Category: Fever Research

  • The California Code

    The California Code refers to the collection of statutes enacted by the California State Legislature, which, alongside uncodified acts, forms the general statutory law of California. These codes are organized into 29 subject matter divisions, such as the Penal Code, the Civil Code, and the Vehicle Code. The official versions of these codes are maintained by the California Office of Legislative Counsel. 

    Here’s a breakdown of what constitutes the California Code:

    1. California Statutes:

    • Enacted by the Legislature: The California State Legislature, consisting of the Assembly and Senate, is responsible for creating laws, which are then codified into the California Codes. 
    • Organized by Subject: The codes are divided into 29 subject matter divisions, covering areas like criminal law (Penal Code), civil law (Civil Code), and vehicle regulations (Vehicle Code), among others. 
    • Official Publication: The Legislative Counsel is the official publisher of the California Codes. 

    2. California Code of Regulations:

    • Administrative Regulations:The California Code of Regulations (CCR) contains the official compilation of state agency regulations. 
    • OAL Oversight:The Office of Administrative Law (OAL) is responsible for publishing and maintaining the CCR. 
    • Weekly Updates:OAL updates both the hard-copy and online versions of the CCR weekly to reflect new, amended, or repealed regulations. 

    3. Other Important Components:

    • Case Law:Judicial decisions interpreting the California Codes and the CCR also play a crucial role in the legal landscape. 
    • Building Standards:The California Building Standards Code (Title 24 of the CCR) includes standards from national model codes, adaptations of those codes for California, and unique California amendments. 

    In essence, the California Code encompasses the statutory law passed by the Legislature, regulations adopted by state agencies, and the interpretations of those laws by the courts. 

    The Penal Code of California forms the basis for the application of most criminal law, criminal procedure, penal institutions, and the execution of sentences, among other things, in the American state of California. It was originally enacted in 1872 as one of the original four California Codes, and has been substantially amended and revised since then.

    The Civil Code of California is a collection of statutes for the State of California. The code is made up of statutes which govern the general obligations and rights of persons within the jurisdiction of California. It was based on a civil code originally prepared by David Dudley Field II in 1865 for the state of New York (but which was never enacted in that state). It is one of the 29 California Codes and was among the first four enacted in 1872.

    The California Vehicle Code, informally referred to as the Veh. Code or the CVC, is a legal code which contains almost all statutes relating to the operation, ownership and registration of vehicles (including bicycles and even animals when riding on a public roadway) in the state of California in the United States. It is one of the 29 California Codes enacted by the California State Legislature.

    The California Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC) (referenced in statute by its original name, the Legislative Counsel Bureau) was founded in 1913 and is a nonpartisan public agency that drafts legislative proposals, prepares legal opinions, and provides other confidential legal services to the Legislature and certain other California agencies and offices. The OLC also provides computer services, data networking, customer support, and related technology services to the Legislature. This includes hosting the California Legislative Information Website where the official versions of legislative measures, statutes contained within the Codes of California, the California Constitution, various legislative publications, and other resources, are published. The head of the office, known as the Legislative Counsel of California, is appointed by a vote of the Legislature.

  • The Unruh Civil Rights Act

    The Unruh Civil Rights Act, codified as California Civil Code Section 51, is a California state law that prohibits discrimination by businesses based on various protected characteristics. It ensures that all individuals are entitled to “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments”. 

    Key aspects of the Unruh Civil Rights Act:

    • Scope of protection:The Act applies to all business establishments in California, including those operating online, and protects against discrimination based on age, ancestry, color, disability, national origin, race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation. 
    • Discrimination prohibited:It prevents businesses from discriminating against individuals based on these protected characteristics in the provision of services, accommodations, or facilities. 
    • Examples of violations:The California Civil Rights Department (CRD) lists examples of potential violations including charging different service fees based on race, refusing service to individuals with HIV, or denying a table to a same-sex couple. 
    • Damages for violations:Violations of the Act can result in statutory damages of at least $4,000 per occurrence, actual damages for losses suffered, and attorney’s fees for the prevailing party. 
    • Statute of limitations:Claims under the Unruh Act must be filed within two years of the discriminatory act if pursuing the claim in court, or within one year if filing with the California Civil Rights Department (CRD). 
    • Relationship to the ADA:The Unruh Act is broader than the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in its application to business establishments, but the ADA also plays a significant role in protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities in California. 

    Civil Code – CIV

    DIVISION 1. PERSONS [38 – 86]

    PART 2. PERSONAL RIGHTS [43 – 53.7]

    51.  

    (a) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

    (b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

    (c) This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law or that is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status, or to persons regardless of their genetic information.

    (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any construction, alteration, repair, structural or otherwise, or modification of any sort whatsoever, beyond that construction, alteration, repair, or modification that is otherwise required by other provisions of law, to any new or existing establishment, facility, building, improvement, or any other structure, nor shall anything in this section be construed to augment, restrict, or alter in any way the authority of the State Architect to require construction, alteration, repair, or modifications that the State Architect otherwise possesses pursuant to other laws.

    (e) For purposes of this section:

    (1) “Disability” means any mental or physical disability as defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1 of the Government Code.

    (2) (A) “Genetic information” means, with respect to any individual, information about any of the following:

    (i) The individual’s genetic tests.

    (ii) The genetic tests of family members of the individual.

    (iii) The manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of the individual.

    (B) “Genetic information” includes any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical research that includes genetic services, by an individual or any family member of the individual.

    (C) “Genetic information” does not include information about the sex or age of any individual.

    (3) “Medical condition” has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

    (4) “Race” is inclusive of traits associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles. “Protective hairstyles” includes, but is not limited to, such hairstyles as braids, locs, and twists.

    (5) “Religion” includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice.

    (6) “Sex” includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. “Sex” also includes, but is not limited to, a person’s gender. “Gender” means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity and gender expression. “Gender expression” means a person’s gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.

    (7) “Sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status” includes any of the following:

    (A) Any combination of those characteristics.

    (B) A perception that the person has any particular characteristic or characteristics within the listed categories or any combination of those characteristics.

    (C) A perception that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any particular characteristic or characteristics, or any combination of characteristics, within the listed categories.

    (8) “Sexual orientation” has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (s) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

    (f) A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.

    (g) Verification of immigration status and any discrimination based upon verified immigration status, where required by federal law, shall not constitute a violation of this section.

    (h) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the provision of services or documents in a language other than English, beyond that which is otherwise required by other provisions of federal, state, or local law, including Section 1632.(Amended by Stats. 2024, Ch. 779, Sec. 2.5. (SB 1137) Effective January 1, 2025.)

  • International Criminal Court

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an intergovernmental organization and international tribunal seated in The Hague, Netherlands. It is the first and only permanent international court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The ICC is distinct from the International Court of Justice, an organ of the United Nations that hears disputes between states. Established in 2002 pursuant to the multilateral Rome Statute, the ICC is considered by its proponents to be a major step toward justice, and an innovation in international law and human rights.

    The Court has faced a number of criticisms. Some governments have refused to recognize the court’s assertion of jurisdiction, with other civil groups also accusing the court of bias, Eurocentrism and racism. Others have also questioned the effectiveness of the court as a means of upholding international law.

    History

    The establishment of an international tribunal to judge political leaders accused of international crimes was first proposed during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 following the First World War by the Commission of Responsibilities. The issue was addressed again at a conference held in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1937, which resulted in the conclusion of the first convention stipulating the establishment of a permanent international court to try acts of international terrorism. The convention was signed by 13 states, but none ratified it and the convention never entered into force.

    Following the Second World War, the allied powers established two ad hoc tribunals to prosecute Axis leaders accused of war crimes. The International Military Tribunal, which sat in Nuremberg, prosecuted German leaders while the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo prosecuted Japanese leaders. In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly first recognized the need for a permanent international court to deal with atrocities of the kind prosecuted after World War II. At the request of the General Assembly, the International Law Commission (ILC) drafted two statutes by the early 1950s but these were shelved during the Cold War, which made the establishment of an international criminal court politically unrealistic.

    Benjamin B. Ferencz, an investigator of Nazi war crimes after World War II and the Chief Prosecutor for the United States Army at the Einsatzgruppen trial, became a vocal advocate of the establishment of international rule of law and of an international criminal court. In his book Defining International Aggression: The Search for World Peace (1975), he advocated for the establishment of such a court. Another leading proponent was Robert Kurt Woetzel, a German-born professor of international law, who co-edited Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court in 1970 and created the Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1971.

    Formal proposal and establishment

    In June 1989, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, A. N. R. Robinson, revived the idea of a permanent international criminal court by proposing the creation of tribunal to address the illegal drug trade. In response, the General Assembly tasked the ILC with once again drafting a statute for a permanent court.

    While work began on the draft, the UN Security Council established two ad hoc tribunals in the early 1990s: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, created in 1993 in response to large-scale atrocities committed by armed forces during the Yugoslav Wars, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, created in 1994 following the Rwandan genocide. The creation of these tribunals further highlighted to many the need for a permanent international criminal court.

    In 1994, the ILC presented its final draft statute for the International Criminal Court to the General Assembly and recommended that a conference be convened to negotiate a treaty that would serve as the Court’s statute. To consider major substantive issues in the draft statute, the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995. After considering the Committee’s report, the General Assembly created the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the ICC to prepare a consolidated draft text. From 1996 to 1998, six sessions of the Preparatory Committee were held at the United Nations headquarters in New York City, during which NGOs provided input and attended meetings under the umbrella organisation of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). In January 1998, the Bureau and coordinators of the Preparatory Committee convened for an Inter-Sessional meeting in Zutphen in the Netherlands to technically consolidate and restructure the draft articles into a draft.

    Finally, the General Assembly convened a conference in Rome in June 1998, with the aim of finalizing the treaty to serve as the Court’s statute. On 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by a vote of 120 to seven, with 21 countries abstaining. The seven countries that voted against the treaty were China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the U.S., and Yemen.

    Israel’s opposition to the treaty stemmed from the inclusion in the list of war crimes “the action of transferring population into occupied territory”, a provision added during the Rome Conference at the insistence of Arab countries with the specific intention of targeting Israeli citizens.

    The UN General Assembly voted on 9 December 1999 and again on 12 December 2000 to endorse the ICC. Following 60 ratifications, the Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 and the International Criminal Court was formally established.

    The first bench of 18 judges was elected by the Assembly of States Parties in February 2003. They were sworn in at the inaugural session of the Court on 11 March 2003.

    The Court issued its first arrest warrants on 8 July 2005, and the first pre-trial hearings were held in 2006.

    The Court issued its first judgment in 2012 when it found Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo guilty of war crimes related to using child soldiers. Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

    In 2010, the states parties of the Rome Statute held the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda. The Review Conference led to the adoption of two resolutions that amended the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. Resolution 5 amended Article 8 on war crimes, criminalizing the use of certain kinds of weapons in non-international conflicts whose use was already forbidden in international conflicts. Resolution 6, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Statute, provided the definition and a procedure for jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

    Organization

    The ICC has four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.

    The President is the most senior judge chosen by the eighteen judges in the Judicial Division.

    The Judicial Division is composed of eighteen judges and hears cases before the Court.

    The Office of the Prosecutor is headed by the Prosecutor, who investigates crimes and initiates criminal proceedings before the Judicial Division.

    The Registry is headed by the Registrar and is charged with managing all the administrative functions of the ICC, including the headquarters, detention unit, and public defense office.

    The ICC employs over 900 personnel from roughly 100 countries and conducts proceedings in English and French.

    Operation

    The ICC began operations on 1 July 2002, upon the entry into force of the Rome Statute, a multilateral treaty that serves as the court’s charter and governing document. States which become party to the Rome Statute become members of the ICC, serving on the Assembly of States Parties, which administers the court. As of January 2025, there are 125 ICC member states, 29 states have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute (including four who have withdrawn their signature) and 41 states have neither signed nor become parties to the Rome Statute.

    Intended to serve as the “court of last resort”, the ICC complements existing national judicial systems and may exercise its jurisdiction only when national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals. It lacks universal territorial jurisdiction and may only investigate and prosecute crimes committed within member states, crimes committed by nationals of member states, or crimes in situations referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council.

    The ICC held its first hearing in 2006, concerning war crimes charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Congolese warlord accused of recruiting child soldiers; his subsequent conviction in 2012 was the first in the court’s history. The Office of the Prosecutor has opened twelve official investigations and is conducting an additional nine preliminary examinations.

    Dozens of individuals have been indicted in the ICC, including Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony, former President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, Libyan head of state Muammar Gaddafi, President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    On 17 March 2023, ICC judges issued arrest warrants for Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights in Russia Maria Lvova-Belova for child abductions in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia denounced the arrest warrants as “outrageous”. Putin became the first head of state of a U.N. Security Council Permanent Member to be the subject of an ICC arrest warrant. Although Russia withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016, and is thus not a participant in the ICC nor under its jurisdiction, Putin can be charged for actions against Ukraine, which is not a party but has accepted jurisdiction of the court since 2014. Should Putin travel to a state party, he can be arrested by local authorities. Later in 2023, Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs retaliated by placing several ICC officials on its wanted list. In March 2024, the ICC issued two more arrest warrants, for Sergey Kobylash, the commander of the Long-Range Aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, and Viktor Sokolov, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet over their role in war crimes in Ukraine.

    On 20 May 2024, the ICC’s chief prosecutor Karim Khan announced his intention to seek arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant, leader of Hamas Yahya Sinwar, leader of the Al Qassem Brigades Mohammed Deif, and Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in connection to war crimes committed in the Israel-Hamas war. On November 21, warrants were formally issued for Netanyahu, Gallant and Deif. Warrants for Haniyeh and Sinwar were withdrawn following confirmation of their deaths in July and October respectively.

    On 23 January 2025, the ICC’s chief prosecutor Karim Khan announced requests for arrest warrants against Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and the chief justice of Afghanistan Abdul Hakim Haqqani, for crimes against humanity of the oppression and persecution of Afghan women and girls, who have been deprived of the freedom of movement, the rights to control their bodies, to education, and to a private and family life. Alleged resistance and opposition are brutally suppressed with murder, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, since 2021.

    Establishing the court’s jurisdiction

    The process to establish the court’s jurisdiction may be “triggered” by any one of three possible sources: (1) a state party, (2) the Security Council or (3) a prosecutor. It is then up to the prosecutor acting proprio motu to initiate an investigation under the requirements of Article 15 of the Rome Statute. The procedure is slightly different when referred by a state party or the Security Council, in which cases the prosecutor does not need authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate the investigation. Where there is a reasonable basis to proceed, it is mandatory for the prosecutor to initiate an investigation. The factors listed in Article 53 considered for reasonable basis include whether the case would be admissible, and whether there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice (the latter stipulates balancing against the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims).

    Structure

    The ICC is governed by the Assembly of States Parties, which is made up of the states that are party to the Rome Statute. The Assembly elects officials of the Court, approves its budget, and adopts amendments to the Rome Statute. The Court itself has four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.

    State parties

    Main article: States parties to the Rome Statute

    As of January 2025, 125 states[a] are parties to the Statute of the Court, including all the countries of South America, nearly all of Europe, most of Oceania and roughly half of Africa. Burundi and the Philippines were member states, but later withdrew effective 27 October 2017 and 17 March 2019, respectively. A further 29 countries[a] have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. The law of treaties obliges these states to refrain from “acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty until they declare they do not intend to become a party to the treaty. Four signatory states have informed the UN Secretary General that they no longer intend to become states parties and, as such, have no legal obligations arising from their signature of the Statute; they are Israel in 2002, the United States on 6 May 2002, Sudan on 26 August 2008, and Russia on 30 November 2016. Forty-one other states[a] have neither signed nor acceded to the Rome Statute. Some of them, including China and India, are critical of the Court.

    Assembly

    The Court’s management oversight and legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties, consists of one representative from each state party. Each state party has one vote and “every effort” has to be made to reach decisions by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, decisions are made by vote. The Assembly is presided over by a president and two vice-presidents, who are elected by the members to three-year terms.

    The Assembly meets in full session once a year, alternating between New York and The Hague, and may also hold special sessions where circumstances require. Sessions are open to observer states and non-governmental organizations.

    The Assembly elects the judges and prosecutors, decides the Court’s budget, adopts important texts (such as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), and provides management oversight to the other organs of the Court. Article 46 of the Rome Statute allows the Assembly to remove from office a judge or prosecutor who “is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties” or “is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute”.

