may be little more than an admission as to the existence, and legitimation, of the discretion of the adjudicator.

    However, the principles of estoppel and equity in the international context do not retain all the connotations they do under common law. The reference to the principles as “general” signify that, if rules were to be adapted from municipal law, they should be at a sufficient level of generality to encompass similar rules existing in many municipal systems. Principles of municipal law should be regarded as sources of inspiration rather than as sources of rules of direct application.

    Judicial decisions and juristic writings

    According to Article 38(1)(d) of its Statute, the ICJ is also to apply “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”. It is difficult to tell what influence these materials have on the development of the law. Pleadings in cases before the ICJ are often replete with references to case law and to legal literature.

    Judicial decisions

    The decisions of international and municipal courts and the publications of academics can be referred to, not as a source of law as such, but as a means of recognizing the law established in other sources. In practice, the International Court of Justice does not refer to domestic decisions although it does invoke its previous case-law.

    There is no rule of stare decisis in international law. The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. Nevertheless, often the Court would refer to its past decisions and advisory opinions to support its explanation of a present case.

    Often the International Court of Justice will consider General Assembly resolutions as indicative of customary international law.

    Juristic writings

    Article 38(1)(d) of the International Court of Justice Statute states that the ‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’ are also among the ‘subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law’. The scholarly works of prominent jurists are not sources of international law but are essential in developing the rules that are sourced in treaties, custom and the general principles of law. This is accepted practice in the interpretation of international law and was utilized by the United States Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana case (175 US (1900) 677 at 700–1). In the practice of the International Court of Justice, citations to teachings in decisions are exceptional, but Judges routinely refer to them in their individual opinions.

  • Sovereign state

    A sovereign state is a state that has the highest authority over a territory. It is commonly understood that a sovereign state is independent. When referring to a specific polity, the term “country” may also refer to a constituent country, or a dependent territory.

    A sovereign state is usually required to have a permanent population, defined territory, a government not under another, and the capacity to interact with other sovereign states. In actual practice, recognition or non-recognition by other states plays an important role in determining the status of a country. Unrecognized states often have difficulty engaging in diplomatic relations with other sovereign states.

    Since the end of the 19th century, almost the entire globe has been divided into sections (countries) with more or less defined borders assigned to different states.Previously, quite large plots of land were either unclaimed or deserted, or inhabited by nomadic peoples that were not organized into states. However, even in modern states, there are large remote areas, such as the Amazon’s tropical forests, that are either uninhabited or inhabited exclusively or mainly by indigenous people (and some of them are still not in constant contact). Additionally, there are states where de facto control is contested or where it is not exercised over their whole area.

    Currently, the international community includes more than 200 sovereign states, most of which are represented in the United Nations. These states exist in a system of international relations, where each state takes into account the policies of other states by making its own calculations. From this point of view, States are integrated into the international system of special internal and external security and legitimization of the dilemma. Recently, the concept of the international community has been formed to refer to a group of States that have established rules, procedures and institutions for the implementation of relations. Thus, the foundation for international law, diplomacy between officially recognized sovereign states, their organizations and formal regimes has been laid.

    Westphalian sovereignty

    Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents in domestic structures. It is an international system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations that began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

    Sovereignty is a term that is frequently misused. Up until the 19th century, the radicalised concept of a “standard of civilization” was routinely deployed to determine that certain people in the world were “uncivilized”, and lacking organised societies. That position was reflected and constituted in the notion that their “sovereignty” was either completely lacking or at least of an inferior character when compared to that of the “civilized” people”. Lassa Oppenheim said, “There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning, which was universally agreed upon.” In the opinion of H. V. Evatt of the High Court of Australia, “sovereignty is neither a question of fact, nor a question of law, but a question that does not arise at all”.

    Sovereignty has taken on a different meaning with the development of the principle of self-determination and the prohibition against the threat or use of force as jus cogens norms of modern international law. The United Nations Charter, the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, and the charters of regional international organizations express the view that all states are juridically equal and enjoy the same rights and duties based upon the mere fact of their existence as persons under international law. The right of nations to determine their own political status and exercise permanent sovereignty within the limits of their territorial jurisdictions is widely recognized.

    In political science, sovereignty is usually defined as the most essential attribute of the state in the form of its complete self-sufficiency in the frames of a certain territory, that is its supremacy in the domestic policy and independence in the foreign one.

    Named after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the Westphalian System of state sovereignty, according to Bryan Turner, “made a more or less clear separation between religion and state, and recognized the right of princes “to confessionalize” the state, that is, to determine the religious affiliation of their kingdoms on the pragmatic principle of cuius regio eius religio [whose realm, his religion].

    Before 1900, sovereign states enjoyed absolute immunity from the judicial process, derived from the concepts of sovereignty and the Westphalian equality of states. First articulated by Jean Bodin, the powers of the state are considered to be suprema potestas within territorial boundaries. Based on this, the jurisprudence has developed along the lines of affording immunity from prosecution to foreign states in domestic courts. In The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court wrote that the “perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns” has created a class of cases where “every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation”.

    Absolute sovereign immunity is no longer as widely accepted as it has been in the past, and some countries, including the United States, Canada, Singapore, Australia, Pakistan and South Africa, have introduced restrictive immunity by statute, which explicitly limits jurisdictional immunity to public acts, but not private or commercial ones, though there is no precise definition by which public acts can easily be distinguished from private ones.

    Recognition

    State recognition signifies the decision of a sovereign state to treat another entity as also being a sovereign state. Recognition can be either expressed or implied and is usually retroactive in its effects. It does not necessarily signify a desire to establish or maintain diplomatic relations.

    There are debates over whether states can exist as a fact independent of recognition or whether recognition is one of the facts necessary to bring states into being. No definition is binding on all the members of the community of nations on the criteria for statehood. Some argue that the criteria are mainly political, not legal. L.C. Green cited the recognition of the unborn Polish and Czechoslovak states in World War I and explained that “since recognition of statehood is a matter of discretion, it is open to any existing State to accept as a state any entity it wishes, regardless of the existence of territory or of an established government.” International lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht states that recognition is not merely a formality but an active interpretation in support of any facts. Once made however it cannot be arbitrarily revoked on account of another state’s own discretion or internal politics.

    Constitutive theory

    The constitutive theory of statehood defines a state as a person of international law if, and only if, it is recognised as sovereign by at least one other state. This theory of recognition was developed in the 19th century. Under it, a state was sovereign if another sovereign state recognised it as such. Because of this, new states could not immediately become part of the international community or be bound by international law, and recognised nations did not have to respect international law in their dealings with them. In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, the Final Act recognised only 39 sovereign states in the European diplomatic system, and as a result, it was firmly established that in the future new states would have to be recognised by other states, and that meant in practice recognition by one or more of the great powers.

    One of the major criticisms of this law is the confusion caused when some states recognise a new entity, but other states do not. Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the theory’s main proponents, suggested that a state must grant recognition as a possible solution. However, a state may use any criteria when judging if they should give recognition and they have no obligation to use such criteria. Many states may only recognise another state if it is to their advantage.

    In 1912, L. F. L. Oppenheim said the following, regarding constitutive theory:

    International Law does not say that a State is not in existence as long as it is not recognised, but it takes no notice of it before its recognition. Through recognition only and exclusively a State becomes an International Person and a subject of International Law.

    Recognition or non-recognition by other states can override declarative theory criteria in cases such as Kosovo and Somaliland.

    Declarative theory

    By contrast, the declarative theory of statehood defines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria: 1) a defined territory; 2) a permanent population; 3) a government and 4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states. According to declarative theory, an entity’s statehood is independent of its recognition by other states, as long as the sovereignty was not gained by military force. The declarative model was expressed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention.

    A “territory” in the international law context consists of land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, and air space above the territory. There is no requirement on strictly delimited borders or minimum size of the land, but artificial installations and uninhabitable territories cannot be considered territories sufficient for statehood. The term “permanent population” defines the community that has the intention to inhabit the territory permanently and is capable of supporting the superstructure of the State, though there is no requirement for a minimum population. The government must be capable of exercising effective control over a territory and population (the requirement known in legal theory as the “effective control test”) and guarantee the protection of basic human rights by legal methods and policies. The “capacity to enter into relations with other states” reflects the entity’s degree of independence.

    Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention declares that political statehood is independent of recognition by other states, and the state is not prohibited from defending itself.

    A similar opinion about “the conditions on which an entity constitutes a state” is expressed by the European Economic Community Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, which found that a state was defined by having a territory, a population, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states.