    The states parties cannot interfere with the judicial functions of the Court. Disputes concerning individual cases are settled by the Judicial Divisions.

    In 2010, Kampala, Uganda hosted the Assembly’s Rome Statute Review Conference.

    Organs
    The Court has four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Division, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.

    Presidency

    The Presidency is responsible for the proper administration of the Court (apart from the Office of the Prosecutor). It comprises the President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents—three judges of the Court who are elected to the Presidency by their fellow judges for a maximum of two three-year terms.

    As of March 2024, the President is Tomoko Akane from Japan, who took office on 11 March 2024, succeeding Piotr Hofma?ski. Her first term will expire in 2027.

    Judicial Division

    Main article: Judges of the International Criminal Court
    The Judicial Divisions consist of the 18 judges of the Court, organized into three chambers—the Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber — which carry out the judicial functions of the Court. Judges are elected to the Court by the Assembly of States Parties. They serve nine-year terms and are not generally eligible for re-election. All judges must be nationals of states parties to the Rome Statute, and no two judges may be nationals of the same state. They must be “persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices”.

    The Prosecutor or any person being investigated or prosecuted may request the disqualification of a judge from “any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground”. Any request for the disqualification of a judge from a particular case is decided by an absolute majority of the other judges. Judges may be removed from office if “found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties” or is unable to exercise his or her functions. The removal of a judge requires both a two-thirds majority of the other judges and a two-thirds majority of the states parties.

    Office of the Prosecutor

    The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is responsible for conducting investigations and prosecutions. It is headed by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who is assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors. The Rome Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently; as such, no member of the Office may seek or act on instructions from any external source, such as states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations or individuals.

    The Prosecutor may open an investigation under three circumstances:

    when a situation is referred by a state party;
    when a situation is referred by the United Nations Security Council, acting to address a threat to international peace and security; or
    when the Pre-Trial Chamber authorises the prosecutor to open an investigation on the basis of information received from other sources, such as individuals or non-governmental organisations.

    Any person being investigated or prosecuted may request the disqualification of a prosecutor from any case “in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground”. Requests for the disqualification of prosecutors are decided by the Appeals Chamber. A prosecutor may be removed from office by an absolute majority of the states parties through a finding “to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties” or is unable to exercise his or her functions. One critic said there are “insufficient checks and balances on the authority of the ICC prosecutor and judges” and “insufficient protection against politicized prosecutions or other abuses”. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief ICC prosecutor, stressed in 2011 the importance of politics in prosecutions: “You cannot say al-Bashir is in London, arrest him. You need a political agreement.” Henry Kissinger says the checks and balances are so weak that the prosecutor “has virtually unlimited discretion in practice”.

    Lead prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina, in office from 2003 to 2012, was succeeded in the role by Fatou Bensouda of Gambia, who served from 16 June 2012 to 16 June 2021 (she was elected to the nine-year term on 12 December 2011).

    On 12 February 2021, British barrister Karim Khan was selected in a secret ballot against three other candidates to serve as lead prosecutor as of 16 June 2021. As British barrister, Khan had headed the United Nations’ special investigative team when it looked into Islamic State crimes in Iraq. At the ICC, he had been lead defense counsel on cases from Kenya, Sudan and Libya.

    Policy papers

    The Office of the Prosecutor occasionally publishes policy papers that put forth the considerations given to topics the office focuses on, and often the criteria for case selection. While a policy paper does not give the Court jurisdiction over a new category of crimes, it promises what the Office of Prosecutor will consider when selecting cases in the upcoming term of service. OTP’s policy papers are subject to revision.

    The following papers have been published since the start of the ICC:

    1 September 2007: Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice

    12 April 2010: Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation

    1 November 2013: Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations

    20 June 2014: Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes

    15 September 2016: Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation

    15 November 2016: Policy on Children
    The paper published in September 2016 announced that the ICC will focus on environmental crimes when selecting cases. The Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, “inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land”. This has been interpreted as a major shift in environmental law and a move with significant effects.

    Registry

    The Registry is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court. This includes, among other things,

    The administration of legal aid matters, court management, victims and witnesses matters, defence counsel, detention unit, and the traditional services provided by administrations in international organisations, such as finance, translation, building management, procurement and personnel.

    The Registry is headed by the Registrar, who is elected by the judges to a five-year term. As of April 2023 the Registrar is Osvaldo Zavala Giler.

    Crimes for which individuals can be prosecuted

    The Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction means the crimes for which individuals can be prosecuted. Individuals can only be prosecuted for crimes that are listed in the Statute. The primary crimes are listed in article 5 of the Statute and defined in later articles: genocide (defined in article 6), crimes against humanity (defined in article 7), war crimes (defined in article 8), and crimes of aggression (defined in article 8 bis) In addition, article 70 defines offences against the administration of justice, which is a fifth category of crime for which individuals can be prosecuted.

    Genocide

    Article 6 defines the crime of genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. There are five such acts which constitute crimes of genocide under article 6.

    Killing members of a group

    Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
    Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
    Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
    Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
    The definition of these crimes is identical to those contained within the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.

    Crimes against humanity

    Article 7 defines crimes against humanity as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”. The article lists 16 such as individual crimes:

    Murder

    Extermination

    Enslavement

    Deportation or forcible transfer of population[113]

    Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty

    Torture

    Rape

    Sexual slavery

    Enforced prostitution

    Forced pregnancy

    Enforced sterilization

    Sexual violence

    Persecution

    Enforced disappearance of persons

    Apartheid

    Other inhumane acts

    War crimes

    Article 8 defines war crimes depending on whether an armed conflict is either international (which generally means it is fought between states) or non-international (which generally means that it is fought between non-state actors, such as rebel groups, or between a state and such non-state actors). The most serious crimes constitute either grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Protocols. In total there are 74 war crimes listed in article 8.

    Eleven crimes constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and apply only to international armed conflicts:

    Willful killing

    Torture

    Inhumane treatment

    Biological experiments

    Willfully causing great suffering

    Destruction and appropriation of property

    Compelling service in hostile forces

    Denying a fair trial

    Unlawful deportation and transfer

    Unlawful confinement

    Taking hostages

    Seven crimes constitute serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and apply only to non-international armed conflicts:

    Murder

    Mutilation

    Cruel treatment

    Torture

    Outrages upon personal dignity

    Taking hostages

    Sentencing or execution without due process

    Another 56 crimes defined by article 8: 35 apply to international armed conflicts and 21 to non-international armed conflicts. Such crimes include attacking civilians or civilian objects, attacking peacekeepers, causing excessive incidental death or damage, transferring populations into occupied territories, treacherously killing or wounding, denying quarter, pillaging, employing poison, using expanding bullets, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and conscripting or using child soldiers.

    Crimes of aggression

    Article 8 bis defines crimes of aggression. The Statute originally provided that the Court could not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until such time as the states parties agreed on a definition of the crime and set out the conditions under which it could be prosecuted. Such an amendment was adopted at the first review conference of the ICC in Kampala, Uganda, in June 2010. This amendment specified that the ICC would not be allowed to exercise jurisdiction of the crime of aggression until two further conditions had been satisfied: (1) the amendment has entered into force for 30 states parties and (2) on or after 1 January 2017, the Assembly of States Parties has voted in favor of allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction. On 26 June 2016 the first condition was satisfied and the state parties voted in favor of allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction on 14 December 2017. The Court’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of aggression was accordingly activated on 17 July 2018.

    The Statute, as amended, defines the crime of aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Statute defines an “act of aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The article also contains a list of seven acts of aggression, which are identical to those in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 1974 and include the following acts when committed by one state against another state:

    Invasion or attack by armed forces against territory

    Military occupation of territory

    Annexation of territory

    Bombardment against territory

    Use of any weapons against territory

    Blockade of ports or coasts

    Attack on the land, sea, or air forces or marine and air fleets

    The use of armed forces which are within the territory of another state by agreement, but in contravention of the conditions of the agreement

    Allowing territory to be used by another state to perpetrate an act of aggression against a third state

    Sending armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries to carry out acts of armed force

    Offences against the administration of justice

    Article 70 criminalizes certain intentional acts which interfere with investigations and proceedings before the Court, including giving false testimony, presenting false evidence, corruptly influencing a witness or official of the Court, retaliating against an official of the Court, and soliciting or accepting bribes as an official of the Court.

    Jurisdiction and admissibility

    The Rome Statute requires that several criteria exist in a particular case before an individual can be prosecuted by the Court. The Statute contains three jurisdictional requirements and three admissibility requirements. All criteria must be met for a case to proceed. The three jurisdictional requirements are (1) subject-matter jurisdiction (what acts constitute crimes), (2) territorial or personal jurisdiction (where the crimes were committed or who committed them), and (3) temporal jurisdiction (when the crimes were committed).

    For an individual to be prosecuted by the Court either territorial jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction must exist. Therefore, an individual can only be prosecuted if he or she has either (1) committed a crime within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court or (2) committed a crime while being a national of a state that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

    Territorial jurisdiction

    The territorial jurisdiction of the Court includes the territory, registered vessels, and registered aircraft of states which have either (1) become party to the Rome Statute or (2) accepted the Court’s jurisdiction by filing a declaration with the Court.

    In situations that are referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council, the territorial jurisdiction is defined by the Security Council, which may be more expansive than the Court’s normal territorial jurisdiction. For example, if the Security Council refers a situation that took place in the territory of a state that has both not become party to the Rome Statute and not lodged a declaration with the Court, the Court will still be able to prosecute crimes that occurred within that state.

    Personal jurisdiction

    The personal jurisdiction of the Court extends to all natural persons who commit crimes, regardless of where they are located or where the crimes were committed, as long as those individuals are nationals of either (1) states that are party to the Rome Statute or (2) states that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction by filing a declaration with the Court. As with territorial jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction can be expanded by the Security Council if it refers a situation to the Court.

    Temporal jurisdiction requirements

    Temporal jurisdiction is the time period over which the Court can exercise its powers. No statute of limitations applies to any of the crimes defined in the Statute. This is not completely retroactive. Individuals can only be prosecuted for crimes that took place on or after 1 July 2002, which is the date that the Rome Statute entered into force. If a state became party to the Statute, and therefore a member of the Court, after 1 July 2002, then the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction prior to the membership date for certain cases. For example, if the Statute entered into force for a state on 1 January 2003, the Court could only exercise temporal jurisdiction over crimes that took place in that state or were committed by a national of that state on or after 1 January 2003.

    Admissibility requirements

    To initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor must (1) have a “reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed”, (2) the investigation would be consistent with the principle of complementarity, and (3) the investigation serves the interests of justice.

    The principle of complementarity means the Court will only prosecute an individual if states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Therefore, if legitimate national investigations or proceedings into crimes have taken place or are ongoing, the Court will not initiate proceedings. This principle applies regardless of the outcome of national proceedings. Even if an investigation is closed without any criminal charges being filed or if an accused person is acquitted by a national court, the Court will not prosecute an individual for the crime in question so long as it is satisfied that the national proceedings were legitimate. The application of the complementarity principle has recently come under theoretical scrutiny.

    The Court will only initiate proceedings if a crime is of “sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court”.

    The Prosecutor will initiate an investigation unless there are “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice” when “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims”. Furthermore, even if an investigation has been initiated and there are substantial facts to warrant a prosecution and no other admissibility issues, the Prosecutor must determine whether a prosecution would serve the interests of justice “taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime”.

    Individual criminal responsibility

    The Court has jurisdiction over natural persons. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the Rome Statute. In accordance with the Rome Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission; In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide; Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions.

    Procedure

    Trial

    Trials are conducted under a hybrid common law and civil law judicial system, but it has been argued the procedural orientation and character of the court is still evolving. A majority of the three judges present, as triers of fact in a bench trial, may reach a decision, which must include a full and reasoned statement. Trials are supposed to be public, but proceedings are often closed, and such exceptions to a public trial have not been enumerated in detail. In camera proceedings are allowed for protection of witnesses or defendants as well as for confidential or sensitive evidence. Hearsay and other indirect evidence is not generally prohibited, but it has been argued the court is guided by hearsay exceptions which are prominent in common law systems. There is no subpoena or other means to compel witnesses to come before the court, although the court has some power to compel testimony of those who chose to come before it, such as fines.

    Rights of the accused

    The Rome Statute provides that all persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and establishes certain rights of the accused and persons during investigations. These include the right to be fully informed of the charges against them; the right to have a lawyer appointed, free of charge; the right to a speedy trial; and the right to examine the witnesses against them.

    To ensure “equality of arms” between defence and prosecution teams, the ICC has established an independent Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) to provide logistical support, advice and information to defendants and their counsel. The OPCD also helps to safeguard the rights of the accused during the initial stages of an investigation. Thomas Lubanga’s defence team said they were given a smaller budget than the Prosecutor and that evidence and witness statements were slow to arrive.

    Victim participation

    One of the great innovations of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence is the series of rights granted to victims. For the first time in the history of international criminal justice, victims have the possibility under the Statute to present their views and observations before the Court.

    Participation before the Court may occur at various stages of proceedings and may take different forms, although it will be up to the judges to give directions as to the timing and manner of participation.

    Participation in the Court’s proceedings will in most cases take place through a legal representative and will be conducted “in a manner which is not prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”.

    The victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute provide victims with the opportunity to have their voices heard and to obtain, where appropriate, some form of reparation for their suffering. It is the aim of this attempted balance between retributive and restorative justice that, it is hoped, will enable the ICC to not only bring criminals to justice but also help the victims themselves obtain some form of justice. Justice for victims before the ICC comprises both procedural and substantive justice, by allowing them to participate and present their views and interests, so that they can help to shape truth, justice and reparations outcomes of the Court.

    Article 43(6) establishes a Victims and Witnesses Unit to provide “protective measures and security arrangements, counseling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses. Article 68 sets out procedures for the “Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings. article 68 The Court has also established an Office of Public Counsel for Victims, to provide support and assistance to victims and their legal representatives.

    Reparations

    Victims before the International Criminal Court can also claim reparations under Article 75 of the Rome Statute. Reparations can only be claimed when a defendant is convicted and at the discretion of the Court’s judges. So far the Court has ordered reparations against Thomas Lubanga. Reparations can include compensation, restitution and rehabilitation, but other forms of reparations may be appropriate for individual, collective or community victims. Article 79 of the Rome Statute establishes a Trust Fund to provide assistance before a reparation order to victims in a situation or to support reparations to victims and their families if the convicted person has no money.

    Cooperation by states not party to Rome Statute

    One of the principles of international law is that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for third states without their consent, and this is also enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The cooperation of the non-party states with the ICC is envisioned by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to be of voluntary nature. States not acceded to the Rome Statute might still be subject to an obligation to cooperate with ICC in certain cases. When a case is referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council all UN member states are obliged to cooperate, since its decisions are binding for all of them. Also, there is an obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law, which stems from the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, which reflects the absolute nature of international humanitarian law.

    In relation to cooperation in investigation and evidence gathering, it is implied from the Rome Statute[78]:?article 99? that the consent of a non-party state is a prerequisite for ICC Prosecutor to conduct an investigation within its territory, and it seems that it is even more necessary for him to observe any reasonable conditions raised by that state, since such restrictions exist for states party to the Statute. Taking into account the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (which worked with the principle of the primacy, instead of complementarity) in relation to cooperation, some scholars have expressed their pessimism as to the possibility of ICC to obtain cooperation of non-party states. As for the actions that ICC can take toward non-party states that do not cooperate, the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court may inform the Assembly of States Parties or Security Council, when the matter was referred by it, when non-party state refuses to cooperate after it has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the Court.

    Amnesty and national reconciliation processes

    It is unclear to what extent the ICC is compatible with reconciliation processes that grant amnesty to human rights abusers as part of agreements to end conflict. Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council to prevent the Court from investigating or prosecuting a case, article 16 and Article 53 allows the Prosecutor the discretion not to initiate an investigation if he or she believes that “an investigation would not serve the interests of justice”. Former ICC president Philippe Kirsch has said that “some limited amnesties may be compatible” with a country’s obligations genuinely to investigate or prosecute under the Statute.

    It is sometimes argued that amnesties are necessary to allow the peaceful transfer of power from abusive regimes. By denying states the right to offer amnesty to human rights abusers, the International Criminal Court may make it more difficult to negotiate an end to conflict and a transition to democracy. For example, the outstanding arrest warrants for four leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army are regarded by some as an obstacle to ending the insurgency in Uganda. Czech politician Marek Benda argues that “the ICC as a deterrent will in our view only mean the worst dictators will try to retain power at all costs”. The United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross maintain that granting amnesty to those accused of war crimes and other serious crimes is a violation of international law.

    Facilities

    Headquarters

    The official seat of the Court is in The Hague, Netherlands, but its proceedings may take place anywhere.

    The Court moved into its first permanent premises in The Hague, located at Oude Waalsdorperweg 10, on 14 December 2015. Part of The Hague’s International Zone, which also contains the Peace Palace, Europol, Eurojust, ICTY, OPCW and The Hague World Forum, the court facilities are situated on the site of the Alexanderkazerne, a former military barracks, adjacent to the dune landscape on the northern edge of the city. The ICC’s detention centre is a short distance away.

    The land and financing for the construction were provided by the Netherlands. The host state also organised and financed the architectural design competition, which started at the end of 2008. Three architects were chosen by an international jury from 171 applicants to enter into further negotiations. The Danish firm Schmidt Hammer Lassen were selected to design the premises, since its design met all the ICC criteria, such as design quality, sustainability, functionality and costs.

    The barracks were demolished from November 2011 to August 2012. In October 2012 the tendering procedure for the general contractor was completed and the combination Visser & Smit Bouw and Boele & van Eesteren (“Courtys”) was selected.

    The building has a compact footprint and consists of six connected building volumes with a garden motif. The tallest volume with a green façade, placed in the middle of the design, is the Court Tower, which accommodates three courtrooms. The rest of the building’s volumes accommodate the offices of the different organs of the ICC.

    From 2002 to late 2015, the ICC was housed in interim premises in The Hague provided by the Netherlands. Formerly belonging to KPN, the provisional headquarters were located at Maanweg 174 in the east-central portion of the city.

    Detention centre

    Main article: People detained by the International Criminal Court § Detention centre

    The ICC’s detention centre accommodates both those convicted by the court and serving sentences as well as those suspects detained pending the outcome of their trial. It comprises twelve cells on the premises of the Scheveningen branch of the Hague Penitentiary Institution, The Hague, close to the ICC’s headquarters in the Alexanderkazerne. Suspects held by the former International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia were held in the same prison and shared some facilities, like the fitness room, but had no contact with suspects held by the ICC.

    Other offices

    The ICC maintains a liaison office in New York and field offices in places where it conducts its activities. As of 18 October 2007, the Court had field offices in Kampala, Kinshasa, Bunia, Abéché and Bangui.

    Finance

    The ICC is financed by contributions from the states parties. The amount payable by each state party is determined using the same method as the United Nations: each state’s contribution is based on the country’s capacity to pay, which reflects factors such as a national income and population. The maximum amount a single country can pay in any year is limited to 22% of the Court’s budget; Japan paid this amount in 2008.

    The Court spent €80.5 million in 2007. The Assembly of States Parties approved a budget of €90.4 million for 2008, €101.2 million for 2009, and €141.6 million for 2017. As of April 2017, the ICC’s staff consisted of 800 persons from approximately 100 states.

    Trial history

    The Court’s Pre-Trial Chambers have publicly indicted 69 people. Proceedings against 35 are ongoing: 30 are at large as fugitives, one person’s case is in the pre-trial stage, and four are on trial. Proceedings against 34 have been completed: three are serving sentences, seven have finished sentences, four have been acquitted, seven have had the charges against them dismissed, four have had the charges against them withdrawn, and nine have died before the conclusion of the proceedings against them.

    Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui were tried by the ICC. Lubanga and Katanga were convicted and sentenced to 14 and 12 years imprisonment, respectively, whereas Chui was acquitted.

    The judgment of Jean-Pierre Bemba was rendered in March 2016. Bemba was convicted on two counts of crimes against humanity and three counts of war crimes. This marked the first time the ICC convicted someone of sexual violence as they added rape to his conviction. Bemba’s convictions were overturned by the Court’s Appeal Chamber in June 2018. The Court refused to compensate Bemba for losses suffered by him during his 10 years of imprisonment. It has been argued that this decision raises important questions about the court’s present powers.

    Ntaganda (DR Congo) was convicted to 30 years for crimes against humanity. The Bemba et al. OAJ case and the Laurent Gbagbo-Blé Goudé trial in the Côte d’Ivoire situation ended in acquittals. The Banda trial in the situation of Darfur, Sudan, was scheduled to begin in 2014 but the start date was vacated.

    Charges against Malian Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi have been confirmed and he was sentenced to nine years in prison. On 25 November 2021, his sentence was commuted to 7 years in prison, and he was released on 18 September 2022. Ugandan Dominic Ongwen has been convicted to a prison sentence of 25 years.

    On 6 July 2020, two Uyghur activist groups filed a complaint with the ICC calling for it to investigate PRC officials for crimes against Uyghurs, including allegations of genocide. In December 2020, ICC prosecutors rejected the complaint, stating that the ICC did not have jurisdictional basis to proceed.

    On 31 October 2023, the Israeli families of over 34 victims of the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, filed an Article 15 communication with the ICC prosecutor’s office urging an investigation into the killings and abductions, and the ICC confirmed the receipt of the filing. Reporters Without Borders also lodged a complaint regarding the deaths of eight Palestinian journalists in the Gaza Strip during Israel’s bombardment, as well as an Israeli journalist killed during a surprise attack by Hamas in southern Israel.

    Investigations and preliminary examinations

    Currently, the Office of the Prosecutor has opened investigations in Afghanistan, Bangladesh/Myanmar, Burundi, the Central African Republic (twice), Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Palestine, the Philippines, Uganda, Ukraine, and Venezuela I. The Office of the Prosecutor carried out and closed preliminary investigations in Bolivia; Colombia; Congo II; Gabon; Guinea; Honduras; Iraq/the United Kingdom; registered vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia; and South Korea. Ongoing preliminary examinations are being carried out in situations in Lithuania/Belarus, Nigeria, and Venezuela II.

    Relationships

    United Nations

    Unlike the International Court of Justice, the ICC is legally independent from the United Nations. The Rome Statute grants certain powers to the United Nations Security Council, which limit its functional independence. Article 13 allows the Security Council to refer to the Court situations that would not otherwise fall under the Court’s jurisdiction (as it did in relation to the situations in Darfur and Libya, which the Court could not otherwise have prosecuted as neither Sudan nor Libya are state parties). Article 16 allows the Security Council to require the Court to defer from investigating a case for a period of twelve months. article 16 Such a deferral may be renewed indefinitely by the Security Council. This sort of an arrangement gives the ICC some of the advantages inhering in the organs of the United Nations such as using the enforcement powers of the Security Council, but it also creates a risk of being tainted with the political controversies of the Security Council.

    The Court cooperates with the UN in many different areas, including the exchange of information and logistical support. The Court reports to the UN each year on its activities, and some meetings of the Assembly of States Parties are held at UN facilities. The relationship between the Court and the UN is governed by a “Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations”.

    Nongovernmental organizations

    During the 1970s and 1980s, international human rights and humanitarian Nongovernmental Organizations (or NGOs) began to proliferate at exponential rates. Concurrently, the quest to find a way to punish international crimes shifted from being the exclusive responsibility of legal experts to being shared with international human rights activism.

    NGOs helped birth the ICC through advocacy and championing for the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against humanity. NGOs closely monitor the organization’s declarations and actions, ensuring that the work that is being executed on behalf of the ICC is fulfilling its objectives and responsibilities to civil society. According to Benjamin Schiff, “From the Statute Conference onward, the relationship between the ICC and the NGOs has probably been closer, more consistent, and more vital to the Court than have analogous relations between NGOs and any other international organization.”

    There are a number of NGOs working on a variety of issues related to the ICC. The NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court has served as a sort of umbrella for NGOs to coordinate with each other on similar objectives related to the ICC. The CICC has 2,500 member organizations in 150 countries. The original steering committee included representatives from the World Federalist Movement, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and No Peace Without Justice. Today, many of the NGOs with which the ICC cooperates are members of the CICC. These organizations come from a range of backgrounds, spanning from major international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, to smaller, more local organizations focused on peace and justice missions. Many work closely with states, such as the International Criminal Law Network, founded and predominantly funded by the Hague municipality and the Dutch Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The CICC also claims organizations that are themselves federations, such as the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH).

    CICC members subscribe to three principles that permit them to work under the umbrella of the CICC, so long as their objectives match them:

    Promoting worldwide ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC

    Maintaining the integrity of the Rome Statute of the ICC, and
    Ensuring the ICC will be as fair, effective and independent as possible

    The NGOs that work under the CICC do not normally pursue agendas exclusive to the work of the Court, rather they may work for broader causes, such as general human rights issues, victims’ rights, gender rights, rule of law, conflict mediation, and peace. The CICC coordinates their efforts to improve the efficiency of NGOs’ contributions to the Court and to pool their influence on major common issues. From the ICC side, it has been useful to have the CICC channel NGO contacts with the Court so that its officials do not have to interact individually with thousands of separate organizations.

    NGOs have been crucial to the evolution of the ICC, as they assisted in the creation of the normative climate that urged states to seriously consider the Court’s formation. Their legal experts helped shape the Statute, while their lobbying efforts built support for it. They advocate Statute ratification globally and work at expert and political levels within member states for passage of necessary domestic legislation. NGOs are greatly represented at meetings for the Assembly of States Parties, and they use the ASP meetings to press for decisions promoting their priorities. Many of these NGOs have reasonable access to important officials at the ICC because of their involvement during the Statute process. They are engaged in monitoring, commenting upon, and assisting in the ICC’s activities.

    The ICC often depends on NGOs to interact with local populations. The Registry Public Information Office personnel and Victims Participation and Reparations Section officials hold seminars for local leaders, professionals and the media to spread the word about the Court. These are the kinds of events that are often hosted or organized by local NGOs. Because there can be challenges with determining which of these NGOs are legitimate, CICC regional representatives often have the ability to help screen and identify trustworthy organizations.

    NGOs are also “sources of criticism, exhortation and pressure upon” the ICC. The ICC heavily depends on NGOs for its operations. Although NGOs and states cannot directly impact the judicial nucleus of the organization, they can impart information on crimes, can help locate victims and witnesses, and can promote and organize victim participation. NGOs outwardly comment on the Court’s operations, “push for expansion of its activities especially in the new justice areas of outreach in conflict areas, in victims’ participation and reparations, and in upholding due-process standards and defense ‘equality of arms’ and so implicitly set an agenda for the future evolution of the ICC.” The relatively uninterrupted progression of NGO involvement with the ICC may mean that NGOs have become repositories of more institutional historical knowledge about the ICC than its national representatives, and have greater expertise than some of the organization’s employees themselves. While NGOs look to mold the ICC to satisfy the interests and priorities that they have worked for since the early 1990s, they unavoidably press against the limits imposed upon the ICC by the states that are members of the organization. NGOs can pursue their own mandates, irrespective of whether they are compatible with those of other NGOs, while the ICC must respond to the complexities of its own mandate as well as those of the states and NGOs.

    Another issue has been that NGOs possess “exaggerated senses of their ownership over the organization and, having been vital to and successful in promoting the Court, were not managing to redefine their roles to permit the Court its necessary independence.” Additionally, because there does exist such a gap between the large human rights organizations and the smaller peace-oriented organizations, it is difficult for ICC officials to manage and gratify all of their NGOs. “ICC officials recognize that the NGOs pursue their own agendas, and that they will seek to pressure the ICC in the direction of their own priorities rather than necessarily understanding or being fully sympathetic to the myriad constraints and pressures under which the Court operates.” Both the ICC and the NGO community avoid criticizing each other publicly or vehemently, although NGOs have released advisory and cautionary messages regarding the ICC. They avoid taking stances that could potentially give the Court’s adversaries, particularly the U.S., more motive to berate the organization.

    Criticism and opposition

    African states

    In October 2016, after repeated claims that the court was biased against African states, Burundi, South Africa and the Gambia announced their withdrawals from the Rome Statute. Following Gambia’s presidential election later that year, which ended the long rule of Yahya Jammeh, Gambia rescinded its withdrawal notification. A decision by the High Court of South Africa in early 2017 ruled that the attempted withdrawal was unconstitutional, as it had not been agreed by Parliament, prompting the South African government to inform the UN that it was revoking its decision to withdraw.

    African accusations of Western imperialism

    The ICC has been accused of bias and as being a tool of Western imperialism, only punishing leaders from small, weak states while ignoring crimes committed by richer and more powerful states. This sentiment has been expressed particularly by African leaders due to an alleged disproportionate focus of the Court on Africa, while it claims to have a global mandate. Until January 2016, all nine situations which the ICC had been investigating were in African countries.

    African critics have suggested the ICC is acting as a neo-colonial force seeking to further empower Western political and extractive interests in Africa. Scholar Awol Allo has described the court’s underlying problem that has led to these challenges with Africa as not overt racism, but Eurocentrism. Another analysis suggests that African states are motivated by concerns over Africa’s place in world order: the problem is the sovereign inequality displayed by the ICC prosecutor’s focus.

    The prosecution of Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta (both charged before coming into office) led to the Kenyan parliament passing a motion calling for Kenya’s withdrawal from the ICC, and the country called on the other 33 African states party to the ICC to withdraw their support, an issue which was discussed at a special African Union (AU) summit in October 2013.

    Though the ICC has denied the charge of disproportionately targeting African leaders, and claims to stand up for victims wherever they may be, Kenya was not alone in criticising the ICC. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir visited Kenya, South Africa, China, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, Qatar and several other countries despite an outstanding ICC warrant for his arrest but was not arrested; he said that the charges against him are “exaggerated” and that the ICC was a part of a “Western plot” against him. Ivory Coast’s government opted not to transfer former first lady Simone Gbagbo to the court but to instead try her at home. Rwanda’s ambassador to the African Union, Joseph Nsengimana, argued that, “It is not only the case of Kenya. We have seen international justice become more and more a political matter.” Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni accused the ICC of “mishandling complex African issues”. Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, at the time AU chairman, told the UN General Assembly at the General debate of the sixty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly: “The manner in which the ICC has been operating has left a very bad impression in Africa. It is totally unacceptable.”

    African Union (AU) withdrawal proposal

    Main article: States parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court § Withdrawal

    South African President Jacob Zuma said the perceptions of the ICC as “unreasonable” led to the calling of the special AU summit on 13 October 2015. Botswana is a notable supporter of the ICC in Africa. At the summit, the AU did not endorse the proposal for a collective withdrawal from the ICC due to lack of support for the idea. The summit concluded that serving heads of state should not be put on trial and that the Kenyan cases should be deferred. Ethiopian formerly Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom said: “We have rejected the double standard that the ICC is applying in dispensing international justice.” Despite these calls, the ICC went ahead with requiring William Ruto to attend his trial. The UNSC was then asked to consider deferring the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto for a year, but this was rejected. In November, the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties responded to Kenya’s calls for an exemption for sitting heads of state by agreeing to consider amendments to the Rome Statute to address the concerns.

    On 7 October 2016, Burundi announced that it would leave the ICC, after the court began investigating political violence in that nation. In the two weeks that followed, South Africa and The Gambia also announced their intention to leave the court, with Kenya and Namibia reportedly also considering departure. All three nations cited the fact that all 39 people indicted by the court over its history by that date had been African and that the court has made no effort to investigate war crimes tied to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following The Gambia’s presidential election later that year, which ended the long rule of Yahya Jammeh, the new government rescinded its withdrawal notification. The High Court of South Africa ruled on 2 February 2017 that the South African government’s notice to withdraw was unconstitutional and invalid. On 7 March 2017 the South African government formally revoked its intention to withdraw. The ruling ANC revealed on 5 July 2017 that its intention to withdraw stands.

    Israel

    In 2020, the +972 magazine, based in Israel, reported political interference coming from Israel and the U.S. when Fatou Bensouda, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, announced that “there is legal basis to probe Israel and Palestinian groups over war crimes in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, and that her office was ready to investigate the matter”. In 2018, when the Israeli government wanted to demolish the West Bank village of Khan al Ahmar, Bensouda explicitly warned Israel that doing so could be considered a ‘war crime’. The Israeli government’s response was to publicly defy the court, describing the prosecutor’s statement as ‘pure anti-Semitism’ in Netanyahu’s words.