    The Montevideo Convention criteria do not automatically create a state because additional requirements must be met. While they play an important role, they do not determine the status of a country in all cases, such as Kosovo, Rhodesia, and Somaliland.

    In practice, international relations take into account the effect of recognition and non-recognition. It is the act of recognition that affirms whether a country meets the requirements for statehood and is now subject to international law in the same way that other sovereign states are.

    State recognition

    State practice relating to the recognition of states typically falls somewhere between the declaratory and constitutive approaches. International law does not require a state to recognise other states. Recognition is often withheld when a new state is seen as illegitimate or has come about in breach of international law. Almost universal non-recognition by the international community of Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus are good examples of this, the former only having been recognized by South Africa, and the latter only recognized by Turkey. In the case of Rhodesia, recognition was widely withheld when the white minority seized power and attempted to form a state along the lines of Apartheid South Africa, a move that the United Nations Security Council described as the creation of an “illegal racist minority régime”.

    In the case of Northern Cyprus, recognition was withheld from a state created in Northern Cyprus. International law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence, and the recognition of a country is a political issue. On 2 July 2013, The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that “notwithstanding the lack of international recognition of the regime in the northern area, a de facto recognition of its acts may be rendered necessary for practical purposes. Thus the adoption by the authorities of the “TRNC” of civil, administrative or criminal law measures, and their application or enforcement within that territory, may be regarded as having a legal basis in domestic law for the purposes of the Convention”. On 9 October 2014, the US’s Federal Court stated that “the TRNC purportedly operates as a democratic republic with a president, prime minister, legislature and judiciary”. On 2 September 2015, ECtHR decided that “…the court system set up in the “TRNC” was to be considered to have been “established by law” with reference to the “constitutional and legal basis” on which it operated, and it has not accepted the allegation that the “TRNC” courts as a whole lacked independence and/or impartiality”. On 3 February 2017, The United Kingdom’s High Court stated “There was no duty in the United Kingdom law upon the Government to refrain from recognizing Northern Cyprus. The United Nations itself works with Northern Cyprus law enforcement agencies and facilitates co-operation between the two parts of the island”. and revealed that the co-operation between the United Kingdom police and law agencies in Northern Cyprus is legal. Turkish Cypriots gained “observer status” in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and their representatives are elected in the Assembly of Northern Cyprus. As a country, Northern Cyprus became an observer member in various international organizations (the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA), etc.).

    De facto and de jure states

    Most sovereign states are both de jure and de facto (i.e., they exist both according to law and in practice). However, states which are only de jure are sometimes recognised as being the legitimate government of a territory over which they have no actual control. For example, during the Second World War, governments-in-exile of several states continued to enjoy diplomatic relations with the Allies, notwithstanding that their countries were under occupation by Axis powers. Other entities may have de facto control over a territory but lack international recognition; these may be considered by the international community to be only de facto states. They are considered de jure states only according to their own law and by states that recognise them. For example, Somaliland is commonly considered to be such a state.

    Outlining the concept of a de facto state for EurasiaNet in early 2024, Laurence Broers wrote:

    De facto states can be understood as a product of the very system that excludes the possibility of their existence: the post-Second World War and post-colonial system of sovereign and equal states covering every centimeter of the globe.

    The hegemony of this system, at least until recent years, is what created the possibility of a de facto state as an anomaly existing outside of it – or in Alexander Iskandaryan’s memorable phrase, as “temporary technical errors within the system of international law.” The Soviet and Yugoslav collapses resulted in the emergence of numerous such entities, several of which, including Abkhazia, Transdniester, South Ossetia and the NKR, survived in the margins of international relations for decades despite non-recognition.

    Semi-sovereign states

    Sovereignty is most commonly conceptualised as something categorical, which is either present or absent, and the coherence of any intermediate position in that binary has been questioned, especially in the context of international law. In spite of this, some authors admit the concept of a semi-sovereign state, a state which is officially acknowledged as sovereign but whose theoretical sovereignty is significantly impaired in practice, such as by being de facto subjected to a more powerful neighbour; Belarus, in its relationship with Russia, has been proposed as a contemporary example of a semi-sovereign state. In a somewhat different sense, the term semi-sovereign was famously applied to West Germany by political scientist Peter Katzenstein in his 1987 book Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State, due to having a political system in which the sovereignty of the state was subject to limitations both internal (West Germany’s federal system and the role of civil society) and external (membership in the European Community and reliance on its alliance with the United States and NATO for its national security).

    Relationship between state and government

    Although the terms “state” and “government” are often used interchangeably, international law distinguishes between a non-physical state and its government; and in fact, the concept of “government-in-exile” is predicated upon that distinction. States are non-physical juridical entities, not organisations of any kind. However, ordinarily, only the government of a state can obligate or bind the state, for example by treaty.

    State extinction

    Generally speaking, states are durable entities, though they can become extinguished, either through voluntary means or outside forces, such as military conquest. Violent state abolition has virtually ceased since the end of World War II. Because states are non-physical juridical entities, it has been argued that their extinction cannot be due to physical force alone. Instead, the physical actions of the military must be associated with the correct social or judiciary actions for a state to be abolished.

    Ontological status of the state

    The ontological status of the state has been a subject of debate, especially, whether or not the state, is an object that no one can see, taste, touch, or otherwise detect, actually exists.

    The state as “quasi-abstract”

    It has been argued that one potential reason why the existence of states has been controversial is that states do not have a place in the traditional Platonist duality of the concrete and the abstract. Characteristically, concrete objects are those that have a position in time and space, which states do not have (though their territories have a spatial position, states are distinct from their territories), and abstract objects have a position in neither time nor space, which does not fit the supposed characteristics of states either, since states do have a temporal position (they can be created at certain times and then become extinct at a future time). Therefore, it has been argued that states belong to a third category, the quasi-abstract, that has recently begun to garner philosophical attention, especially in the area of Documentality, an ontological theory that seeks to understand the role of documents in understanding all of social reality. Quasi-abstract objects, such as states, can be brought into being through document acts, and can also be used to manipulate them, such as by binding them by treaty or surrendering them as the result of a war.

    Scholars in international relations can be broken up into two different practices, realists and pluralists, of what they believe the ontological state of the state is. Realists believe that the world is one of only states and interstate relations and the identity of the state is defined before any international relations with other states. On the other hand, pluralists believe that the state is not the only actor in international relations and interactions between states and the state is competing against many other actors.

    The state as “spiritual entity”

    Another theory of the ontology of the state is that the state is a spiritual, or “mystical entity” with its own being, distinct from the members of the state. The German Idealist philosopher Georg Hegel (1770–1831) was perhaps the greatest proponent of this theory. The Hegelian definition of the state is “the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth”.

    Trends in the number of states

    Since the end of World War II, the number of sovereign states in the international system has surged. Some research suggests that the existence of international and regional organisations, the greater availability of economic aid, and greater acceptance of the norm of self-determination have increased the desire of political units to secede and can be credited for the increase in the number of states in the international system. Harvard economist Alberto Alesina and Tufts economist Enrico Spolaore argue in their book, Size of Nations, that the increase in the number of states can partly be credited to a more peaceful world, greater free trade and international economic integration, democratisation, and the presence of international organisations that co-ordinate economic and political policies.

  • Customary law

    A legal custom is the established pattern of behavior within a particular social setting. A claim can be carried out in defense of “what has always been done and accepted by law”.

    Customary law (also, consuetudinary or unofficial law) exists where:

    a certain legal practice is observed and the relevant actors consider it to be an opinion of law or necessity (opinio juris). Most customary laws deal with standards of the community that have been long-established in a given locale. However, the term can also apply to areas of international law where certain standards have been nearly universal in their acceptance as correct bases of action – for example, laws against piracy or slavery (see hostis humani generis). In many, though not all instances, customary laws will have supportive court rulings and case law that have evolved over time to give additional weight to their rule as law and also to demonstrate the trajectory of evolution (if any) in the judicial interpretation of such law by relevant courts.

    A central issue regarding the recognition of custom is determining the appropriate methodology to know what practices and norms actually constitute customary law. It is not immediately clear that classic Western theories of jurisprudence can be reconciled in any useful way with conceptual analyses of customary law, and thus some scholars (like John Comaroff and Simon Roberts) have characterized customary law norms in their own terms. Yet, there clearly remains some disagreement, which is seen in John Hund’s critique of Comaroff and Roberts’ theory, and preference for the contributions of H. L. A. Hart. Hund argues that Hart’s The Concept of Law solves the conceptual problem with which scholars who have attempted to articulate how customary law principles may be identified, defined, and how they operate in regulating social behavior and resolving disputes.

    Customary law is the set of customs, practices and beliefs that are accepted as obligatory rules of conduct by a community.

    Comaroff and Roberts’ famous work, “Rules and Processes”, attempted to detail the body of norms that constitute Tswana law in a way that was less legalistic (or rule-oriented) than had Isaac Schapera. They defined “mekgwa le melao ya Setswana” in terms of Casalis and Ellenberger’s definition: melao therefore being rules pronounced by a chief and mekgwa as norms that become customary law through traditional usage. Importantly, however, they noted that the Tswana seldom attempt to classify the vast array of existing norms into categories and they thus termed this the ‘undifferentiated nature of the normative repertoire’. Moreover, they observe the co-existence of overtly incompatible norms that may breed conflict, either due to circumstances in a particular situation or inherently due to their incongruous content. This lack of rule classification and failure to eradicate internal inconsistencies between potentially conflicting norms allows for much flexibility in dispute settlement and is also viewed as a ‘strategic resource’ for disputants who seek to advance their own success in a case. The latter incongruities (especially inconsistencies of norm content) are typically solved by elevating one of the norms (tacitly) from ‘the literal to the symbolic. This allows for the accommodation of both as they now theoretically exist in different realms of reality. This is highly contextual, which further illustrates that norms cannot be viewed in isolation and are open to negotiation. Thus, although there are a small number of so-called non-negotiable norms, the vast majority are viewed and given substance contextually, which is seen as fundamental to the Tswana.

    Comaroff and Roberts describe how outcomes of specific cases have the ability to change the normative repertoire, as the repertoire of norms is seen to be both in a state of formation and transformation at all times. These changes are justified on the grounds that they are merely giving recognition to de facto observations of transformation. Furthermore, the legitimacy of a chief is a direct determinant of the legitimacy of his decisions. In the formulation of legislative pronouncements, as opposed to decisions made in dispute resolution, the chief first speaks of the proposed norm with his advisors, then council of headmen, then the public assembly debate the proposed law and may accept or reject it. A chief can proclaim the law even if the public assembly rejects it, but this is not often done; and, if the chief proclaims the legislation against the will of the public assembly, the legislation will become melao, however, it is unlikely that it will be executed because its effectiveness depends on the chief’s legitimacy and the norm’s consistency with the practices (and changes in social relations) and will of the people under that chief.

    Regarding the invocation of norms in disputes, Comaroff and Roberts used the term, “paradigm of argument”, to refer to the linguistic and conceptual frame used by a disputant, whereby ‘a coherent picture of relevant events and actions in terms of one or more implicit or explicit normative referents’ is created. In their explanation, the complainant (who always speaks first) thus establishes a paradigm the defendant can either accept and therefore argue within that specific paradigm or reject and therefore introduce his or her own paradigm (usually, the facts are not contested here). If the defendant means to change the paradigm, they will refer to norms as such, where actually norms are not ordinarily explicitly referenced in Tswana dispute resolution as the audience would typically already know them and just the way one presents one’s case and constructs the facts will establish one’s paradigm. The headman or chief adjudicating may also do same: accept the normative basis implied by the parties (or one of them), and thus not refer to norms using explicit language but rather isolate a factual issue in the dispute and then make a decision on it without expressly referring to any norms, or impose a new or different paradigm onto the parties.

    Hund finds Comaroff and Roberts’ flexibility thesis of a ‘repertoire of norms’ from which litigants and adjudicator choose in the process of negotiating solutions between them uncompelling. He is therefore concerned with disproving what he calls “rule scepticism” on their part. He notes that the concept of custom generally denotes convergent behaviour, but not all customs have the force of law. Hund therefore draws from Hart’s analysis distinguishing social rules, which have internal and external aspects, from habits, which have only external aspects. Internal aspects are the reflective attitude on the part of adherents toward certain behaviours perceived to be obligatory, according to a common standard. External aspects manifest in regular, observable behaviour, but is not obligatory. In Hart’s analysis, then, social rules amount to custom that has legal force.

    Hart identifies three further differences between habits and binding social rules. First, a social rule exists where society frowns on deviation from the habit and attempts to prevent departures by criticising such behaviour. Second, when this criticism is seen socially as a good reason for adhering to the habit, and it is welcomed. And, third, when members of a group behave in a common way not only out of habit or because everyone else is doing it, but because it is seen to be a common standard that should be followed, at least by some members. Hund, however, acknowledges the difficulty of an outsider knowing the dimensions of these criteria that depend on an internal point of view.

    For Hund, the first form of rule scepticism concerns the widely held opinion that, because the content of customary law derives from practice, there are actually no objective rules, since it is only behaviour that informs their construction. On this view, it is impossible to distinguish between behaviour that is rule bound and behaviour that is not—i.e., which behaviour is motivated by adherence to law (or at least done in recognition of the law) and is merely a response to other factors. Hund sees this as problematic because it makes quantifying the law almost impossible, since behaviour is obviously inconsistent. Hund argues that this is a misconception based on a failure to acknowledge the importance of the internal element. In his view, by using the criteria described above, there is not this problem in deciphering what constitutes “law” in a particular community.

    According to Hund, the second form of rule scepticism says that, though a community may have rules, those rules are not arrived at ‘deductively’, i.e. they are not created through legal/moral reasoning only but are instead driven by the personal/political motives of those who create them. The scope for such influence is created by the loose and undefined nature of customary law, which, Hund argues, grants customary-lawmakers (often through traditional ‘judicial processes’) a wide discretion in its application. Yet, Hund contends that the fact that rules might sometimes be arrived at in the more ad hoc way, does not mean that this defines the system. If one requires a perfect system, where laws are created only deductively, then one is left with a system with no rules. For Hund, this cannot be so and an explanation for these kinds of law-making processes is found in Hart’s conception of “secondary rules” (rules in terms of which the main body of norms are recognised). Hund therefore says that for some cultures, for instance in some sections of Tswana society, the secondary rules have developed only to the point where laws are determined with reference to politics and personal preference. This does not mean that they are not “rules”. Hund argues that if we acknowledge a developmental pattern in societies’ constructions of these secondary rules then we can understand how this society constructs its laws and how it differs from societies that have come to rely on an objective, stand-alone body of rules.

    The modern codification of civil law developed from the tradition of medieval custumals, collections of local customary law that developed in a specific manorial or borough jurisdiction, and which were slowly pieced together mainly from case law and later written down by local jurists. Custumals acquired the force of law when they became the undisputed rule by which certain rights, entitlements, and obligations were regulated between members of a community. Some examples include Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae for England, the Coutume de Paris for the city of Paris, the Sachsenspiegel for northern Germany, and the many fueros of Spain.

    In international law, customary law refers to the Law of Nations or the legal norms that have developed through the customary exchanges between states over time, whether based on diplomacy or aggression. Essentially, legal obligations are believed to arise between states to carry out their affairs consistently with past accepted conduct. These customs can also change based on the acceptance or rejection by states of particular acts. Some principles of customary law have achieved the force of peremptory norms, which cannot be violated or altered except by a norm of comparable strength. These norms are said to gain their strength from universal acceptance, such as the prohibitions against genocide and slavery. Customary international law can be distinguished from treaty law, which consists of explicit agreements between nations to assume obligations. However, many treaties are attempts to codify pre-existing customary law.

    Customary law is a recognized source of law within jurisdictions of the civil law tradition, where it may be subordinate to both statutes and regulations. In addressing custom as a source of law within the civil law tradition, John Henry Merryman notes that, though the attention it is given in scholarly works is great, its importance is “slight and decreasing”. On the other hand, in many countries around the world, one or more types of customary law continue to exist side by side with official law, a condition referred to as legal pluralism (see also List of national legal systems).

    In the canon law of the Catholic Church, custom is a source of law. Canonical jurisprudence, however, differs from civil law jurisprudence in requiring the express or implied consent of the legislator for a custom to obtain the force of law.

    In the English common law, “long usage” must be established.

    It is a broad principle of property law that, if something has gone on for a long time without objection, whether it be using a right of way or occupying land to which one has no title, the law will eventually recognise the fact and give the person doing it the legal right to continue.

    It is known in case law as “customary rights”. Something which has been practised since time immemorial by reference to a particular locality may acquire the legal status of a custom, which is a form of local law. The legal criteria defining a custom are precise. The most common claim in recent times, is for customary rights to moor a vessel.