    The Guardian reported in 2024, on the basis of anonymous sources, that Israel had conducted a nine-year “war” against the ICC. These sources alleged that Israeli intelligence agencies were used to “surveil, hack, pressure, smear and allegedly threaten senior ICC staff in an effort to derail the court’s inquiries.” In particular, Yossi Cohen, director of Mossad at the time, allegedly threatened Bensouda and her family in an attempt to dissuade her from opening war crime inquiries against Israel. The anonymous sources are said to be familiar with disclosures Bensouda made to the ICC regarding the operation.

    In November 2024, after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Gaza war, Netanyahu accused the ICC of antisemitism, while Gallant argued the Court set “a dangerous precedent against the right to self-defence and ethical warfare and encourages murderous terrorism.” In that same November, Israel appealed the ICC warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant.

    In November 2024, France argued that the arrest warrants for Israeli leaders are not valid because Israel is not a member of the ICC. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said on various occasions that Italy would not arrest Prime Minister Netanyahu. In January 2025, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk guaranteed safe passage for senior Israeli officials, including Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to an event in Poland marking the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The majority of the Polish public disagreed with the government’s decision not to arrest Netanyahu.

    Germany’s CDU leader Friedrich Merz criticized the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Netanyahu. In February 2025, one day after the 2025 German federal election, he announced his will to invite Netanyahu to Germany, “as an open challenge” to the decision of the ICC.

    In April 2025, Netanyahu visited Hungary, a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. During the visit, the Hungarian government’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán announced that it would withdraw from the ICC, describing it as “politically biased”. The withdrawal will become effective after one year’s written notice. Hungary will join Israel, the US, Russia, China and North Korea among nations which do not recognise the ICC’s jurisdiction.

    Philippines

    Following the announcement that the ICC would open a preliminary investigation on the Philippines in connection to its escalating drug war, President Rodrigo Duterte announced on 14 March 2018 that the Philippines would start to submit plans to withdraw, completing the process on 17 March 2019. The ICC pointed out that it retained jurisdiction over the Philippines during the period when it was a state party to the Rome Statute, from November 2011 to March 2019.

    On 11 March 2025, Duterte was arrested on an ICC warrant pursuant to his role in the Philippine Drug War and flown from Manila to The Hague.

    Russia

    In March 2023, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that Russia did not recognize the Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin on account of war crimes in Ukraine and noted that Russia, like other countries which had not ratified the Rome Statute, did not recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC, saying “And accordingly, any decisions of this kind are null and void for the Russian Federation from the point of view of law.”

    State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin wrote on Telegram, “Yankees, hands off Putin!” calling the move evidence of Western “hysteria”, and saying that “we regard any attacks on the President of the Russian Federation as aggression against our country”.

    South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor criticized the ICC for not having what she called an “evenhanded approach” to all leaders responsible for violations of international law. South Africa, which failed in its obligation to arrest visiting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in June 2015, invited Vladimir Putin to the 15th BRICS Summit in Durban. On 19 July 2023, South Africa announced that “by mutual agreement” Putin would not attend the summit. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended in Putin’s place.

    In the months following the arrest warrant for Putin being issued, Russia issued warrants for the arrest of multiple ICC officials, including the court’s president Piotr Hofma?ski and its vice-president Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza.

    In advance of a visit by Putin to Mongolia on 3 September 2024, the ICC stated that Mongolia was obligated to place Putin under arrest, due to Mongolia being a signatory of the Rome Statute of the ICC. After failure to make the arrest, Mongolia was described by Ukraine as complicit in Putin’s war crimes. Following the visit and the refusal to arrest Putin, the Mongolia government said that the issue of energy relations is critical to the country and that “Mongolia has always maintained a policy of neutrality in all its diplomatic relations, as demonstrated in our statements of record to date.”

    United States

    United States and the International Criminal Court

    United States President George W. Bush signed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (informally referred to as The Hague Invasion Act) to signify the United States’ opposition to any possible future jurisdiction of the court or its tribunals. The act gives the President the power to use “all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court”. During the administration of Barack Obama, U.S. opposition to the ICC evolved to “positive engagement”, but no effort was made to ratify the Rome Statute.

    The subsequent Donald Trump administration was considerably more hostile to the Court, similar to the Bush administration, threatening prosecution and financial sanctions on ICC judges and staff in U.S. courts as well as imposing visa bans in response to any investigation against American nationals in connection to alleged crimes and atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. in Afghanistan. The threat included sanctions against any of over 120 countries that have ratified the Court for cooperating in the process. In November 2017, Fatou Bensouda advised the court to consider seeking charges for human rights abuses committed during the War in Afghanistan such as alleged rapes and tortures by the U.S. Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, crime against humanity committed by the Taliban, and war crimes committed by the Afghan National Security Forces. John Bolton, National Security Advisor of the United States, stated that ICC Court had no jurisdiction over the U.S., which had not ratified the Rome Statute. In 2020, overturning the previous decision not to proceed, senior judges at the ICC authorized an investigation into the alleged war crimes in Afghanistan.

    On 11 June 2020, the United States announced sanctions on officials and employees, as well as their families, involved in investigating alleged crimes against humanity committed by U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan. This move was widely criticized by human rights groups. The U.S. ordered sanctions against the ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, and the ICC’s head of Jurisdiction, Complementary, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochok, for an investigation into alleged war crimes by U.S. forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan since 2003. Attorney General William Barr said, “The US government has reason to doubt the honesty of the ICC. The Department of Justice has received substantial credible information that raises serious concerns about a long history of financial corruption and malfeasance at the highest levels of the office of the prosecutor”. The ICC responded with a statement expressing “profound regret at the announcement of further threats and coercive actions.” “These attacks constitute an escalation and an unacceptable attempt to interfere with the rule of law and the Court’s judicial proceedings”, the statement said. “They are announced with the declared aim of influencing the actions of ICC officials in the context of the court’s independent and objective investigations and impartial judicial proceedings.”

    On 30 September 2020, prominent United States human rights lawyers announced that they would sue Trump and his Administration—including Barr, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin, and OFAC director Andrea Gacki, and the departments they head—on the grounds that Trump’s Executive Order 13928 order had gagged them, violating their right to free speech and impeding their work in trying to obtain justice on behalf of victims of war crimes. One of the plaintiffs, Diane Marie Amann, stated that, as a result of sanctions against the chief prosecutor at the ICC, she herself risked having her family assets seized if she continued to work for children who are bought and sold by traffickers, killed, tortured, sexually abused and forced to become child soldiers.

    On 4 January 2021, U.S. District Judge Katherine Polk Failla in New York City issued a preliminary injunction against the Trump administration from imposing criminal or civil penalties against ICC personnel and those who support the court’s work, including the plaintiffs. The sanctions were subsequently lifted by the Biden administration Secretary of State Antony Blinken in April 2021.

    In 2023, the Biden administration welcomed the issuing of an ICC arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Joe Biden said that the issuing of the warrant “makes a very strong point”. In 2024, the Biden administration opposed an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over alleged Israeli war crimes committed during the Gaza war in the Gaza Strip. Biden denounced Netanyahu’s arrest warrant as “outrageous.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden administration would work with the US Congress on potential sanctions against the ICC. Prior to the issuing of the ICC’s arrest warrant for Netanyahu, a group of US Republican senators sent a letter to ICC prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan that contained the warning “Target Israel and we will target you. If you move forward … we will move to end all American support for the ICC, sanction your employees and associates, and bar you and your families from the United States. You have been warned.” The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to sanction ICC officials on 4 June 2024.

    On 9 January 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act by 243–140 to sanction the ICC in protest at its arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant issued in November 2024.[390][391] On February 6, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing economic and travel sanctions on individuals involved in ICC investigations targeting U.S. citizens and allies, notably Israel. This action coincided with Netanyahu visiting Washington. The sanctions entail freezing U.S. assets of designated individuals and prohibiting their entry into the United States. This move mirrors a similar stance taken during Trump’s first term, when sanctions were applied to ICC officials over investigations into alleged war crimes by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

    U.S. criticisms

    The United States Department of State argues that there are “insufficient checks and balances on the authority of the ICC prosecutor and judges” and “insufficient protection against politicized prosecutions or other abuses”. The current law in the United States on the ICC is the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA), 116 Stat. 820. The ASPA authorizes the President of the United States to use “all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court”. This authorization has led the act to be nicknamed the “Hague Invasion Act” because the freeing of U.S. citizens by force might be possible only through military action.

    On 10 September 2018, John R. Bolton, in his first major address as U.S. National Security Advisor, reiterated that the ICC lacks checks and balances, exercises “jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed and ambiguous definitions”, and has failed to “deter and punish atrocity crimes”. The ICC, Bolton said, was “superfluous”, given that “domestic judicial systems already hold American citizens to the highest legal and ethical standards”. He added that the U.S. would do everything “to protect our citizens” should the ICC attempt to prosecute U.S. servicemen over alleged detainee abuse in Afghanistan. In that event, ICC judges and prosecutors would be barred from entering the U.S., their funds in the U.S. would be sanctioned and the U.S. “will prosecute them in the U.S. criminal system. We will do the same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of Americans”, Bolton said. He also criticized Palestinian efforts to bring Israel before the ICC over allegations of human rights abuses in the West Bank and Gaza.

    Office of Public Counsel for the Defence

    Concerning the independent Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD), Thomas Lubanga’s defence team say they were given a smaller budget than the Prosecutor and that evidence and witness statements were slow to arrive.

    Impartiality

    The International Criminal Court is often “critiqued for being selective, or imperialistic, or reflecting the geopolitical interests of powerful states,” says Sarah Knuckey, a Columbia law professor. While many Western countries supported the arrest warrant for Russian President Putin, how they respond to the warrant against Israel’s Netanyahu will be “a test of the genuineness of their commitment to international justice for all”, she continued.

    Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the ICC’s prosecutor team takes no account of the roles played by the government in the conflict of Uganda, Rwanda or Congo. This led to a flawed investigation, because the ICC did not reach the conclusion of its verdict after considering the governments’ position and actions in the conflict.

    Unintentional consequences

    Research indicates that prosecutions of leaders who are culpable of international crimes in the ICC makes them less likely to peacefully step down, which can prolong conflicts and incentivize them to make continued use of mass violence. It is also argued that there is little evidence that international criminal prosecution practically fosters peace: “the ICC has been used as a means of intervention in ongoing conflicts with the expectation that the indictments, arrests, and trials of elite perpetrators have deterrence and preventive effects for atrocity crimes. Despite these legitimate intentions and great expectations, there is little evidence of the efficacy of justice as a means to peace”.

    State cooperation

    That the ICC cannot mount successful cases without state cooperation is problematic for several reasons. It means that the ICC acts inconsistently in its selection of cases, is prevented from taking on hard cases and loses legitimacy. It also gives the ICC less deterrent value, as potential perpetrators of war crimes know that they can avoid ICC judgment by taking over government and refusing to cooperate.

    Principle of complementarity

    The Rome Statute’s principle of complementarity (that the Court will only prosecute if states are unwilling or unable to) is often taken for granted in the legal analysis of international criminal law and its jurisprudence. Initially the thorny issue of the actual application of the complementarity principle arose in 2008, when William Schabas published his influential paper. No substantive research was made by other scholars on this issue for quite some time. In June 2017, Victor Tsilonis advanced the same criticism which is reinforced by events, practices of the Office of the Prosecutor and ICC cases in the Essays in Honour of Nestor Courakis. His paper essentially argues that the Senussi case arguably is the first instance of the complementarity principle’s actual implementation eleven whole years after the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

    On the other hand, in 2017, Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda invoked the principle of complementarity in the situation between Russia and Georgia in the Ossetia region. Moreover, following the threats of certain African states (initially Burundi, Gambia and South Africa) to withdraw their ratifications, Bensouda again referred to the principle of complementarity as a core principle of ICC’s jurisdiction and has more extensively focused on the principle’s application on the latest Office of The Prosecutor’s Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016.

    Some advocates have suggested that the ICC go “beyond complementarity” and systematically support national capacity for prosecutions. They argue that national prosecutions, where possible, are more cost-effective, preferable to victims and more sustainable.

    Jurisdiction over corporations

    There is a debate on whether the ICC should have jurisdiction over corporations that violate international law. Supporters argue that corporations can and do commit human rights violations, such as war crimes linked to raw materials in conflict zones. Critics argue that prosecuting corporations would compromise the principle of complementarity, that it would give corporations excessive power under international law, or that it would compromise voluntary initiatives by companies. John Ruggie has argued that jurisdiction of corporations under international law should be limited to international crimes, while Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli of La Sabana University argues that it should cover all human rights violations.

    Despite its lack of jurisdiction, the ICC announced in 2016 that it would prioritize criminal cases linked to land grabbing, illegal resource extraction, or environmental degradation caused by corporate activity. The proposed crime of ecocide would have jurisdiction over corporations as well as governments. Supporters of criminalizing ecocide argue that it would shift the ICC’s priorities away from Africa, since most environmental degradation is caused by states and corporations in the Global North

  • European Court of Human Rights

    The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), also known as the Strasbourg Court, is an international court of the Council of Europe which interprets the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court hears applications alleging that a contracting state has breached one or more of the human rights enumerated in the convention or its optional protocols to which a member state is a party. The court is based in Strasbourg, France.

    The court was established in 1959 and decided its first case in 1960 in Lawless v. Ireland. An application can be lodged by an individual, a group of individuals, or one or more of the other contracting states. Aside from judgments, the court can also issue advisory opinions. The convention was adopted within the context of the Council of Europe, and all of its 46 member states are contracting parties to the convention. The court’s primary means of judicial interpretation is the living instrument doctrine, meaning that the Convention is interpreted in light of present-day conditions.

    International law scholars consider the ECtHR to be the most effective international human rights court in the world. Nevertheless, the court has faced challenges with verdicts not implemented by the contracting parties.

    History and structure

    A segment of the Berlin Wall in front of the European Court of Human Rights

    On 10 December 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which aims to promote the universal recognition of rights set out therein, in order to strengthen the protection of human rights at the international level. While hugely important in setting a global standard for the first time, the declaration was essentially aspirational, and had no judicial enforcement mechanism. In 1949, the twelve member states of the newly created Council of Europe began work on the European Convention on Human Rights, drawing inspiration from the rights already set out in the Declaration, but with the crucial difference that—for the European countries which chose to sign up to it—there would be a judicial mechanism to ensure that they respected the basic rights of their citizens.

    The court was established on 21 January 1959 on the basis of Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights when its first members were elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Initially, access to the court was restricted by the European Commission of Human Rights, abolished in 1998. The court kept a low profile during its first years and did not accumulate much case law, first finding a violation in Neumeister v Austria (1968). The convention charges the court with ensuring the observance of the engagement undertaken by the contracting states in relation to the convention and its protocols, that is ensuring the enforcement and implementation of the European Convention in the member states of the Council of Europe.

    As a court of the Council of Europe

    The European Court of Human Rights, which enforces the European Convention on Human Rights, is the best known body of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe (CoE) (French: Conseil de l’Europe, CdE) is an international organisation founded in the wake of World War II to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe. Founded in 1949, it now has 46 member states, covering a population of approximately 700 million, and operates with an annual budget of approximately 500 million euros.

    The organisation is distinct from the 27-nation European Union (EU), although it is sometimes confused with it, partly because the EU has adopted the original flag of Europe created by the Council of Europe in 1955, as well as the anthem of Europe.No country has ever joined the EU without first belonging to the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is an official United Nations observer.

    Member states

    The jurisdiction of the court has been recognized to date by all 46 member states of the Council of Europe. On 1 November 1998, the court became a full-time institution and the European Commission of Human Rights, which used to decide on admissibility of applications, was abolished by Protocol 11.

    The accession of new states to the European Convention on Human Rights following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to a sharp increase in applications filed in the court. The efficiency of the court was threatened seriously by the large accumulation of pending applications.

    In 1999, 8,400 applications were allocated to be heard. In 2003, 27,200 cases were filed and the number pending rose to approximately 65,000. In 2005, the court opened 45,500 case files. In 2009, 57,200 applications were allocated, with 119,300 pending. At the time, more than 90 per cent of applications were declared to be inadmissible, and the majority of cases decided—around 60 per cent of the decisions by the court—related to what is termed repetitive cases: where the court has already delivered judgment finding a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights or where well established case law exists on a similar case.

    Protocol 11 was designed to deal with the backlog of pending cases by establishing the court and its judges as a full-time institution, by simplifying the procedure and reducing the length of proceedings. However, as the workload of the court continued to increase, the contracting states agreed that further reforms were necessary and in May 2004, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Protocol 14 was drafted with the aim of reducing the workload of the court and that of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervises the execution of judgments, so that the court could focus on cases that raise important human rights issues.