    The mooring must have been in continuous use for “time immemorial” which is defined by legal precedent as 12 years (or 20 years for Crown land) for the same purpose by people using them for that purpose. To give two examples: a custom of mooring which might have been established in past times for over two hundred years by the fishing fleet of local inhabitants of a coastal community will not simply transfer so as to benefit present day recreational boat owners who may hail from much further afield. Whereas a group of houseboats on a mooring that has been in continuous use for the last 25 years with a mixture of owner occupiers and rented houseboats, may clearly continue to be used by houseboats, where the owners live in the same town or city. Both the purpose of the moorings and the class of persons benefited by the custom must have been clear and consistent.

    In Canada, customary aboriginal law has a constitutional foundation and for this reason has increasing influence.

    In the Scandinavian countries customary law continues to exist and has great influence.

    Customary law is also used in some developing countries, usually used alongside common or civil law. For example, in Ethiopia, despite the adoption of legal codes based on civil law in the 1950s according to Dolores Donovan and Getachew Assefa there are more than 60 systems of customary law currently in force, “some of them operating quite independently of the formal state legal system”. They offer two reasons for the relative autonomy of these customary law systems: one is that the Ethiopian government lacks sufficient resources to enforce its legal system to every corner of Ethiopia; the other is that the Ethiopian government has made a commitment to preserve these customary systems within its boundaries.

    In 1995, President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev announced a decree to revitalize the aqsaqal courts of village elders. The courts would have jurisdiction over property, torts and family law. The aqsaqal courts were eventually included under Article 92 of the Kyrgyz constitution. As of 2006, there were approximately 1,000 aqsaqal courts throughout Kyrgyzstan, including in the capital of Bishkek. Akaev linked the development of these courts to the rekindling of Kyrgyz national identity. In a 2005 speech, he connected the courts back to the country’s nomadic past and extolled how the courts expressed the Kyrgyz ability of self-governance. Similar aqsaqal courts exist, with varying levels of legal formality, in other countries of Central Asia.

    The Somali people in the Horn of Africa follow a customary law system referred to as xeer. It survives to a significant degree everywhere in Somalia and in the Somali communities in the Ogaden. Economist Peter Leeson attributes the increase in economic activity since the fall of the Siad Barre administration to the security in life, liberty and property provided by Xeer in large parts of Somalia. The Dutch attorney Michael van Notten also draws upon his experience as a legal expert in his comprehensive study on Xeer, The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa (2005).

    In India many customs are accepted by law. For example, Hindu marriage ceremonies are recognized by the Hindu Marriage Act.

    In Indonesia, customary adat laws of the country’s various indigenous ethnicities are recognized, and customary dispute resolution is recognized in Papua. Indonesian adat law are mainly divided into 19 circles, namely Aceh, Gayo, Alas, and Batak, Minangkabau, South Sumatra, the Malay regions, Bangka and Belitung, Kalimantan, Minahasa, Gorontalo, Toraja, South Sulawesi, Ternate, the Molluccas, Papua, Timor, Bali and Lombok, Central and East Java including the island of Madura, Sunda, and the Javanese monarchies, including the Yogyakarta Sultanate, Surakarta Sunanate, and the Pakualaman and Mangkunegaran princely states.

    In the Philippines, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 recognizes customary laws of indigenous peoples within their domain.

  • International law

    International law, also known as public international law and the law of nations, is the set of rules, norms, legal customs and standards that states and other actors feel an obligation to, and generally do, obey in their mutual relations. In international relations, actors are simply the individuals and collective entities, such as states, international organizations, and non-state groups, which can make behavioral choices, whether lawful or unlawful. Rules are formal, typically written expectations that outline required behavior, while norms are informal, often unwritten guidelines about appropriate behavior that are shaped by custom and social practice. It establishes norms for states across a broad range of domains, including war and diplomacy, economic relations, and human rights.

    International law differs from state-based domestic legal systems in that it operates largely through consent, since there is no universally accepted authority to enforce it upon sovereign states. States and non-state actors may choose to not abide by international law, and even to breach a treaty, but such violations, particularly of peremptory norms, can be met with disapproval by others and in some cases coercive action including diplomacy, economic sanctions, and war.

    The sources of international law include international custom (general state practice accepted as law), treaties, and general principles of law recognised by most national legal systems. Although international law may also be reflected in international comity—the practices adopted by states to maintain good relations and mutual recognition—such traditions are not legally binding. The relationship and interaction between a national legal system and international law is complex and variable. National law may become international law when treaties permit national jurisdiction to supranational tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Court. Treaties such as the Geneva Conventions require national law to conform to treaty provisions. National laws or constitutions may also provide for the implementation or integration of international legal obligations into domestic law.

    The modern term “international law” was originally coined by Jeremy Bentham in his 1789 book Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation to replace the older law of nations, a direct translation of the late medieval concepts of ius gentium, used by Hugo Grotius, and droits des gens, used by Emer de Vattel. The definition of international law has been debated; Bentham referred specifically to relationships between states which has been criticised for its narrow scope. Lassa Oppenheim defined it in his treatise as “a law between sovereign and equal states based on the common consent of these states” and this definition has been largely adopted by international legal scholars.

    There is a distinction between public and private international law; the latter is concerned with whether national courts can claim jurisdiction over cases with a foreign element and the application of foreign judgments in domestic law, whereas public international law covers rules with an international origin. The difference between the two areas of law has been debated as scholars disagree about the nature of their relationship. Joseph Story, who originated the term “private international law”, emphasised that it must be governed by the principles of public international law but other academics view them as separate bodies of law. Another term, transnational law, is sometimes used to refer to a body of both national and international rules that transcend the nation state, although some academics emphasise that it is distinct from either type of law. It was defined by Philip Jessup as “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers”.

    A more recent concept is supranational law, which was described in a 1969 paper as ” relatively new word in the vocabulary of politics”. Systems of supranational law arise when nations explicitly cede their right to make decisions to this system’s judiciary and legislature, which then have the right to make laws that are directly effective in each member state. This has been described as “a level of international integration beyond mere intergovernmentalism yet still short of a federal system”. The most common example of a supranational system is the European Union.

    With origins tracing back to antiquity, states have a long history of negotiating interstate agreements. An initial framework was conceptualised by the Ancient Romans and this idea of ius gentium has been used by various academics to establish the modern concept of international law. Among the earliest recorded examples are peace treaties between the Mesopotamian city-states of Lagash and Umma (approximately 3100 BCE), and an agreement between the Egyptian pharaoh, Ramesses II, and the Hittite king, Ḫattušili III, concluded in 1279 BCE. Interstate pacts and agreements were negotiated and agreed upon by polities across the world, from the eastern Mediterranean to East Asia. In Ancient Greece, many early peace treaties were negotiated between its city-states and, occasionally, with neighbouring states. The Roman Empire established an early conceptual framework for international law, jus gentium, which governed the status of foreigners living in Rome and relations between foreigners and Roman citizens. Adopting the Greek concept of natural law, the Romans conceived of jus gentium as being universal. However, in contrast to modern international law, the Roman law of nations applied to relations with and between foreign individuals rather than among political units such as states.

    Beginning with the Spring and Autumn period of the eighth century BCE, China was divided into numerous states that were often at war with each other. Rules for diplomacy and treaty-making emerged, including notions regarding just grounds for war, the rights of neutral parties, and the consolidation and partition of states; these concepts were sometimes applied to relations with barbarians along China’s western periphery beyond the Central Plains. The subsequent Warring States period saw the development of two major schools of thought, Confucianism and Legalism, both of which held that the domestic and international legal spheres were closely interlinked, and sought to establish competing normative principles to guide foreign relations. Similarly, the Indian subcontinent was divided into various states, which over time developed rules of neutrality, treaty law, and international conduct, and established both temporary and permanent embassies.

    Following the collapse of the western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE, Europe fragmented into numerous often-warring states for much of the next five centuries. Political power was dispersed across a range of entities, including the Church, mercantile city-states, and kingdoms, most of which had overlapping and ever-changing jurisdictions. As in China and India, these divisions prompted the development of rules aimed at providing stable and predictable relations. Early examples include canon law, which governed ecclesiastical institutions and clergy throughout Europe; the lex mercatoria (“merchant law”), which concerned trade and commerce; and various codes of maritime law, such as the Rolls of Oléron— aimed at regulating shipping in North-western Europe — and the later Laws of Wisby, enacted among the commercial Hanseatic League of northern Europe and the Baltic region.

    In the Islamic world, Muhammad al-Shaybani published Al-Siyar Al-Kabīr in the eighth century, which served as a fundamental reference work for siyar, a subset of Sharia law, which governed foreign relations. This was based on the division of the world into three categories: the dar al-Islam, where Islamic law prevailed; the dar al-sulh, non-Islamic realms that concluded an armistice with a Muslim government; and the dar al-harb, non-Islamic lands which were contested through jihad. Islamic legal principles concerning military conduct served as precursors to modern international humanitarian law and institutionalised limitations on military conduct, including guidelines for commencing war, distinguishing between civilians and combatants and caring for the sick and wounded.

    During the European Middle Ages, international law was concerned primarily with the purpose and legitimacy of war, seeking to determine what constituted “just war”. The Greco-Roman concept of natural law was combined with religious principles by Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1135–1204) and Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) to create the new discipline of the “law of nations”, which unlike its eponymous Roman predecessor, applied natural law to relations between states. In Islam, a similar framework was developed wherein the law of nations was derived, in part, from the principles and rules set forth in treaties with non-Muslims.

    The 15th century witnessed a confluence of factors that contributed to an accelerated development of international law. Italian jurist Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357) was considered the founder of private international law. Another Italian jurist, Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400), provided commentaries and compilations of Roman, ecclesiastical, and feudal law, creating an organised source of law that could be referenced by different nations. Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) took a secular view to international law, authoring various books on issues in international law, notably Law of War, which provided comprehensive commentary on the laws of war and treaties. Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546), who was concerned with the treatment of indigenous peoples by Spain, invoked the law of nations as a basis for their innate dignity and rights, articulating an early version of sovereign equality between peoples. Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) emphasised that international law was founded upon natural law and human positive law.

    Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is widely regarded as the father of international law, being one of the first scholars to articulate an international order that consists of a “society of states” governed not by force or warfare but by actual laws, mutual agreements, and customs. Grotius secularised international law; his 1625 work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, laid down a system of principles of natural law that bind all nations regardless of local custom or law. He inspired two nascent schools of international law, the naturalists and the positivists. In the former camp was German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), who stressed the supremacy of the law of nature over states. His 1672 work, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, expanded on the theories of Grotius and grounded natural law to reason and the secular world, asserting that it regulated only external acts of states. Pufendorf challenged the Hobbesian notion that the state of nature was one of war and conflict, arguing that the natural state of the world is actually peaceful but weak and uncertain without adherence to the law of nations. The actions of a state consist of nothing more than the sum of the individuals within that state, thereby requiring the state to apply a fundamental law of reason, which is the basis of natural law. He was among the earliest scholars to expand international law beyond European Christian nations, advocating for its application and recognition among all peoples on the basis of shared humanity.

    In contrast, positivist writers, such as Richard Zouche (1590–1661) in England and Cornelis van Bynkershoek (1673–1743) in the Netherlands, argued that international law should derive from the actual practice of states rather than Christian or Greco-Roman sources. The study of international law shifted away from its core concern on the law of war and towards the domains such as the law of the sea and commercial treaties. The positivist school grew more popular as it reflected accepted views of state sovereignty and was consistent with the empiricist approach to philosophy that was then gaining acceptance in Europe.

    The developments of the 17th century culminated at the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which is considered the seminal event in international law. The resulting Westphalian sovereignty is said to have established the current international legal order characterised by independent nation states, which have equal sovereignty regardless of their size and power, defined primarily by non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, although historians have challenged this narrative. The idea of nationalism further solidified the concept and formation of nation-states. Elements of the naturalist and positivist schools were synthesised, notably by German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel (1714–1767), both of whom sought a middle-ground approach. During the 18th century, the positivist tradition gained broader acceptance, although the concept of natural rights remained influential in international politics, particularly through the republican revolutions of the United States and France.

    Until the mid-19th century, relations between states were dictated mostly by treaties, agreements between states to behave in a certain way, unenforceable except by force, and nonbinding except as matters of honour and faithfulness. One of the first instruments of modern armed conflict law was the Lieber Code of 1863, which governed the conduct of warfare during the American Civil War, and is noted for codifying rules and articles of war adhered to by nations across the world, including the United Kingdom, Prussia, Serbia and Argentina. In the years that followed, numerous other treaties and bodies were created to regulate the conduct of states towards one another, including the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, and the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the first of which was passed in 1864.

    Colonial expansion by European powers reached its peak in the late 19th century and its influence began to wane following the unprecedented bloodshed of World War I, which spurred the creation of international organisations. Right of conquest was generally recognized as international law before World War II. The League of Nations was founded to safeguard peace and security. International law began to incorporate notions such as self-determination and human rights. The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 to replace the League, with an aim of maintaining collective security. A more robust international legal order followed, buttressed by institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The International Law Commission (ILC) was established in 1947 to develop and codify international law.

    In the 1940s through the 1970s, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and decolonisation across the world resulted in the establishment of scores of newly independent states. As these former colonies became their own states, they adopted European views of international law. A flurry of institutions, ranging from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) to the World Health Organization furthered the development of a multilateralist approach as states chose to compromise on sovereignty to benefit from international cooperation. Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing focus on the phenomenon of globalisation and on protecting human rights on the global scale, particularly when minorities or indigenous communities are involved, as concerns are raised that globalisation may be increasing inequality in the international legal system.

    The sources of international law applied by the community of nations are listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is considered authoritative in this regard. These categories are, in order, international treaties, customary international law, general legal principles and judicial decisions and the teachings of prominent legal scholars as “a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”. It was originally considered that the arrangement of the sources sequentially would suggest an implicit hierarchy of sources; however, the statute does not provide for a hierarchy and other academics have argued that therefore the sources must be equivalent.

    General principles of law have been defined in the Statute as “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” but there is no academic consensus about what is included within this scope. They are considered to be derived from both national and international legal systems, although including the latter category has led to debate about potential cross-over with international customary law. The relationship of general principles to treaties or custom has generally been considered to be “fill[ing] the gaps” although there is still no conclusion about their exact relationship in the absence of a hierarchy.

    A treaty is defined in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”. The definition specifies that the parties must be states, however international organisations are also considered to have the capacity to enter treaties. Treaties are binding through the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which allows states to create legal obligations on themselves through consent. The treaty must be governed by international law; however it will likely be interpreted by national courts. The VCLT, which codifies several bedrock principles of treaty interpretation, holds that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. This represents a compromise between three theories of interpretation: the textual approach which looks to the ordinary meaning of the text, the subjective approach which considers factors such as the drafters’ intention, and the teleological approach which interprets a treaty according to its objective and purpose.

    A state must express its consent to be bound by a treaty through signature, exchange of instruments, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Accession refers to a state choosing to become party to a treaty that it is unable to sign, such as when establishing a regional body. Where a treaty states that it will be enacted through ratification, acceptance or approval, the parties must sign to indicate acceptance of the wording but there is no requirement on a state to later ratify the treaty, although they may still be subject to certain obligations. When signing or ratifying a treaty, a state can make a unilateral statement to negate or amend certain legal provisions which can have one of three effects: the reserving state is bound by the treaty but the effects of the relevant provisions are precluded or changes, the reserving state is bound by the treaty but not the relevant provisions, or the reserving state is not bound by the treaty. An interpretive declaration is a separate process, where a state issues a unilateral statement to specify or clarify a treaty provision. This can affect the interpretation of the treaty but it is generally not legally binding. A state is also able to issue a conditional declaration stating that it will consent to a given treaty only on the condition of a particular provision or interpretation.

    Article 54 of the VCLT provides that either party may terminate or withdraw from a treaty in accordance with its terms or at any time with the consent of the other party, with ‘termination’ applying to a bilateral treaty and ‘withdrawal’ applying to a multilateral treaty. Where a treaty does not have provisions allowing for termination or withdrawal, such as the Genocide Convention, it is prohibited unless the right was implied into the treaty or the parties had intended to allow for it. A treaty can also be held invalid, including where parties act ultra vires or negligently, where execution has been obtained through fraudulent, corrupt or forceful means, or where the treaty contradicts peremptory norms.

    Customary international law requires two elements: a consistent practice of states and the conviction of those states that the consistent practice is required by a legal obligation, referred to as opinio juris. Custom distinguishes itself from treaty law as it is binding on all states, regardless of whether they have participated in the practice, with the exception of states who have been persistent objectors during the process of the custom being formed and special or local forms of customary law. The requirement for state practice relates to the practice, either through action or failure to act, of states in relation to other states or international organisations. There is no legal requirement for state practice to be uniform or for the practice to be long-running, although the ICJ has set a high bar for enforcement in the cases of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and North Sea Continental Shelf. There has been legal debate on this topic with the only prominent view on the length of time necessary to establish custom explained by Humphrey Waldock as varying “according to the nature of the case”. The practice is not required to be followed universally by states, but there must be a “general recognition” by states “whose interests are specially affected”.