    Judges

    Judges are elected for a non-renewable nine-year term. The number of full-time judges sitting in the court is equal to the number of contracting states to the European Convention on Human Rights, currently 46. The convention requires that judges be of “high moral character” and have qualifications suitable for high judicial office, or be jurists of recognised competence.

    Each judge is elected by majority vote in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from among three candidates nominated by each contracting state. Judges are elected whenever a sitting judge’s term has expired or when a new state accedes to the convention. The retiring age of judges is 70, but they may continue to serve as judges until a new judge is elected or until the cases in which they sit have come to an end.

    Judges perform their duties in an individual capacity and are prohibited from having any institutional or similar ties with the state in respect of which they were elected. To ensure the independence of the court, judges are not allowed to participate in activity that may compromise the court’s independence. Judges cannot hear or decide a case if they have a familial or professional relationship with a party. A judge can be dismissed from office only if the other judges decide, by a two-thirds majority, that the judge has ceased to fulfil the required conditions. Judges enjoy, during their term as judges, the privileges and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

    The European Court of Human Rights is assisted by a registry made up of around 640 agents, of which a little less than half of lawyers divided into 31 sections. The registry carries out preparatory work for the judges, and performs the communication activities of the court, with the applicants, the public and the press. The registrar and the deputy registrar are elected by the Plenary Court.

    Plenary court and administration

    The plenary court is an assembly of all of the court’s judges. It has no judicial functions. It elects the court’s president, vice-president, registrar and deputy registrar. It also deals with administrative matters, discipline, working methods, reforms, the establishment of Chambers and the adoption of the Rules of Court.

    The president of the court, the two vice-presidents (also section presidents) and the three other section presidents are elected by the Plenary Court, Section presidents are elected by the Plenary Court, a formation made up of the 46 elected judges of the court. The mandate of the holders is for a renewable period of three years. They are renowned for their morality and competence. They must be independent and there is incompatibility with other functions. They cannot be revoked by their state of origin, but only by decision of their peers, taken by a two-thirds majority and for serious reasons.

    Jurisdiction

    The court has jurisdiction amongst the member states of the Council of Europe which includes almost every country in Europe except for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Russia and Vatican City. The jurisdiction of the court is generally divided into inter-state cases, applications by individuals against contracting states, and advisory opinions in accordance with Protocol No.2. Applications by individuals constitute the majority of cases heard by the court. A committee is constituted by three judges, chambers by seven judges, and a Grand Chamber by 17 judges.

    Applications by individuals

    Applications by individuals against contracting states, alleging that the state violated their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, can be made by any person, non-governmental organisation, or group of individuals. Although the official languages of the court are English and French, applications may be submitted in any one of the official languages of the contracting states. An application has to be made in writing and signed by the applicant or by the applicant’s representative.

    Once registered with the court, the case is assigned to a Judge Rapporteur, who can make a final decision on whether the case is inadmissible. A case may be inadmissible when it is incompatible with the requirements of ratione materiae, ratione temporis or ratione personae, or if the case cannot be proceeded with on formal grounds, such as non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, lapse of the four months from the last internal decision complained of, anonymity, substantial identity with a matter already submitted to the court, or with another procedure of international investigation.

    If the Judge Rapporteur decides that the case can proceed, the case is then referred to a chamber of the court which, unless it decides that the application is inadmissible, communicates the case to the government of the state against which the application is made, asking the government to present its observations on the case.

    The chamber of the court then deliberates and judges the case on its admissibility and its merits. Cases that raise serious questions of interpretation and application of the European Convention on Human Rights, a serious issue of general importance, or which may depart from previous case law can be heard in the Grand Chamber if all parties to the case agree to the chamber of the court relinquishing jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber. A panel of five judges decides whether the Grand Chamber accepts the referral.

    Interstate cases

    Any contracting state to the European Convention on Human Rights can sue another contracting state in the court for alleged breaches of the convention, although in practice this is very rare. As of 2021, five interstate cases have been decided by the court:

    Ireland v. United Kingdom (no. 5310/71), judgement of 18 January 1978 on inhuman and degrading treatment in Northern Ireland (art. 3)

    Denmark v. Turkey (no. 34382/97), judgement of 5 April 2000 ratifying a friendly settlement of 450,000 DKK regarding a Danish national detained in Turkey (art. 3)

    Cyprus v. Turkey (IV) (no. 25781/94), judgements of 10 May 2001 on the treatment of missing persons (art. 2, 3 and 5), the right of return of Greeks who have fled to the south (art. 8, 13 and P1-1), the rights of Greeks still living in the north (art. 3, 8, 9, 10, 13, P1-1, P1-2) and trial by military courts (art. 6). A subsequent judgement of 12 May 2014 awarded €90 million in ‘just satisfaction’ (art. 41)

    Georgia v. Russian Federation (I) (no. 13255/07), judgement of

    3 July 2014 on the collective expulsion of Georgians from Russia (art. 3, 5, 13, 38, P4-4) and Russia not cooperating with the court (art. 38)

    Georgia v. Russian Federation (II) (no. 38263/08), judgement of 21 January 2021

    Advisory opinion

    The Committee of Ministers may, by majority vote, ask the court to deliver an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, unless the matter relates to the content and scope of fundamental rights which the court has already considered. Since 2018, member states can similarly request advisory opinions on questions of principle concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, on the basis of Protocol No. 16. This mechanism aims to foster dialogue between national courts and the ECtHR, thereby preempting Convention violations and minimizing the latter’s caseload. Unlike preliminary references under EU law, advisory opinions may only be solicited by the “highest courts and tribunals” of a member state. Although Article 5 of Protocol No. 16 states that “Advisory opinions shall not be binding”, they nonetheless enter the ECtHR’s case law and may be enforced through later individual complaints if contravened.

    Erga omnes effects

    ECtHR rulings have erga omnes effects (that is, they are potentially binding on all member states), because the court “determines issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of European Convention States”, although erga omnes effect “is not regarded by all States Parties as a legal requirement”.

    Procedure and decisions

    After the preliminary finding of admissibility the court examines the case by hearing representations from both parties. The court may undertake any investigation it deems necessary on the facts or issues raised in the application and contracting states are required to provide the court with all necessary assistance for this purpose.

    The European Convention on Human Rights requires all hearings to be in public, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the holding of a private hearing. In practice the majority of cases are heard in private following written pleadings. In confidential proceedings the court may assist both parties in securing a settlement, in which case the court monitors the compliance of the agreement with the convention. However, in many cases, a hearing is not held.

    The judgment of the Grand Chamber is final. Judgments by the chamber of the court become final three months after they are issued, unless a reference to the Grand Chamber for review or appeal has been made. If the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request for referral, the judgment of the chamber of the court becomes final. The Grand Chamber is made up of 17 judges: the court’s president and vice-presidents, the section presidents and the national judge, together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. Grand Chambers include a public hearing, which is transmitted as a webcast on the ECHR site. After the public hearing, the judges deliberate.

    The court’s chamber decides both issues regarding admissibility and merits of the case. Generally, if any claim is found admissible, its merits are dealt with in the same judgment. In final judgments the court makes a declaration that a contracting state has (or has not) violated the convention in respect of each admissible claim, and in case of violation may order the contracting state to pay material and/or moral damages and the legal expenses incurred in domestic courts and the court in bringing the case.

    The court’s judgments are public and must contain reasons justifying the decision. Article 46 of the convention provides that contracting states undertake to abide by the court’s final decision. On the other hand, advisory opinions are, by definition, non-binding. The court has to date decided consistently that under the convention it has no jurisdiction to annul domestic laws or administrative practices which violate the convention.

    The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is charged with supervising the execution of the court’s judgments. The Committee of Ministers oversees the contracting states’ changes to their national law in order that it is compatible with the convention, or individual measures taken by the contracting state to redress violations. Judgments by the court are binding on the respondent states concerned and states usually comply with the Court’s judgments.

    Chambers decide cases by a majority. Any judge who has heard the case can attach to the judgment a separate opinion. This opinion can concur or dissent with the decision of the court. In case of a tie in voting, the president has the casting vote.

    Exhaustion of domestic remedies

    Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights establishes as a precondition on referral to the European Court of Human Rights, the exhaustion of domestic remedies. This condition is the consequence of the subsidiary jurisdiction of the supranational court, which monitors the application of the convention and seeks to eradicate human rights violations. The applicant must establish the inability of the national courts to remedy the breaches, by exercising the appropriate effective and adequate remedies, and in substance alleging a violation of the Convention.

    Interim measures

    Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court permits the ECtHR to “indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings.” Interim measures are binding and afford litigants temporary protections on an expedited basis, although the ECtHR has chosen to only impose them in cases concerning imminent danger to life and limb. Such measures are often deployed to prevent extradition or expulsion to countries with inadequate human rights guarantees, whereas requests to prevent potentially damaging publications or property seizures seldom elicit similar responses.

    Just satisfaction

    The court may award pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, called “just satisfaction”. The awards are typically small in comparison to verdicts by national courts and rarely exceed £1,000 plus legal costs. Non-pecuniary damages are more closely correlated to what the state can afford to pay than the specific harm suffered by the complainant. In some cases, repeated patterns of human rights violations lead to higher awards in an effort to punish the responsible state, but paradoxically in other cases they lead to lower awards, or the cases being struck entirely.

    Judicial interpretation

    The court’s primary method of judicial interpretation is the living instrument doctrine, meaning that the text of the Convention “must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” rather than the intent of its framers. In Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2008), the court emphasized that it “upholds individual rights as practical and effective, rather than theoretical and illusory protections”. Another key part of the Court’s interpretation is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

    One area that the living instrument doctrine has changed ECtHR jurisprudence over time is with regard to differential treatment exclusively based on ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual orientation, which it is increasingly likely to label unjustified discrimination. In addition, with the proliferation of alternative family arrangements, the court has expanded its definition of family under Article 8, for example to same-sex couples, as in Oliari and Others v Italy (2015). Although defenders argue that living instrument doctrine is necessary for the court to stay relevant and its rulings to adapt to the actual conditions, such interpretations are labeled overreach or judicial activism by critics.

    Margin of appreciation

    The Court uses the doctrine of margin of appreciation, referring to the member states’ rights to set moral standards within reason. Over time, the court has narrowed the margin of appreciation (to the point, according to some commentators, of a “demise” of margin of appreciation). Narrowing margin of appreciation is a target of criticism for those who believe that the ECtHR should minimize its role, especially from the United Kingdom.

    Proponents of a stronger recognition of margin of appreciation cite local conceptions of human rights, specific to the context of each country and its culture, and the risk of handing down judgements that lack local cultural and grassroots legitimacy. Critics argue that the principle of “emerging consensus” of the member states on which the ECtHR operates is fundamentally flawed, because such a consensus often relies on trends, and historically in many instances social and political consensus was retrospectively acknowledged to have been wrong.

    Such an approach is accused of risking stigmatisation and coercion of the few dissenting countries, encouraging a pack mentality. Furthermore, critics argue that the EHtCR has claimed that such consensus exists even when objectively it did not, due to the judicial activism of its judges. It has been said that in failing to distinctly define how a consensus is reached reduces its legitimacy. Furthermore, as the ECtHR grows, the consensus between the members diminishes.

    However, the margin of appreciation doctrine has also come under sharp criticism from jurists and academics who say that it undermines the universal nature of human rights.

    Proportionality analysis

    Proportionality analysis governs much of the Court’s jurisprudence. The guarantees of ECHR Articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 are subject to whatever limitations may be “necessary in a democratic society”, citing factors including national security, public safety, health and morals, and the rights and freedoms of others. Such conditions require the balancing of individual rights and community interests, as first articulated in the Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2). Critics maintain that proportionality engenders largely subjective rulings: a judge’s personal preferences and beliefs may color their perceptions of rights’ relative importance. The Court has established certain formulas to ensure consistency across such decisions, but these guidelines cover only a small fraction of its case law.

    Relationship with other courts

    European Court of Justice

    Justice and European Court of Human Rights

    The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is not institutionally related to the European Court of Human Rights: the two courts are related to distinct organizations. However, since all EU states are members of the Council of Europe and so are parties of the Convention on Human Rights, there are concerns about consistency in case law between the two courts. The CJEU refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and treats the Convention on Human Rights as if it were part of the EU’s legal system since it forms part of the legal principles of the EU member states.

    Even though its member states are party to the convention, the European Union itself is not a party, as it did not have competence to become one under previous treaties. However, EU institutions are bound under Article 6 of the EU Treaty of Nice to respect human rights under the convention. Furthermore, since the Treaty of Lisbon took effect on 1 December 2009, the EU is expected to sign the convention. That would mean that the Court of Justice is bound by the judicial precedents of the Court of Human Rights’ case law and so is subject to its human rights law, which would avoid issues of conflicting case law between these two courts. In December 2014, the CJEU released Opinion 2/13 rejecting accession to the Convention.

    Despite the European Union’s failure to accede to the Convention, the ECtHR has consistently held that member states are bound by ECHR guarantees even when executing and implementing EU law. Nevertheless, the Court has simultaneously sought to promote international cooperation and avoid interfering in internal Union affairs. It has balanced the conflicting aims of fostering European harmony and avoiding ECHR circumvention via the “Bosphorus Presumption”, a policy of conditional deference articulated in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland. Because the CJEU represents a “comparable” human rights enforcement mechanism, the ECtHR may presume “that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its EU membership”. This presumption may be refuted in any particular instances where protections of Convention rights are “manifestly deficient”.

    National courts

    Most of the contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights have incorporated the convention into their own national legal systems, either through constitutional provision, statute or judicial decision. The ECtHR increasingly considers judicial dialogue with national courts to be a “high priority”, especially when it comes to implementation of judgements. According to a 2012 study, the ECTtHR tends to justify its decisions with citations to its own case law in order to convince national courts to accept its rulings.

    In 2015, Russia adopted a law declaring it legal to overrule judgements from the ECtHR, codifying an earlier Russian Constitutional Court decision which ruled that Russia could refuse to recognize an ECtHR decision if it conflicted with the Constitution of Russia, and in 2020 Russia made constitutional amendments stipulating that the Russian Constitution supersedes international law. (In March 2022, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a history of disregard for the principles of the Convention, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe.) Other countries have also moved to restrict the binding nature of the ECtHR judgments, subject to the countries’ own constitutional principles. In 2004, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that judgements handed down by the ECtHR are not always binding on German courts. The Italian Constitutional Court also restricts the applicability of ECtHR decisions.

    A 2016 book characterizes Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden to be mostly friendly to ECtHR judgements; France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey to be moderately critical; the United Kingdom to be strongly critical; and Russia to be openly hostile. In 2019, south Caucasus states were judged partially compliant in a law review article.

    Effectiveness

    International law scholars consider the ECtHR to be the most effective international human rights court in the world. According to Michael Goldhaber in A People’s History of the European Court of Human Rights, “Scholars invariably describe it with superlatives”.

    Implementation

    The court lacks enforcement powers. Some states have ignored ECtHR verdicts and continued practices judged to be human rights violations. Although all damages must be paid to the applicant within the time frame specified by the court (usually three months) or else will accumulate interest, there is no formal deadline for any more complex compliance required by the judgement. However, by leaving a judgement unimplemented for a long period of time, brings into question the state’s commitment to addressing human rights violations in a timely fashion.

    The number of non-implemented judgements rose from 2,624 in 2001 to 9,944 at the end of 2016, 48% of which had gone without implementation five years or more. In 2016, all but one of the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe had not implemented at least one ECtHR verdict in a timely fashion, although most non-implemented verdicts concern a few countries: Italy (2,219), Russia (1,540), Turkey (1,342), and Ukraine (1,172). More than 3,200 non-implemented judgements “concerned violations by security forces and poor detention conditions”.

    Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, stated: “Our work is based on cooperation and good faith. When you don’t have that, it’s very difficult to have an impact. We kind of lack the tools to help countries that don’t want to be helped.” Russia systematically ignores ECtHR verdicts, paying compensation in most cases but refusing to fix the problem, leading to a high number of repeat cases. Russian legislation has set up a specific fund for paying the claimants in successful ECtHR verdicts.

    Notable non-implemented judgements include:

    In Hirst v. United Kingdom (2005), and several subsequent cases, the court found that a blanket deprivation of suffrage to British prisoners violated Article 3 of Protocol 1, which guarantees the right to vote. A minimal compromise was implemented in 2017.