    The second element of the test, opinio juris, the belief of a party that a particular action is required by the law is referred to as the subjective element. The ICJ has stated in dictum in North Sea Continental Shelf that, “Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”. A committee of the International Law Association has argued that there is a general presumption of an opinio juris where state practice is proven but it may be necessary if the practice suggests that the states did not believe it was creating a precedent.The test in these circumstances is whether opinio juris can be proven by the states’ failure to protest. Other academics believe that intention to create customary law can be shown by states including the principle in multiple bilateral and multilateral treaties, so that treaty law is necessary to form customs.

    The adoption of the VCLT in 1969 established the concept of jus cogens, or peremptory norms, which are “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”. Where customary or treaty law conflicts with a peremptory norm, it will be considered invalid, but there is no agreed definition of jus cogens. Academics have debated what principles are considered peremptory norms but the mostly widely agreed is the principle of non-use of force. The next year, the ICJ defined erga omnes obligations as those owed to “the international community as a whole”, which included the illegality of genocide and human rights.

    There are generally two approaches to the relationship between international and national law, namely monism and dualism. Monism assumes that international and national law are part of the same legal order. Therefore, a treaty can directly become part of national law without the need for enacting legislation, although they will generally need to be approved by the legislature. Once approved, the content of the treaty is considered as a law that has a higher status than national laws. Examples of countries with a monism approach are France and the Netherlands. The dualism approach considers that national and international law are two separate legal orders, so treaties are not granted a special status. The rules in a treaty can only be considered national law if the contents of the treaty have been enacted first. An example is the United Kingdom; after the country ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, the convention was only considered to have the force of law in national law after Parliament passed the Human Rights Act 1998.

    In practice, the division of countries between monism and dualism is often more complicated; countries following both approaches may accept peremptory norms as being automatically binding and they may approach treaties, particularly later amendments or clarifications, differently than they would approach customary law. Many countries with older or unwritten constitutions do not have explicit provision for international law in their domestic system and there has been an upswing in support for monism principles in relation to human rights and humanitarian law, as most principles governing these concepts can be found in international law.

    A state is defined under Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States as a legal person with a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter relations with other states. There is no requirement on population size, allowing micro-states such as San Marino and Monaco to be admitted to the UN, and no requirement of fully defined boundaries, allowing Israel to be admitted despite border disputes. There was originally an intention that a state must have self-determination, but now the requirement is for a stable political environment. The final requirement of being able to enter relations is commonly evidenced by independence and sovereignty.

    Under the principle of par in parem non habet imperium, all states are sovereign and equal, but state recognition often plays a significant role in political conceptions. A country may recognise another nation as a state and, separately, it may recognise that nation’s government as being legitimate and capable of representing the state on the international stage. There are two theories on recognition; the declaratory theory sees recognition as commenting on a current state of law which has been separately satisfied whereas the constitutive theory states that recognition by other states determines whether a state can be considered to have legal personality. States can be recognised explicitly through a released statement or tacitly through conducting official relations, although some countries have formally interacted without conferring recognition.

    Throughout the 19th century and the majority of the 20th century, states were protected by absolute immunity, so they could not face criminal prosecution for any actions. However a number of countries began to distinguish between acta jure gestionis, commercial actions, and acta jure imperii, government actions; the restrictive theory of immunity said states were immune where they were acting in a governmental capacity but not a commercial one. The European Convention on State Immunity in 1972 and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property attempt to restrict immunity in accordance with customary law.

    Historically individuals have not been seen as entities in international law, as the focus was on the relationship between states. As human rights have become more important on the global stage, being codified by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, individuals have been given the power to defend their rights to judicial bodies. International law is largely silent on the issue of nationality law with the exception of cases of dual nationality or where someone is claiming rights under refugee law but as, argued by the political theorist Hannah Arendt, human rights are often tied to someone’s nationality. The European Court of Human Rights allows individuals to petition the court where their rights have been violated and national courts have not intervened and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights have similar powers.

    Traditionally, sovereign states and the Holy See were the sole subjects of international law. With the proliferation of international organisations over the last century, they have also been recognised as relevant parties. One definition of international organisations comes from the ILC’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations which in Article 2(a) states that it is “an organization established by treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality”. This definition functions as a starting point but does not recognise that organisations can have no separate personality but nevertheless function as an international organisation. The UN Economic and Social Council has emphasised a split between inter-government organisations (IGOs), which are created by inter-governmental agreements, and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). All international organisations have members; generally this is restricted to states, although it can include other international organisations. Sometimes non-members will be allowed to participate in meetings as observers.

    The Yearbook of International Organizations sets out a list of international organisations, which include the UN, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF. Generally organisations consist of a plenary organ, where member states can be represented and heard; an executive organ, to decide matters within the competence of the organisation; and an administrative organ, to execute the decisions of the other organs and handle secretarial duties. International organisations will typically provide for their privileges and immunity in relation to its member states in their constitutional documents or in multilateral agreements, such as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. These organisations also have the power to enter treaties, using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations as a basis although it is not yet in force. They may also have the right to bring legal claims against states depending, as set out in Reparation for Injuries, where they have legal personality and the right to do so in their constitution.

    United Nations

    The UNSC has the power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take decisive and binding actions against states committing “a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression” for collective security although prior to 1990, it has only intervened once, in the case of Korea in 1950. This power can only be exercised, however, where a majority of member states vote for it, as well as receiving the support of the permanent five members of the UNSC. This can be followed up with economic sanctions, military action, and similar uses of force. The UNSC also has a wide discretion under Article 24, which grants “primary responsibility” for issues of international peace and security. The UNGA, concerned during the Cold War with the requirement that the USSR would have to authorise any UNSC action, adopted the “Uniting for Peace” resolution of 3 November 1950, which allowed the organ to pass recommendations to authorize the use of force. This resolution also led to the practice of UN peacekeeping, which has been notably been used in East Timor and Kosovo.

    International courts

    There are more than one hundred international courts in the global community, although states have generally been reluctant to allow their sovereignty to be limited in this way. The first known international court was the Central American Court of Justice, prior to World War I, when the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was established. The PCIJ was replaced by the ICJ, which is the best known international court due to its universal scope in relation to geographical jurisdiction and subject matter. There are additionally a number of regional courts, including the Court of Justice of the European Union, the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice of the Andean Community. Interstate arbitration can also be used to resolve disputes between states, leading in 1899 to the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration which facilitates the process by maintaining a list of arbitrators. This process was used in the Island of Palmas case and to resolve disputes during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war.

    The ICJ operates as one of the six organs of the UN, based out of the Hague with a panel of fifteen permanent judges. It has jurisdiction to hear cases involving states but cannot get involved in disputes involving individuals or international organizations. The states that can bring cases must be party to the Statute of the ICJ, although in practice most states are UN members and would therefore be eligible. The court has jurisdiction over all cases that are referred to it and all matters specifically referred to in the UN Charter or international treaties, although in practice there are no relevant matters in the UN Charter. The ICJ may also be asked by an international organisation to provide an advisory opinion on a legal question, which are generally considered non-binding but authoritative.

    Conflict of laws, also known as private international law, was originally concerned with choice of law, determining which nation’s laws should govern a particular legal circumstance. Historically the comity theory has been used although the definition is unclear, sometimes referring to reciprocity and sometimes being used as a synonym for private international law. Story distinguished it from “any absolute paramount obligation, superseding all discretion on the subject”. There are three aspects to conflict of laws – determining which domestic court has jurisdiction over a dispute, determining if a domestic court has jurisdiction and determining whether foreign judgments can be enforced. The first question relates to whether the domestic court or a foreign court is best placed to decide the case. When determining the national law that should apply, the lex causae is the law that has been chosen to govern the case, which is generally foreign, and the lexi fori is the national law of the court making the determination. Some examples are lex domicilii, the law of the domicile, and les patriae, the law of the nationality.

    The rules which are applied to conflict of laws will vary depending on the national system determining the question. There have been attempts to codify an international standard to unify the rules so differences in national law cannot lead to inconsistencies, such as through the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Brussels Regulations. These treaties codified practice on the enforcement of international judgments, stating that a foreign judgment would be automatically recognised and enforceable where required in the jurisdiction where the party resides, unless the judgement was contrary to public order or conflicted with a local judgment between the same parties. On a global level, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was introduced in 1958 to internationalise the enforcement of arbitral awards, although it does not have jurisdiction over court judgments.

    A state must prove that it has jurisdiction before it can exercise its legal authority. This concept can be divided between prescriptive jurisdiction, which is the authority of a legislature to enact legislation on a particular issue, and adjudicative jurisdiction, which is the authority of a court to hear a particular case. This aspect of private international law should first be resolved by reference to domestic law, which may incorporate international treaties or other supranational legal concepts, although there are consistent international norms. There are five forms of jurisdiction which are consistently recognised in international law; an individual or act can be subject to multiple forms of jurisdiction. The first is the territorial principle, which states that a nation has jurisdiction over actions which occur within its territorial boundaries. The second is the nationality principle, also known as the active personality principle, whereby a nation has jurisdiction over actions committed by its nationals regardless of where they occur. The third is the passive personality principle, which gives a country jurisdiction over any actions which harm its nationals. The fourth is the protective principle, where a nation has jurisdiction in relation to threats to its “fundamental national interests”. The final form is universal jurisdiction, where a country has jurisdiction over certain acts based on the nature of the crime itself.

    Following World War II, the modern system for international human rights was developed to make states responsible for their human rights violations. The UN Economic and Security Council established the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1946, which developed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which established non-binding international human rights standards, for work, standards of living, housing and education, non-discrimination, a fair trial and prohibition of torture. Two further human rights treaties were adopted by the UN in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These two documents along with the UDHR are considered the International Bill of Human Rights.

    Non-domestic human rights enforcement operates at both the international and regional levels. Established in 1993, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights supervises Charter-based and treaty-based procedures. The former are based on the UN Charter and operate under the UN Human Rights Council, where each global region is represented by elected member states. The Council is responsible for Universal Periodic Review, which requires each UN member state to review its human rights compliance every four years, and for special procedures, including the appointment of special rapporteurs, independent experts and working groups. The treaty-based procedure allows individuals to rely on the nine primary human rights treaties:

    International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination


    ICCPR


    ICESCR


    Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women


    Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment


    Convention on the Rights of the Child


    International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

    Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

    International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance – to enforce their rights.

    The regional human rights enforcement systems operate in Europe, Africa and the Americas through the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. International human rights has faced criticism for its Western focus, as many countries were subject to colonial rule at the time that the UDHR was drafted, although many countries in the Global South have led the development of human rights on the global stage in the intervening decades.

    International labour law is generally defined as “the substantive rules of law established at the international level and the procedural rules relating to their adoption and implementation”. It operates primarily through the International Labor Organization (ILO), a UN agency with the mission of protecting employment rights which was established in 1919. The ILO has a constitution setting out a number of aims, including regulating work hours and labour supply, protecting workers and children and recognising equal pay and the right to free association, as well as the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, which re-defined the purpose of the ILO. The 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work further binds ILO member states to recognise fundamental labour rights including free association, collective bargaining and eliminating forced labour, child labour and employment discrimination.

    The ILO have also created labour standards which are set out in their conventions and recommendations. Member states then have the choice as to whether or not to ratify and implement these standards. The secretariat of the ILO is the International Labour Office, which can be consulted by states to determine the meaning of a convention, which forms the ILO’s case law. Although the Right to Organise Convention does not provide an explicit right to strike, this has been interpreted into the treaty through case law. The UN does not specifically focus on international labour law, although some of its treaties cover the same topics. Many of the primary human rights conventions also form part of international labour law, providing protection in employment and against discrimination on the grounds of gender and race.

    It has been claimed that there is no concept of discrete international environmental law, with the general principles of international law instead being applied to these issues. Since the 1960s, a number of treaties focused on environmental protection were ratified, including the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment of 1972, the World Charter for Nature of 1982, and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985. States generally agreed to co-operate with each other in relation to environmental law, as codified by principle 24 of the Rio Declaration of 1972. Despite these, and other, multilateral environmental agreements covering specific issues, there is no overarching policy on international environmental protection or one specific international organisation, with the exception of the UN Environmental Programme. Instead, a general treaty setting out the framework for tackling an issue has then been supplemented by more specific protocols.

    Climate change has been one of the most important and heavily debated topics in recent environmental law. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, intended to set out a framework for the mitigation of greenhouse gases and responses to resulting environmental changes, was introduced in 1992 and came into force two years later. As of 2023, 198 states were a party. Separate protocols have been introduced through conferences of the parties, including the Kyoto Protocol which was introduced in 1997 to set specific targets for greenhouse gas reduction and the 2015 Paris Agreement which set the goal of keeping global warming at least below 2 °C (3.6 °F) above pre-industrial levels.

    Individuals and organisations have some rights under international environmental law as the Aarhus Convention in 1998 set obligations on states to provide information and allow public input on these issues. However few disputes under the regimes set out in environmental agreements are referred to the ICJ, as the agreements tend to specify their compliance procedures. These procedures generally focus on encouraging the state to once again become compliant through recommendations but there is still uncertainty on how these procedures should operate and efforts have been made to regulate these processes although some worry that this will undercut the efficiency of the procedures themselves.

    Legal territory can be divided into four categories. There is territorial sovereignty which covers land and territorial sea, including the airspace above it and the subsoil below it, territory outside the sovereignty of any state, res nullius which is not yet within territorial sovereignty but is territory that is legally capable of being acquired by a state and res communis which is territory that cannot be acquired by a state. There have historically been five methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty, reflecting Roman property law: occupation, accretion, cession, conquest and prescription.

    The law of the sea is the area of international law concerning the principles and rules by which states and other entities interact in maritime matters. It encompasses areas and issues such as navigational rights, sea mineral rights, and coastal waters jurisdiction. The law of the sea was primarily composed of customary law until the 20th century, beginning with the League of Nations Codification Conference in 1930, the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and the adoption of the UNCLOS in 1982. The UNCLOS was particularly notable for making international courts and tribunals responsible for the law of the sea.

    The boundaries of a nation’s territorial sea were initially proposed to be three miles in the late 18th century. The UNCLOS instead defined it as being at most 12 nautical miles from the baseline (usually the coastal low-water mark) of a state; both military and civilian foreign ships are allowed innocent passage through these waters despite the sea being within the state’s sovereignty. A state can have jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters where it claims a contiguous zone of up to 24 nautical miles from its baseline for the purpose of preventing the infringement of its “customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations”. States are also able to claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) following passage of the UNCLOS, which can stretch up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline and gives the sovereign state rights over natural resources. Some states have instead chosen to retain their exclusive fishery zones, which cover the same territory. There are specific rules in relation to the continental shelf, as this can extend further than 200 nautical miles. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has specified that a state has sovereign rights over the resources of the entire continental shelf, regardless of its distance from the baseline, but different rights apply to the continental shelf and the water column above it where it is further than 200 nautical miles from the coast.

    The UNCLOS defines the high seas as all parts of the sea that are not within a state’s EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters. There are six freedoms of the high seas—navigation, overflight, laying submarine cables and pipelines, constructing artificial islands, fishing and scientific research—some of which are subject to legal restrictions. Ships in the high seas are deemed to have the nationality of the flag that they have the right to fly and no other state can exercise jurisdiction over them; the exception is ships used for piracy, which are subject to universal jurisdiction.

    In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank) and the IMF. At the conference, the International Trade Organization was proposed but failed to be instituted due to the refusal of the United States to ratify its charter. Three years later, Part IV of the statute was adopted to create the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which operated between 1948 and 1994, when the WTO was established. The OPEC, which banded together to control global oil supply and prices, caused the previous reliance on fixed currency exchange rates to be dropped in favour of floating exchange rates in 1971. During this recession, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan pushed for free trade and deregulation under a neo-liberal agenda known as the Washington Consensus.

    The law relating to the initiation of armed conflict is jus ad bellum. This was codified in 1928 in the Kellogg–Briand Pact, which stated that conflicts should be settled through peaceful negotiations with the exception, through reservations drafted by some state parties, of self-defence. These fundamental principles were re-affirmed in the UN Charter, which provided for “an almost absolute prohibition on the use of force”, with the only three exceptions. The first involves force authorised by the UNSC, as the entity is responsible in the first instance for responding to breaches or threats to the peace and acts of aggression, including the use of force or peacekeeping missions. The second exception is where a state is acting in individual or collective self-defence. A state is allowed to act in self-defence in the case of an “armed attack” but the intention behind this exception has been challenged, particularly as nuclear weapons have become more common, with many states relying instead on the customary right of self-defence as set out in the Caroline test. The ICJ considered collective self-defence in Nicaragua v. United States, where the U.S. unsuccessfully argued that it had mined harbours in Nicaragua in pre-emption of an attack by the Sandinista government against another member of the Organization of American States. The final exception is where the UNSC delegates its responsibility for collective security to a regional organisation, such as NATO.

    On humanitarian grounds, the use of landmines (Ottawa Treaty) and cluster munitions (CCM) is prohibited under international law.