    The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was first ruled to be discriminatory in 2009 (Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), for preventing Bosnian citizens who were not of Bosniak, Croat, or Serb ethnicity from being elected to certain state offices. As of December 2019, the discriminatory provisions have yet to be repealed or amended, despite three subsequent cases confirming their incompatibility with the Convention.

    In Alekseyev v. Russia (2010), the ban on Moscow Pride was judged to violate freedom of assembly. In 2012, Russian courts banned the event for the next 100 years. The ECtHR confirmed its ruling that bans on pride parades violate freedom of assembly rights in Alekseyev and Others v. Russia (2018).

    Bayev and Others v. Russia (2017), relating to the Russian gay propaganda law and related laws, which the court judged to abridge freedom of speech.

    Azerbaijani opposition politician Ilgar Mammadov, whose imprisonment the ECtHR ruled illegal in 2014; he was not released until 2018. He was subsequently acquitted and paid compensation.

    Following Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (2017), the ECtHR dismissed all 12,143 cases following the pattern of Ivanov v. Ukraine (2009) as well as any future cases following that pattern, handing them to the Department of Execution at the Council of Europe for enforcement. These cases all involved complainants not being paid money they were due under Ukrainian law. In the eight years between Ivanov and Burmych, Ukraine made no effort to resolve these cases, leading the ECtHR to “effectively give up on trying to incentivize Ukraine to comply with its judgments”. As of 2020, the money owed to the complainants in these cases remains unpaid.
    Another issue is delayed implementation of judgements.

    Caseload

    The caseload of the court expanded rapidly after the fall of the Soviet Union, growing from fewer than 8,400 cases filed in 1999 to 57,000 in 2009. Most of these cases concern nationals of the former Eastern Bloc where there is less trust in the court system. In 2009, the court had a backlog of 120,000 cases which would have required 46 years to process at the previous rate, leading to reforms. According to the BBC, the court began “to be seen as a victim of its own success”.

    Between 2007 and 2017, the number of cases dealt with each year was relatively constant (between 1,280 and 1,550); two-thirds of cases were repetitive and most concerned a few countries: Turkey (2,401), Russia (2,110), Romania (1,341), and Poland (1,272). Repetitive cases indicate a pattern of human rights violations in a given country. The 2010 Interlaken Declaration stated that the court would reduce its caseload by cutting back on the number of repetitive cases it dealt with.

    As a result of Protocol 14 reforms to reduce caseload, single judges were empowered to reject applications as inadmissible and a system of “pilot judgements” was created to handle repetitive cases without a formal finding for each one. Pending applications peaked at 151,600 in 2011 and were reduced to 59,800 by 2019.

    These reforms led to an increasing number of applications being declared inadmissible or bypassed a ruling under the new pilot procedure. According to Steven Greer, “large numbers of applications will not, in practice, be examined”, and this situation is qualified as a “structural denial of justice for certain categories of meritorious applicants whose cases cannot be handled”. Access to justice may also be de facto impeded the lack of legal aid and other factors.

    Impact

    ECtHR rulings have expanded the protection of human rights in every signatory country. Notable rights secured include:

    Article 2: right to life including the abolition of capital punishment, and effective investigation of deaths in custody and due to domestic violence

    Article 3: freedom from torture and ill-treatment, ending police brutality and excessively poor conditions in prisons, banning forced sterilization

    Article 4: Article 4 cases have resulted in the criminalization of forced labor and human trafficking in several countries

    Article 5: liberty and security, such as ending excessive pretrial detention that resulted in innocent people jailed for years

    Article 6: right to a fair trial, including quashing wrongful convictions, limiting the length of judicial proceedings to avoid unfair delays, and securing judicial impartiality

    Article 8:
    Right to privacy, which has included limits on wiretapping and decriminalization of homosexuality

    Right to family life, including ending child custody regimes which discriminated against men, LGBT people, and religious minorities

    Article 9: freedom of conscience and religion including conscientious objection, right to proselytize, undue burdens on exercise of religion, state interference in religious organizations

    Article 10: freedom of expression protections, including quashing of defamation laws that prohibited expressing unflattering opinions or imposed excessive penalties, protection for whistleblowers and journalists who exposed political corruption or criticized the government

    Article 11: freedom of association and peaceful assembly, such as the right to organize pride parades and political demonstrations

    Article 14 and Protocol 12: right to equal treatment, such as ruling against forms of institutional racism against Romani people

    Protocol 1, Article 1: property rights, including restoration of property illegally confiscated by the state and fair compensation for expropriation

    Honours and awards

    In 2010, the court received the Freedom Medal from the Roosevelt Institute. In 2020, the Greek government nominated the court for the Nobel Peace Prize.

  • Supranational union

    A supranational union is a type of international organization and political union that is empowered to directly exercise some of the powers and functions otherwise reserved to states. A supranational organization involves a greater transfer of or limitation of state sovereignty than other kinds of international organizations.

    The European Union (EU) has been described as a paradigmatic case of a supranational organization, as it has deep political, economic and social integration, which includes a common market, joint border control, a supreme court, and regular popular elections.

    Another method of decision-making in international organisations is intergovernmentalism, in which state governments play a more prominent role.

    Origin as a legal concept

    After the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Albert Einstein spoke and wrote frequently in the late 1940s in favour of a “supranational” organization to control all military forces except for local police forces, including nuclear weapons. He thought this might begin with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and grow to encompass most other nations, presenting this as the only way to avoid nuclear war. He broached the idea in the November 1945 and November 1947 articles in The Atlantic Monthly that described how the constitution of such an organization might be written. In an April 1948 address at Carnegie Hall, he reiterated: “There is only one path to peace and security: the path of supranational organization.” Thanks to his celebrity, Einstein’s ideas on the subject generated much discussion and controversy, but the proposal did not generate much support in the West and the Soviet Union viewed it with hostility.

    With its founding Statute of 1949 and its Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which came into force in 1953, the Council of Europe created a system based on human rights and the rule of law. Robert Schuman, French foreign minister, initiated the debate on supranational democracy in his speeches at the United Nations, at the signing of the council’s Statutes and at a series of other speeches across Europe and North America.

    The term “supranational” occurs in an international treaty for the first time (twice) in the Treaty of Paris, 18 April 1951. This new legal term defined the community method in creating the European Coal and Steel Community and the beginning of the democratic re-organisation of Europe. It defines the relationship between the High Authority or European Commission and the other four institutions. In the treaty, it relates to a new democratic and legal concept.

    The Founding Fathers of the European Community and the present European Union said that supranationalism was the cornerstone of the governmental system. This is enshrined in the Europe Declaration made on 18 April 1951, the same day as the European Founding Fathers signed the Treaty of Paris.

    “By the signature of this Treaty, the participating Parties give proof of their determination to create the first supranational institution and that thus they are laying the true foundation of an organised Europe. This Europe remains open to all nations. We profoundly hope that other nations will join us in our common endeavour.”

    This declaration of principles that included their judgement for the necessary future developments was signed by Konrad Adenauer (West Germany), Paul van Zeeland and Joseph Meurice (Belgium), Robert Schuman (France), Count Sforza (Italy), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), and Dirk Stikker and Jan van den Brink (The Netherlands). It was made to recall future generations to their historic duty of uniting Europe based on liberty and democracy under the rule of law. Thus, they viewed the creation of a wider and deeper Europe as intimately bound to the healthy development of the supranational or Community system.

    This Europe was open to all nations who were free to decide, a reference/or an invitation and encouragement of liberty to the Iron Curtain countries. The term supranational does not occur in succeeding treaties, such as the Treaties of Rome, the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Nice or the Constitutional Treaty or the very similar Treaty of Lisbon.

    Distinguishing features of a supranational union

    A supranational union is a supranational polity which lies somewhere between a confederation that is an association of sovereign states and a federation that is a single sovereign state. The European Economic Community was described by its founder Robert Schuman as midway between confederalism which recognises the complete independence of states in an association and federalism which seeks to fuse them in a super-state. The EU has supranational competences, but it possesses these competences only to the extent that they are conferred on it by its member states (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Within the scope of these competences, the union exercises its powers in a sovereign manner, having its own legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. The supranational Community also has a chamber for organised civil society including economic and social associations and regional bodies.

    The union has legal supremacy over its member states only to the extent that its member state governments have conferred competences on the union. It is up to the individual governments to assure that they have full democratic backing in each of the member states. The citizens of the member states, though retaining their nationality and national citizenship, additionally become citizens of the union, as is the case with the European Union.

    The European Union, the only clear example of a supranational union, has a parliament with legislative oversight, elected by its citizens. To this extent, a supranational union like the European Union has characteristics that are not entirely dissimilar to the characteristics of a federal state like the United States of America. However, the differences in scale become apparent if one compares the United States federal budget with the budget of the European Union (which amounts only to about one percent of combined GDP) or the size of the federal civil service of the United States with the Civil Service of the European Union.

    Supranationalism in the European Union

    Historically the concept was introduced and made a concrete reality by Robert Schuman when the French Government agreed to the principle in the Schuman Declaration and accepted the Schuman Plan confined to specific sectors of vital interest of peace and war. Thus commenced the European Community system beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community. The six founder States (France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) agreed on the goal: making “war not only unthinkable but materially impossible”. They agreed about the means: putting the vital interests, namely coal and steel production, under a common High Authority, subject to common democratic and legal institutions. They agreed on the European rule of law and a new democratic procedure.

    The five institutions (besides the High Authority) were a Consultative Committee (a chamber representing civil society interests of enterprises, workers and consumers), a parliament, and a Council of government ministers. A Court of Justice would decide disputes coming from governments, public or private enterprises, consumer groups, any other group interests or even an individual. A complaint could be lodged in a local tribunal or national courts, where appropriate. Member states have yet to fulfil and develop the articles in the Paris and Rome treaties for full democracy in the European Parliament and other institutions such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions.

    Schuman described supranational unions as a new stage in human development. It contrasted with destructive nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that began in a glorious patriotism and ended in wars. He traced the beginning concept of supranationality back to the nineteenth century, such as the Postal Union, and the term supranational is used around the time of the First World War. Democracy, which he defined as “in the service of the people and acting in agreement with it”, was a fundamental part of a supranational community. However, governments only began to hold direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and then not according to the treaties. A single electoral statute was specified in the treaty for Europe’s first community of coal and steel in 1951. Civil society (largely non-political) was to have its own elected chamber in the Consultative Committees specific to each Community as democratically agreed, but the process was frozen (as were Europe’s parliamentary elections) by Charles de Gaulle and other politicians who opposed the Community method.

    Today supranationalism only exists in the two European Communities inside the EU: the Economic Community (often called the European Community although it does not legally cover all State activities) and Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community, a non-proliferation community, in which certain potentialities have been frozen or blocked). Supranational Communities provide powerful but generally unexploited and innovatory means for democratic foreign policy, by mobilising civil society to the democratically agreed goals of the Community.

    The first Community of Coal and Steel was agreed only for fifty years. Opposition, mainly by enterprises which had to pay a small European tax of less than 1% and government ministers in the council, led to its democratic mandate not being renewed. Its jurisprudence and heritage remains part of the European Community system.

    De Gaulle attempted to turn the European Commission into a political secretariat under his control in the Fouchet Plan but this move was thwarted by such democrats in the Benelux countries as Paul-Henri Spaak, Joseph Luns and Joseph Bech as well as a large wave of other pro-Europeans in all the Community countries.

    The supranational Community method came under attack, not only from de Gaulle but also from other nationalists and Communists. In the post-de Gaulle period, rather than holding pan-European elections under a single statute as specified in all the treaties, governments held and continue to hold separate national elections for the European Parliament. These often favour the major parties and discriminate against smaller, regional parties. Rather than granting elections to organised civil society in the consultative committees, governments created a three-pillar system under the Amsterdam Treaty and Maastricht Treaty, mixing intergovernmental and supranational systems. Two pillars governing External policy and Justice and Home affairs are not subject to the same democratic controls as the Community system.

    In the Lisbon Treaty and the earlier nearly identical Constitutional Treaty, the democratic independence of the five key institutions is further blurred. This moves the project from full democratic supranationalism in the direction of not just intergovernmentalism but the politicisation of the institutions, and control by two or three major party political organisations. The Commission defines key legal aspects of the supranational system because its members must be independent of commercial, labour, consumer, political or lobby interests (Article 9 of the Paris Treaty). The commission was to be composed of a small number of experienced personalities, whose impartiality was beyond question. As such, the early presidents of the Commission and the High Authority were strong defenders of European democracy against national, autocratic practice or the rule of the strong over the weak.

    The idea in the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties is to run the European Commission as a political office. Governments would prefer to have a national member in the commission, although this is against the principle of supranational democracy. (The original concept was that the commission should act as a single impartial college of independent, experienced personalities having public confidence. One of the Communities was defined in the treaty with a Commission with fewer members than the number of its member states.) Thus, the members of the commission are becoming predominantly party-political, and composed of sometimes rejected, disgraced or unwanted national politicians.

    The first president of the High Authority was Jean Monnet, who never joined a political party, as was the case with most of the other members of the Commissions. They came from diverse liberal professions, having made recognised European contributions.

    Governments also wish to retain the secrecy of their deliberations in the Council of Ministers or the European Council, which discusses matters of the most vital interest to European citizens. While some institutions such as the European Parliament have their debates open to the public, others such as the Council of Ministers and numerous committees are not. Schuman wrote in his book, Pour l’Europe (For Europe), that in a democratic supranational Community “the Councils, committees and other organs should be placed under the control of public opinion that was effectual without paralysing their activity nor useful initiatives”.

    Categorising European supranationalism

    Joseph H. H. Weiler, in his work The Dual Character of Supranationalism, states that there are two main facets to European supranationalism, although these seem to be true of many supranational systems. These are:

    Normative supranationalism: The Relationships and hierarchy which exist between Community policies and legal measures on one hand and the competing policies and legal measures of the member states on the other (the executive dimension)
    Decisional supranationalism: The institutional framework and decision making by which such measures are initiated, debated, formulated, promulgated and, finally, executed (the legislative-judicial dimension)
    In many ways, the split sees the separation of powers confined to merely two branches.

    Comparing the European Union and the United States

    In the Lisbon Treaty, the distribution of competences in various policy areas between member states and the European Union is redistributed in three categories. In 19th century US, it had exclusive competences only. Competences not explicitly listed belong to lower levels of governance.

    EU exclusive competenceEU shared competenceEU supporting competenceUS exclusive competence
    The Union has exclusive competence to make directives and conclude international agreements when provided for in a Union legislative act.Member states cannot exercise competence in areas where the Union has done so.The Union can carry out actions to support, co-ordinate or supplement member states’ actions.U.S. federal government in the 19th century.
    the customs unionthe establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal marketmonetary policy for the member states whose currency is the eurothe conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policycommon commercial (trade) policythe internal marketsocial policy, for the aspects defined in this Treatyeconomic, social and territorial cohesionagriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resourcesenvironmentconsumer protectiontransporttrans-European Networksenergythe area of freedom, security and justicecommon safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty Common Foreign and Security Policythe protection and improvement of human healthindustryculturetourismeducation, youth, sport and vocational trainingcivil protection (disaster prevention)administrative cooperationInternal improvementsSubsidies (mainly to shipping)Tariff Disposal of public lands immigration law Foreign policy Copyrights Patents Currency












    Democratic deficit in the EU and other supranational unions

    In a supranational union, the problem of how to reconcile the principle of equality among nation states, which applies to international (intergovernmental) organisations, and the principle of equality among citizens, which applies within nation states is resolved by taking a sectoral approach. This allows an innovatory, democratic broadening the number of actors to be included. These are present not only in the classical Parliament which has slightly different functions but also in the Consultative Committees such as the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions which the treaties give powers equivalent to parliaments in their own areas but which are at present still developing their potential. In the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty mixes two principles (classical parliamentary government with a politically elected government) and a supranational community with an independent European Commission.

    Governments are also trying to treat the Lisbon Treaty as a simple classical treaty, or even an amendment to one, which does not require citizens’ support or democratic approval. The proposed Lisbon Treaty and the earlier Constitutional draft still retain in the European Union elements of a supranational union, as distinct from a federal state on the lines of the United States of America. But this is at the expense of the democratic potentialities of a full supranational union as conceived in the first Community.

    Other international organisations with some degree of integration

    The only union generally recognised as having achieved the status of a supranational union is the European Union.

    Although the Soviet Union was created under an initial ideological appearance of forming a supranational union, it never de facto functioned as one, and constitutionally was a federation; see Republics of the Soviet Union § Constitutional status for details.