    International humanitarian law (IHL) is an effort to “mitigate the human suffering caused by war” and it is often complementary to the law of armed conflict and international human rights law. The concept of jus in bello (law in war) covers IHL, which is distinct from jus ad bellum. Its scope lasts from the initiation of conflict until a peaceful settlement is reached. There are two main principles in IHL; the principle of distinction dictates that combatants and non-combatants must be treated differently and the principle of not causing disproportionate suffering to combatants. In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ described these concepts as “intransgressible principles of international customary law”.

    The two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 considered restrictions on the conduct of war and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross, considered the protection of innocent parties in conflict zones. The First Geneva Convention covers wounded and ill combatants, the Second Geneva Convention covers combatants at sea who are wounded, ill or shipwrecked, the Third Geneva Convention covers prisoners of war and the Fourth Geneva Convention covers civilians. These conventions were supplemented the additional Protocol I and Protocol II, which were codified in 1977. Initially IHL conventions were only considered to apply to a conflict if all parties had ratified the relevant convention under the si omnes clause, but this posed concerns and the Martens clause began to be implemented, providing that the law would generally be deemed to apply.

    There have been various agreements to outlaw particular types of weapons, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. The use of nuclear weapons was determined to be in conflict with principles of IHL by the ICJ in 1995, although the court also held that it “cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence.” Multiple treaties have attempted to regulate the use of these weapons, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but key states have failed to sign or have withdrawn. There have been similar debates on the use of drones and cyberwarefare on the international stage.

    International criminal law sets out the definition of international crimes and compels states to prosecute these crimes. While war crimes were prosecuted throughout history, this has historically been done by national courts. The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo were established at the end of World War II to prosecute key actors in Germany and Japan. The jurisdiction of the tribunals was limited to crimes against peace (based on the Kellogg–Briand Pact), war crimes (based on the Hague Conventions) and crimes against humanity, establishing new categories of international crime. Throughout the twentieth century, the separate crimes of genocide, torture and terrorism were also recognised.

    Initially these crimes were intended to be prosecuted by national courts and subject to their domestic procedures. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and the 1984 UN Convention against Torture mandated that the national courts of the contracting countries must prosecute these offenses where the perpetrator is on their territory or extradite them to any other interested state. It was in the 1990s that two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), were established by the UNSC to address specific atrocities. The ICTY had authority to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide occurring in Yugoslavia after 1991 and the ICTR had authority to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

    The International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the 1998 Rome Statute, is the first and only permanent international court to prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. There are 123 state parties to the ICC although a number of states have declared their opposition to the court; it has been criticised by African countries including The Gambia and Kenya for “imperialist” prosecutions. One particular aspect of the court that has received scrutiny is the principle of complementarity, whereby the ICC only has jurisdiction if the national courts of a state with jurisdiction are “unwilling or unable to prosecute” or where a state has investigated but chosen not to prosecute a case. The United States has a particularly complicated relationship with the ICC; originally signing the treaty in 2000, the US stated in 2002 that it did not intend to become a party as it believed the ICC threatened its national sovereignty and the country does not recognise the court’s jurisdiction.

    Hybrid courts are the most recent type of international criminal court; they aim to combine both national and international components, operating in the jurisdiction where the crimes in question occurred. International courts have been criticised for a lack of legitimacy, as they can seem disconnected from the crimes that have occurred, but the hybrid courts are able to provide the resources that may be lacking in countries facing the aftermath of serious conflict. There has been debate about what courts can be included within this definition, but generally the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been listed.

    International legal theory comprises a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches used to explain and analyse the content, formation and effectiveness of international law and institutions and to suggest improvements. Some approaches center on the question of compliance: why states follow international norms in the absence of a coercive power that ensures compliance. Some scholars view compliance failure as a problem of enforcement whereby states can be incentivized to follow international law due to international inducements, reciprocity, concerns about reputation, or domestic political factors. Other scholars see compliance failure as rooted in a lack of state capacity where a willing state is incapable of fully following international legal commitments. Rationalist choice theorists have referred to the “Three Rs” that lead states to comply with international law: Reciprocity, Reputation, and Retaliation. Constructivist scholars emphasize how states are socialized into complying with international law by internalizing norms and seeking status and reputation.

    Other perspectives are policy oriented: they elaborate theoretical frameworks and instruments to criticize the existing norms and to make suggestions on how to improve them. Some of these approaches are based on domestic legal theory, some are interdisciplinary, and others have been developed expressly to analyse international law. Classical approaches to International legal theory are the natural law, the Eclectic and the legal positivism schools of thought.

    The natural law approach argues that international norms should be based on axiomatic truths. The 16th-century natural law writer de Vitoria examined the questions of the just war, the Spanish authority in the Americas, and the rights of the Native American peoples. In 1625, Grotius argued that nations as well as persons ought to be governed by universal principle based on morality and divine justice while the relations among polities ought to be governed by the law of peoples, the jus gentium, established by the consent of the community of nations on the basis of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that is, on the basis of the observance of commitments. On his part, de Vattel argued instead for the equality of states as articulated by 18th-century natural law and suggested that the law of nations was composed of custom and law on the one hand, and natural law on the other. During the 17th century, the basic tenets of the Grotian or eclectic school, especially the doctrines of legal equality, territorial sovereignty, and independence of states, became the fundamental principles of the European political and legal system and were enshrined in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.

    The early positivist school emphasized the importance of custom and treaties as sources of international law. In the 16th-century, Gentili used historical examples to posit that positive law (jus voluntarium) was determined by general consent. van Bynkershoek asserted that the bases of international law were customs and treaties commonly consented to by various states, while John Jacob Moser emphasized the importance of state practice in international law. The positivism school narrowed the range of international practice that might qualify as law, favouring rationality over morality and ethics. The 1815 Congress of Vienna marked the formal recognition of the political and international legal system based on the conditions of Europe. Modern legal positivists consider international law as a unified system of rules that emanates from the states’ will. International law, as it is, is an “objective” reality that needs to be distinguished from law “as it should be”. Classic positivism demands rigorous tests for legal validity and it deems irrelevant all extralegal arguments.

    John Austin asserted that due to the principle of par in parem non habet imperium, “so-called” international law, lacking a sovereign power and so unenforceable, was not really law at all, but “positive morality”, consisting of “opinions and sentiments…more ethical than legal in nature.” Since states are few in number, diverse and atypical in character, unindictable, lack a centralised sovereign power, and their agreements unpoliced and decentralised, Martin Wight argued that international society is better described as anarchy.

    Hans Morgenthau believed international law to be the weakest and most primitive system of law enforcement; he likened its decentralised nature to the law that prevails in preliterate tribal societies. Monopoly on violence is what makes domestic law enforceable; but between nations, there are multiple competing sources of force. The confusion created by treaty laws, which resemble private contracts between persons, is mitigated only by the relatively small number of states. He asserted that no state may be compelled to submit a dispute to an international tribunal, making laws unenforceable and voluntary. International law is also unpoliced, lacking agencies for enforcement. He cites a 1947 US opinion poll in which 75% of respondents wanted “an international police to maintain world peace”, but only 13% wanted that force to exceed the US armed forces. Later surveys have produced similar contradictory results.

    International law is currently navigating a complex array of challenges and controversies that have underscored the dynamic nature of international relations in the 21st century. Some of these challenges include enforcement difficulties, the impact of technological advancements, climate change, and worldwide pandemics. The possible re-emergence of right of conquest as international law is contentious.

    Among the most pressing issues are enforcement difficulties, where the lack of a centralized global authority often leads to non-compliance with international norms, particularly evident in violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Sovereignty disputes further complicate the international legal landscape, as conflicts over territorial claims and jurisdictional boundaries arise, challenging the principles of non-interference and peaceful resolution. Furthermore, the emergence of new global powers introduces additional layers of complexity, as these nations assert their interests and challenge established norms, necessitating a reevaluation of the global legal order to accommodate shifting power dynamics.

    Cybersecurity has also emerged as a critical concern, with international law striving to address the threats posed by cyber-attacks to national security, infrastructure, and individual privacy. Climate change demands unprecedented international cooperation, as evidenced by agreements like the Paris Agreement, though disparities in responsibilities among nations pose significant challenges to collective action.

    The COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted the interconnectedness of the global community, emphasizing the need for coordinated efforts to manage health crises, vaccine distribution, and economic recovery.

    These contemporary issues underscore the need for ongoing adaptation and cooperation within the framework of international law to address the multifaceted challenges of the modern world, ensuring a just, peaceful, and sustainable global order.