    There are a number of other regional organisations that, while not supranational unions, have adopted or intend to adopt policies that may lead to a similar sort of integration in some respects.

    African Union (AU)

    Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
    Benelux, a political union of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Though part of the EU, EU treaties contain an exception that EU law does not preclude further Benelux integration.

    Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

    Central American Integration System (SICA)

    Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a successor organization to the Soviet Union

    Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations
    Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Gulf
    Cooperation council) (GCC)

    Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)

    Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

    Group of 77 (G77) is a coalition of 134 developing countries, designed to promote its members’ collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. It was founded by non-aligned states during the Cold War.

    Organization of Ibero-American States (OEI)

    Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

    Organization of Turkic States

    Pacific Alliance, a Latin American trade bloc

    South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

    Union of South American Nations (USAN)

    Union State, a union of Russian Federation and Belarus
    Other organisations that have also discussed greater integration include:

    Arab League into an “Arab Union”

    Pacific Islands Forum into the “Pacific Union”

    Eurasian Customs Union into the “Eurasian Economic Union”

    Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) into the “Latin American Union”

    East African Community into the “East African Federation”

    Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC)

    Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

  • Municipal law

    Municipal law is the national, domestic, or internal law of a sovereign state and is defined in opposition to international law. It encompasses the laws enacted by national, state, or local governments and is concerned with regulating the behavior of individuals, corporations, and entities within the country. Municipal law includes various branches such as criminal law, private law, administrative law, and constitutional law. It is enforced by domestic courts and administrative bodies.

    Municipal law is tailored to the unique needs, values, and circumstances of the specific political entity it governs. For instance, traffic regulations, criminal codes, and property laws are all examples of municipal laws that vary from one country to another.

    Key differences between municipal and international law
    Scope and jurisdiction: Municipal law applies within a specific country, while international law applies to relations between states and international entities.


    Sources of law: Municipal law is derived from a country’s constitution, statutes, regulations, and case law. International law is based on treaties, international agreements, and customary international law.


    Enforcement: Municipal law is enforced by domestic legal and administrative institutions. International law relies on international bodies, diplomatic efforts, and mutual consent for enforcement.

    Focus: Municipal law addresses internal matters of a state, including criminal justice, civil disputes, and regulatory issues. International law deals with issues such as diplomatic relations, trade agreements, and global security.


    Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties from 1969 provides that if a treaty conflicts with a state’s municipal law (including the state’s constitution), the state is still obliged to meet its obligations under the treaty. The only exception is provided by Article 46 of the Vienna Convention if a state’s expression of consent to be bound by a treaty was a manifest violation of a “rule of its internal law of fundamental importance”.

  • Monism and dualism in international law

    The terms monism and dualism are used to describe two different theories of the relationship between international law and domestic law. Monism and dualism both offer approaches to how international law comes into effect within states, and how conflicts between national and international law are resolved. In practice, many states are partly monist and partly dualist in their actual application of international law in their national systems.

    Monism

    Monists accept that the internal and international legal systems form a unity. Both national legal rules and international rules that a state has accepted, for example by way of a treaty, determine whether actions are legal or illegal. In most so-called “monist” states, a distinction between international law in the form of treaties, and other international law, e.g., customary international law or jus cogens, is made; such states may thus be partly monist and partly dualist.

    In a pure monist state, international law does not need to be translated into national law. It is simply incorporated and has effect automatically in national or domestic laws. The act of ratifying an international treaty immediately incorporates the law into national law; and customary international law is treated as part of national law as well. International law can be directly applied by a national judge, and can be directly invoked by citizens, just as if it were national law. A judge can declare a national rule invalid if it contradicts international rules because, in some states, international rules have priority. In other states, like in Germany, treaties have the same effect as legislation, and by the principle of Lex posterior derogat priori (“Later law removes the earlier”), only take precedence over national legislation enacted prior to their ratification.

    In its most pure form, monism dictates that national law that contradicts international law is null and void, even if it post-dates international law, and even if it is constitutional in nature. From a human rights point of view, for example, this has some advantages. For example, a country has accepted a human rights treaty, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but some of its national laws limit the freedom of the press. A citizen of that country, who is being prosecuted by his state for violating this national law, can invoke the human rights treaty in a national courtroom and can ask the judge to apply this treaty and to decide that the national law is invalid. They do not have to wait for national law that translates international law.

    “So when someone in The Netherlands feels his human rights are being violated he can go to a Dutch judge and the judge must apply the law of the Convention. He must apply international law even if it is not in conformity with Dutch law”.

    Dualism

    Dualists emphasize the difference between national and international law, and require the transposition of the latter into the former. Without this translation, international law does not exist as law. International law has to be national law as well, or it is no law at all. If a state accepts a treaty but does not adapt its national law in order to conform to the treaty or does not create a national law explicitly incorporating the treaty, then it violates international law. But one cannot claim that the treaty has become part of national law. Citizens cannot rely on it and judges cannot apply it. National laws that contradict it remain in force. According to dualists, national judges never apply international law, only international law that has been translated into national law.

    “International law as such can confer no right cognizable in the municipal courts. It is only insofar as the rules of international law are recognized as included in the rules of municipal law that they are allowed in municipal courts to give rise to rights and obligations”.

    In dualist systems, the supremacy of international law is not a rule. Domestic courts cannot apply international laws unless they have been incorporated or transformed into domestic laws. However, the international court does not permit the invocation of contrary domestic laws as a defence. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht pointed out, the International Court’s determination to discourage the evasion of international obligations, and its repeated affirmation of:

    the self-evident principle of international law that a State cannot invoke its municipal law as the reason for the non-fulfillment of its international obligations.

    If international law is not directly applicable, as is the case in dualist systems, then it must be translated into national law, and existing national law that contradicts international law must be “translated away”. It must be modified or eliminated in order to conform to international law.

    Again, from a human rights point of view, if a human rights treaty is accepted for purely political reasons, and states do not intend to fully translate it into national law or to take a monist view on international law, then the implementation of the treaty is very uncertain.

    The problem of lex posterior

    In dualist systems, international law must be translated into national law, and existing national law that contradicts international law must be “translated away”. It must be modified or eliminated in order to conform to international law. However, the need for translation in dualist system causes a problem with regard to national laws voted after the act of translation. In a monist system, a national law that is voted after an international law has been accepted and that contradicts the international law, becomes automatically null and void at the moment it is voted. The international rule continues to prevail. In a dualist system, however, the original international law has been translated into national law – if all went well – but this national law can then be overridden by another national law on the principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori, the later law replaces the earlier one. This means that the country – willingly or unwillingly – violates international law. A dualist system requires continuous screening of all subsequent national law for possible incompatibility with earlier international law.

    Examples

    In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the dualist view is predominant. International law is only part of British national law once it is accepted in national law. A treaty “has no effect in municipal law until an Act of Parliament is passed to give effect to it.”

    In other countries this distinction tends to be blurred.

    In the vast majority of democratic countries outside the Commonwealth, the legislature, or part of the legislature, participates in the process of ratification, so that ratification becomes a legislative act, and the treaty becomes effective in international law and in municipal law simultaneously. For instance, the Constitution of the United States provides that the President “shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur” (Article II (2)). Treaties ratified in accordance with the Constitution automatically become part of the municipal law of the United States.

    The United States has a “mixed” monist-dualist system; international law applies directly in US courts in some instances but not others. The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause states that treaties are part of the supreme law of the land, as suggested by the quote above; however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Medellín v. Texas (2008), held that some treaties are not “self-executing.” Such treaties must be implemented by statute before their provisions may be given effect by national and sub-national courts. Similarly with regard to customary international law, the Supreme Court stated, in the case of The Pacquete Habana (1900), that “international law is part of our law”. However, it also said that international law would not be applied if there is a controlling legislative, executive, or judicial act to the contrary.

    A matter of national legal tradition

    International law does not determine which point of view is to be preferred, monism or dualism. Every state decides for itself, according to its legal traditions. International law only requires that its rules are respected, and states are free to decide on the manner in which they want to respect these rules and make them binding on its citizens and agencies.

    “The transformation of international norms into domestic law is not necessary from the point of view of international law… the necessity of transformation is a question of national, not of international law”.

    Both a monist state and a dualist state can comply with international law. All one can say is that a monist state is less at risk of violating international rules, because its judges can apply international law directly. Negligence or unwillingness to implement international law in national law can only pose a problem in dualist states. States are free to choose the way in which they want to respect international law, but they are always accountable if they fail to adapt their national legal system in a way that they can respect international law. Either they adopt a constitution that implements a monist system so that international law can be applied directly and without transformation, or they do not. But then they have to translate all international law in national law. In a monist state we rely only on the judges and not on the legislators, but judges can also make mistakes. If a judge in a monist state makes mistakes when applying international law, then the country violates international law just as much as a dualist country that, for one reason or another, does not allow its judges to apply international law directly and fails to translate or fails to translate correctly and effectively. One reason for preferring dualism is precisely the fear that national judges are not familiar with international law – a highly complex field of law – and hence are liable to make mistakes.

  • Legal liability

    In law, liable means “responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated”. Legal liability concerns both civil law and criminal law and can arise from various areas of law, such as contracts, torts, taxes, or fines given by government agencies. The claimant is the one who seeks to establish, or prove, liability.

    Liability in business

    In commercial law, limited liability is a method of protection included in some business formations that shields its owners from certain types of liability and that amount a given owner will be liable for. A limited liability form separates the owner(s) from the business. The limited liability form essentially acts as a corporate veil that protects owners from liabilities of the business. This means that when a business is found liable in a case, the owners are not themselves liable; rather, the business is. Thus, only the funds or property the owner(s) have invested into the business are subject to that liability. If, for example, a limited liability business goes bankrupt, then the owner(s) will not lose unrelated assets, such as a personal residence (assuming they do not give personal guarantees). Forms of businesses that offer the limited liability protection include limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations. Sole proprietorships and partnerships do not include limited liability.

    This is the standard model for larger businesses, in which a shareholders will only lose the amount invested (in the form of stock value decreasing). For an explanation, see business entity.

    There is an exception to this rule, however, which allows a claimant to litigate against the owner(s) of a limited liability business, if the owner(s) have engaged in conduct that justifies the claimant’s recovery from the owner(s): This exception is called “piercing the corporate veil.” Courts generally try not to utilize this exception unless there have been serious transgressions. Limited liability aids entrepreneurs, businesses, and the economy in growing and innovating. Therefore, if courts often chose to pierce the veil, that innovation would be restricted. The exact test a court will use to determine if the veil needs to pierced vary by state in the United States.

    For sole proprietorships and general partnerships, the liability is unlimited. Unlimited liability means that the owner(s) of the business have the full responsibility of assuming all the business’s debts. This can include seizure of personal assets in the face of bankruptcy and liquidation. Professionals in limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies will have unlimited liability for their own torts and malpractices. The limited liability of the business will no longer apply for these wrongdoings.

    For business owners, there are main categories of liability exposure to be aware of in order to protect their businesses from liability and financial troubles and issues. The first is employment-related issues where the larger the work force, and the more turnover there is, the larger the likelihood of liability lawsuits such as wrongful termination claims. Another area is accidents and/or injuries on the premises. Next, vehicle-related liability if employees are allowed to drive company cars since this could lead to accidents while they use the company cars. Product-related liability (also called manufacturer’s liability) details poor manufacturing of products that results in injuries and/or accidents, which is discussed in more detail in the following section. Errors/omissions is another category where a lawsuit can result from a mistake on the part of the company such as in a contract or paperwork. Finally, the last major category relates to holding directors and officers personally liable for actions taken by the company, as seen in piercing the corporate veil. Overall, as businesses get larger and more successful, their chances of liability lawsuits increase, but small businesses are not completely immune to them. Entrepreneurs and business owners need to be aware of these types of liability exposures to ensure their businesses are protected.

    Product liability

    Product liability governs civil lawsuits between a plaintiff and defendant who furnishes defective goods that caused loss or injury 11.

    Product liability and its prevalence in the law has changed throughout history. In the 19th century, it worked to both the manufacturers’ and other sellers’ advantages. “Caveat emptor” (“let the buyer beware”) reigned supreme in this area of the law. In this era, the seller had no liability unless they had made an express promise to the customer that was not received. The 19th century was also when the Industrial Revolution was beginning and changing the business world. In order to promote this rise in industrialization and manufacturing, the law avoided allowing damage recoveries that would weaken new industries. In the 20th and 21st centuries, there was no longer this need to protect manufacturers from liability. If anything, there was more of need to impose liability standards on industries because consumers had less power to freely bargain with corporations and other business forms. Furthermore, the complexities and intricacies of goods was increasing, making it harder for the average buyer to determine manufacturing issues when purchasing these goods. Now a new phrase dominates liability: “caveat venditor” or “let the seller beware.” The law finds that sellers and manufacturers can face more liability for defects with the help of insurance and socializing the damages by raising prices and forcing the consumer to pay for it.

    If a manufacturer is found to be negligent, that means they breached their duty to the customer by not eliminating a reasonably foreseeable risk caused by the product. The manufacturer can be seen as negligent if there are problems in the manufacturing process, do not properly inspect their products, do not give a reasonable warning to the customer when the product has a foreseeable risk of harm, and/or the design lends itself to risk of harm. The magnitude and severity of the foreseeable harm are also assessed when looking at negligence.

    Employer liability

    There is a form of liability that exists between employers and their employees. This is called vicarious liability. For it to apply, one party has responsibility for a third party, and the third party commits an unlawful action. An employer may be held liable for the actions of an employee if it is unlawful (i.e. harassment or discrimination), or the employee’s negligent actions while working causes damages to property or injury.

    Respondeat superior (“Let the superior answer”) is a legal principle that dictates when an employer is responsible for the actions of an employee. Employers should worry about this rule when the employee commits a tort or harmful act when the employee was acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the incident. The term “scope of employment” is when an employee is doing work assigned by their employer or is completing a task that is subject to the employer’s control. To test whether the conduct that led to the incident is within the scope of employment, one must determine:

    If it was the type of task the employee was employed to perform
    It occurred flexibly within the authorized work time period
    The incident was not unreasonably far away from the employer authorized location
    The incident was motivated, at least in part, for the purpose of serving the employer

    If these four factors are found to be true, the employer will have to answer for the tort. The reasoning behind this legal principle is because it is thought that the employer is best suited for bearing the financial burden, employers can protect themselves against this burden with insurance, and the cost can be passed to customers by raising prices. On the other hand, if the employee was found to have either detoured or frolicked then defining the scope of employment becomes trickier. The rule of frolic and detour changes how the liability applies. A frolic is when the employee causes a tort when completing an activity that is unrelated to their job. If it is found that the employee had frolicked, the employee would then be liable for damages. For example, if a delivery driver does not complete his deliveries for a few hours so he can do some personal shopping, and on his way to the store, he hits a pedestrian. A detour is more minor. The employee is still participating in a non-work related activity, but the activity is not a major disregard for work duties. An example of a detour would be if on the way to deliver a package, a delivery driver stops at a drive-thru to grab something to eat. When pulling away from the restaurant to continue with deliveries, the driver hits a pedestrian. Here, the employer could still be liable for these damages because the detour was minor.

    An employer can also be liable for a legal principle called negligent hiring. This happens when in the process of hiring a new employee, the employer does not check criminal pasts, backgrounds, or references to ensure the applicant did not pose a potential danger if hired as an employee. Under a similar principle of negligent retention, an employer may face liability if they know that a worker poses a potential danger to others but maintains their employment. To avoid claims of negligent hiring or retention, employers should take appropriate measures to avoid hiring employees who will pose a danger to members of the public, and take appropriate measures in response to any concerns that come to their attention, up to and including dismissal. Employers who serve vulnerable populations, such as young children and the elderly, go to customers’ homes, or have access to weapons may perform criminal background checks as their default practice, and may have additional legal duties when it comes to screening, supervising and disciplining employees.

    It is important for employers to note whether someone working for them is an independent contractor or an employee. An employee is someone who is a paid worker for the employer. An independent contractor, on the other hand, contracts with a principal to produce a result and in the process, gets to determine how that result will be completed. The difference lies in how much control the principal/employer can wield on the agent. Employees are subjected to more control while nonemployee agents, like independent contractors, have more freedom in how they do their job. A principal is not ordinarily liable for torts committed by nonemployee agents since the principal does not fully control the method of work done. However, there are exceptions to this. There can be direct liability if the principal hired an incompetent agent, if harm resulted from nonemployee agent’s failure to perform a duty of care that the principal bestowed on them (a duty of care is an action whose successful performance is so important that if it is delegated to an agent and not accomplished, the principal is still liable), and a principal is liable if the nonemployee agent did not take the correct precautions required to complete very dangerous activities.

    An employer should also be aware on how the extent of their liability can change based on the agreements their agents make. An agent is a person who has the power to act on behalf of another party (typically the principal). Usually, a principal is liable for a contract made by the agent if the agent had actual or apparent authority to make the contract. Actual authority is the ability an agent has to pursue and complete certain activities based on communication and manifestations from the principal. Express authority is when the principal clearly states what the agent has the authority to do while implied authority is based on what is reasonable to assume that the agent is allowed to do based on what the principal wants of the agent. Express and implied authority are both types of actual authority. The second type of authority is apparent authority. This occurs when a principal’s actions lead a third party to reasonably assume that the agent can act in a certain way and create contracts with the third party on behalf of the principal. To determine if an agent is liable for a contract, one must look at the type of principal. There are four types of principals. A disclosed principal is known to the third party, and the third party knows that the agent is acting for this principal. The agent is not liable on authorized contracts made for a disclosed principal since all parties are aware of the contract and who is participating in the contract. An unidentified principal is seen when the third party knows the agent is acting for a principal but lacks knowledge on the principal’s identity. The agent is typically liable for contracts made for an unidentified principal. An undisclosed principal is seen when the third party does not know the principal’s existence and identity and reasonably believes the agent is the other party in the contract. In this instance, the agent can be held liable for the contract. A nonexistent principal refers to when an agent knowingly acts for principal that does not exist, such as an unincorporated association. The agent is liable here if they knew the principal had no capacity to take part in the contract even if the third party knows that the principal does not exist. An agent can also bind themselves to contracts by expressly agreeing to be liable. To avoid this, agents should make no express promises in their own name and should make sure the contract only obligates the principal. An agent may also be liable to a third party if they lack the authority to contract for a principal. The agent may escape liability in this scenario if the third party knows the agent lacks authority, the principal ratifies/affirms the contract, or the agent notifies the third party of his lack of authority.

    Additional concepts

    Economists use the term “legal liability” to describe the legal-bound obligation to pay debts.

  • Comity

    In law, comity is “a principle or practice among political entities such as countries, states, or courts of different jurisdictions, whereby legislative, executive, and judicial acts are mutually recognized.” It is an informal and non-mandatory courtesy to which a court of one jurisdiction affords to the court of another jurisdiction when determining questions where the law or interests of another country are involved. Comity is founded on the concept of sovereign equality among states and is expected to be reciprocal.

    Etymology

    The term comity was derived in the 16th century from the French comité, meaning association and from the Latin cōmitās, meaning courtesy and from cōmis, friendly, courteous.

    Comity may also be referred to as judicial comity or comity of nations.

    History of comity (thirteenth century to nineteenth century)

    The doctrine of international comity has been described variously “as a choice-of-law principle, a synonym for private international law, a rule of public international law, a moral obligation, expediency, courtesy, reciprocity, utility, or diplomacy. Authorities disagree on whether comity is a rule of natural law, custom, treaty, or domestic law. Indeed, there is not even agreement that comity is a rule of law at all.” Because the doctrine touches on many different principles, it is regarded as “one of the more confusing doctrines evoked in cases touching upon the interests of foreign states.” The principle of comity has been questioned and even rejected by many scholars throughout the years; however, the use of the term remains present in case law.

    European jurists have been wrestling with the decision to apply foreign law since the thirteenth century. As the popularity of commerce outside of the locality grew, the need to find a new way to resolve conflicts of law issues arose. The preexisting system known as statutism became too complex and arbitrary to keep up with the societal values of the time.

    A group of Dutch jurists created the doctrine of international comity in the late seventeenth century, most prominently Ulrich Huber. Huber and others sought a way to handle conflicts of law more pragmatically to reinforce the idea of sovereign independence. At the core of his ideas surrounding comity was the respect of one sovereign nation to another. Huber wrote that comitas gentium (“civility of nations”) required the application of foreign law in certain cases because sovereigns “so act by way of comity that rights acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause prejudice to the powers or rights of such government or of their subjects.” Huber “believed that comity was a principle of international law” but also that “the decision to apply foreign law itself was left up to the state as an act of free will.”

    Huber did not believe comity was a stand-alone principle but rather saw it as a basis for building concrete rules and doctrines of law. At the time of its inception in the common law, comity was an attractive principle as the United States and England were in search for a foundational principle by which they could build conflicts of law rules.

    A century after Huber, Lord Mansfield, known for being Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in England for three decades, introduced the doctrine of comity to the English law. Lord Mansfield viewed the application of comity as discretionary, with courts applying foreign law “except to the extent that it conflicted with principles of natural justice or public policy.” He demonstrated this principle in Somerset v Stewart (King’s Bench 1772), which held that slavery was so morally odious that a British court would not recognize the property rights of an American slaveholder in his slave out of comity. English courts and scholars adopted Lord Mansfield ideas on comity and provides a new means for courts to recognize foreign law where the application of English law would lead to injustices.

    Comity was most famously introduced to the American common law by the American jurist Justice Joseph Story in the early nineteenth century. Much like Huber, Story sought to develop a new system of private international law that reflected the new commercial needs of the United States. Similar to Lord Mansfield, Story stressed the importance of justice in comity and that comity is a stand-alone principle that derives from mutual benefit. Story’s view, which ultimately prevailed, was that the consensual or voluntary application of comity doctrine would foster trust among states, “localize the effect of slavery,” and reduce the risk of civil war.

    In the mid-nineteenth century, John Westlake advanced further the idea that States ought to act with comity for reasons of justice in his Treatise on Private International Law. Westlake is praised for adopting Huber’s comity in the English law; he rejected Story’s approach. Westlake states that conflict rules are an instance of domestic sovereignty and therefore, the duty to recognize foreign law must be found as a reason within English law itself.

    Modern approaches to comity by legal system

    United States

    In the law of the United States, the Comity Clause is another term for the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Article Four of the United States Constitution, which provides that “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Article Four as a whole—which includes the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Extradition Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause—has been described as the “interstate comity” article of the Constitution.

    In the case of Bank of Agusta v Earl, the court adopted Justice Joseph Story’s doctrine of comity. At the end of the ninetieth century, the US Supreme Court delivered the classic statement on comity in the decision of Hilton v. Guyot (1895). The court stated that the enforcement of a foreign judgment was a matter of comity is viewed as the “classic” statement of comity in international law. The Court held in that case:

    “Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.

    This case continues to be the leading case cited by American courts when articulating the doctrine of comity. It is an important decision for the country as it articulates the definition of comity and does so in a more broad way than previously. Despite the broad definition in Hilton v Guyot, the court refused to enforce the French judgment based on reciprocity, as France would not have enforced an equivalent judgment. This decision differed from Justice Joseph Story’s idea of comity as his idea of comity was concerned with sovereign interests and was rather concerned with reciprocity.

    The United States faced significant advancement in its global standing as a military and economic power after the Second World War, and this transformed the principle of comity into something that more closely resembled an obligation to apply foreign law. After the Cold War, the Supreme Court heard the case of Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California. In this case, Justice Souter gave the opinion that one only considers comity where there is a “true conflict between domestic and foreign law”. In the dissent, Justice Scalia argues that extraterritorial jurisdiction must consider international comity to ensure international law is not violated. More than ten years later, the Supreme Court heard the decision of F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v Empagran, S.A. where Justice Kennedy writing for the majority adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent.

    In the United States, certain foreign defamation judgments are not recognized under the SPEECH Act (a federal statute enacted in 2010), which supersedes the comity doctrine. The Act aims to stop “libel tourism.”

    Professional Licensure

    In the United States, some states and territories recognize professional engineer licenses granted in a different jurisdiction, depending on the holder’s education and experience (a practice called “licensure by comity”). Rules differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

    England and Wales

    By the end of the nineteenth century, comity had received judicial approval in English law as a foundational principle to private international law. In 1896, Professor Dicey published “Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws” that criticized the doctrine of comity on the basis that it is too vague as it promoted the recognition of foreign laws depending on option.

    Despite the debate on the role of the principle of comity in academia, the Supreme Court and the House of Lords have recognized the role of comity in England and Wales. However, the courts have yet to adopt a precise definition of comity. The case law indicates that comity is relevant in the consideration of determining what effect another state’s laws or judicial power should have in England in a given case.

    Canada (excluding Quebec)

    Unlike the United States of America and Australia, the principle of comity or Full Faith and Credit of recognizing judgments across the country is not recognized in the Canadian constitution or other authoritative bases. However, beginning in the 1990s the courts started to discuss the principle of comity as it relates interprovincially and internationally in a series of cases and adopted the principle of comity as a critical feature underlying Canadian private international law.

    Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye was the first case in this series considering comity in Canadian law. The common law reflected the principle from England that one of the basic tenets of international law is that sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction in their territory. Therefore, before this decision, Canadian courts were conservative in recognizing foreign judgments, including those obtained in other Canadian provinces’ courts. Justice La Forest acknowledges that the common law approach is not grounded in the realities of modern times as states cannot live in complete isolation due to travel, flow of wealth, skills and people. Especially interprovincially, the Canadian Constitution was created to form a single country; therefore, there is no foundation for differential quality of justice in the Canadian judicial structure. In response to modern-day values, Justice LaForest notes the Supreme Court of the United States’ approach to comity in Hilton v Guyot and explains that comity is a necessary principle to ensure order and fairness in modern-day transactions. Still, it is not a matter of absolute obligation but rather a voluntary matter based on common interests. Comity is not only based on respect for foreign sovereignty but also convenience and necessity, and the court held that the principle of comity called for a more liberal approach to foreign judgments. The court chose to revise the common law test and enforce a judgment with a “real and substantial connection” between the action or damages suffered and the adjudicating jurisdiction. This decision had important implications for both interprovincial and international litigations as Canadian courts began to engage with the comity in judgment enforcement.

    The following case addressing comity was Hunt v T&N; the court elaborated on their decision in Morguard by stating that comity is “grounded in notions of order and fairness to participants”. Hunt v T&N is not about enforcement of judgment but rather about the constitutional validity of provincial legislation and its effect on another province’s legislation to the proceeding before it. In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada rewrote the rules on the extraterritorial effects of provincial legislation. These extraterritorial effects of provincial legislation will be assessed according to the principle of comity.

    In the case of Tolofson v Jensen, the court answers the question of which law should govern in tort when the interest of more than one jurisdiction is involved. The court determines that the law of where the tort occurred should apply, this is known as lex loci delicti. Justice La Forest clearly reaffirmed the importance of comity in private international law in the decision. The court states that the choice of law is where the tort occurred for reasons of comity, order and fairness. The court states that international comity helps ensure “harmony” in the face of potential conflicts of law.

    Australia

    The Australian Constitution recognizes that the Full Faith and Credit should be afforded to all common law countries:

    “Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of any State.”

    In case law, the High Court of Australia has never defined the meaning of comity in Australian law. However, the High Court has adopted and approved the definition of comity from the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v Guyot, with the first reference to it being in 1999 in the decision of Lipohar v The Queen. Comity has played an important role in the development and application of Australian private law. It has been used by courts most frequently in navigating sovereign sensitivities and economic realities.

    European Union

    The Brussels 1 Regulation requires that the judgment of the court of one member states of the European Union (absence non-consenting defendants) shall be enforced by the court of another member state.

  • Customary international law

    Customary international law consists of international legal obligations arising from established or usual international practices, which are less formal customary expectations of behavior often unwritten as opposed to formal written treaties or conventions. Along with general principles of law and treaties, custom is considered by the International Court of Justice, jurists, the United Nations, and its member states to be among the primary sources of international law.

    Many governments accept in principle the existence of customary international law, although there are differing opinions as to what rules are contained in it. A rule becomes customary international if two requirements are met:

    (1) There is a state practice that “appears to be sufficiently widespread, representative as well as consistent” showing that a significant number of states have used and relied on the rule in question and the concept has not been rejected by a significant number of states,

    (2) states were motivated by a belief that they were legally compelled to accept the legitimacy of the rule in question because customary international law obligated them to do so (opinio juris).

    In 1950, the International Law Commission listed the following sources as forms of evidence of customary international law: treaties, decisions of national and international courts, national legislation, opinions of national legal advisors, diplomatic correspondence, and practice of international organizations. In 2018, the Commission adopted Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law with commentaries. The United Nations General Assembly welcomed the Conclusions and encouraged their widest possible dissemination.

    The International Court of Justice Statute defines customary international law in Article 38(1)(b) as “a general practice accepted as law”. This is generally determined through two factors: the general practice of states, and what states have accepted as law (opinio juris sive necessitatis). This means that many states need to engage in the practice (in particular, great powers) and that states engage in the practice out of a sense of legal obligation (rather than custom or habit).

    There are several kinds of customary international laws recognized by states. Some customary international laws rise to the level of jus cogens through acceptance by the international community as non-derogable rights, while other customary international law may simply be followed by a small group of states. States are typically bound by customary international law, regardless of whether the states have codified these laws domestically or through treaties.

    Jus cogens

    A peremptory norm (also called jus cogens, Latin for “compelling law”) is a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a non-derogable norm. These norms are rooted in natural law principles, and any laws conflicting with it should be considered null and void. Examples include various international crimes; a state violates customary international law if it permits or engages in slavery, torture, genocide, war of aggression, or crimes against humanity.

    Jus cogens and customary international law are not interchangeable. All jus cogens are customary international law through their adoption by states, but not all customary international laws rise to the level of peremptory norms. States can deviate from customary international law by enacting treaties and conflicting laws, but jus cogens are non-derogable.

    Codification

    Some international customary laws have been codified through treaties and domestic laws, while others are recognized only as customary law.

    The laws of war, also known as jus in bello, were long a matter of customary law before they were codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Conventions, and other treaties. However, these conventions do not purport to govern all legal matters that may arise during war. Instead, Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I dictates that customary international law governs legal matters concerning armed conflict not covered by other agreements.

    Silence as consent

    Generally, sovereign nations must consent in order to be bound by a particular treaty or legal norm. However, international customary laws are norms that have become pervasive enough internationally that countries need not consent in order to be bound. In these cases, all that is needed is that the state has not objected to the law. However, states that object to customary international law may not be bound by them unless these laws are deemed to be jus cogens. However, in a dispute with any nation that has not affirmed the “silence implies consent” principle, any invocation of the “silence implies consent” principle involves an appeal to custom, such that if that nation does not espouse the broader premise of acknowledging the existence of customary international law, such an appeal will depend on circular reasoning (“customary international law is binding because silence implies consent, and silence implies consent because the fact that silence implies consent is one aspect of customary international law”).

    The International Court of Justice

    The Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges the existence of customary international law in Article 38(1)(b), incorporated into the United Nations Charter by Article 92: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such as disputes that are submitted to it, shall apply … international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”

    Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has recognized International Custom as evidence of general practice accepted as law. Thus, general practice demonstrates custom, and not vice versa. In order to prove the existence of customary rule, it is necessary to show that there exists a ‘general practice’ which conforms to the rule and which is accepted as law.

    Customary international law “consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way”. It follows that customary international law can be discerned by a “widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (state practice); Acts must occur out of sense of obligation (opinio juris); Acts must be taken by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a significant number of States.” A marker of customary international law is consensus among states exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation.

    The two essential elements of customary international law are state practice and opinio juris, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.

    In relation to the psychological element that is opinio juris, the International Court of Justice further held in North Sea Continental Shelf that “not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it … The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.” The Court emphasised the need to prove a “sense of legal duty” as distinct from “acts motivated by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition”. This was subsequently confirmed in Nicaragua v. United States of America.

    Bilateral vs. multilateral

    The recognition of different customary laws can range from simple bilateral recognition of customary laws to worldwide multilateral recognition. Regional customs can become customary international law in their respective regions, but do not become customary international law for nations outside the region. The existence of bilateral customary law was recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory case between Portugal and India, in which the court found “no reason why long continued practice between the two states accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two states”.

    Other examples

    Other examples accepted or claimed as customary international law include immunity of visiting foreign heads of state and the principle of non-refoulement. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted the Geneva Conventions as customary international law.

    If any treaty or law has been called as customary international law, then parties which have not ratified said treaty will be bound to observe its provisions in good faith.